




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
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Encounter

DECEMBER 1980

VOL. LV No. 6

ISSN 0013-7073

Edited by **MELVIN J. LASKY** and **ANTHONY THWAITE**

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Per copy: UK £1.00: USA & Canada \$2.50. Back numbers £1.50 (\$3.75). Postage/packing: 30p (70c).

Annual Subscriptions: UK £12.00: USA & Canada \$28.00 surface, \$35.00 by air: Elsewhere £13.00.

Binder for six copies £3.25 (\$7.30).

Address for all departments: Encounter Ltd., 59 St Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS (01-836 4194).

US news-stand distribution by Gordon & Gotch (USA) Inc., P.O. Box 1425, Long Island City, N.Y. 11101.

Authorised as Second-class mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa, and for payment of postage in cash.

Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. © 1980 by Encounter Ltd.

Manuscripts are returned only if accompanied by s.a.e. (English stamp or International Reply Coupons).

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The Teddy-Bears' Picnic

“I SIMPLY don’t believe it”, Edwin said.
“Grown-up people?”

“Well, grown-up now, darling. We weren’t always grown up.”

“But *teddy-bears*, Deborah?”

“I’m sure I’ve told you dozens of times before.”

Edwin shook his head, frowning and staring at his wife. They’d been married six months: he was twenty-nine, swiftly making his way in a stockbroker’s office, Deborah was twenty-six and intended to continue being Mr Harridance’s secretary until a family began to come along. They lived in Wimbledon, in a block of flats called The Zodiac. 23 The Zodiac their address was and friends thought the title amusing and lively, making jokes about Gemini and Taurus and Capricorn when they came to drinks. A Dane had designed The Zodiac in 1968.

“I’ll absolutely tell you this”, Edwin said, “I’m not attending this thing.”

“But darling—”

“Oh, don’t be bloody silly, Deborah.”

Edwin’s mother had called Deborah “a pretty little thing”, implying for those who cared to be perceptive a certain reservation. She’d been more direct with Edwin himself, in a private conversation they’d had after Edwin had said he and Deborah wanted to get married. “Remember, dear”, was how Mrs Chalm had put it then, “she’s not always going to be a pretty little thing. This really isn’t a very sensible marriage, Edwin.” Mrs Chalm was known to be a woman who didn’t go in for cant when dealing with the lives of the children she had borne and brought up; she made no bones about it and often said so. Her husband, on the other hand, kept out of things.

Yet in the end Edwin and Deborah had married, one Tuesday afternoon in December,

and Mrs Chalm resolved to make the best of it. She advised Deborah about this and that, she gave her potted plants for 23 The Zodiac, and in fact was kind. If Deborah had known about her mother-in-law’s doubts she’d have been surprised.

“But we’ve always done it, Edwin. All of us.”

“All of who, for heaven’s sake?”

“Well, Angela for one. And Holly and Jeremy of course.”

“Jeremy? My God!”

“And Peter. And Enid and Charlotte and Harriett.”

“You’ve never told me a word about this, Deborah.”

“I’m really sure I have.”

The sitting-room where this argument took place had a single huge window with a distant view of Wimbledon Common. The walls were covered with rust-coloured hessian, the floor with a rust-coloured carpet. The Chalmers were still acquiring furniture: what there was, reflecting the style of The Zodiac’s architecture, was in bent steel and glass. There was a single picture, of a field of thistles, revealed to be a photograph on closer examination. Bottles of alcohol stood on a glass-topped table, their colourful labels cheering that corner up. Had the Chalmers lived in a Victorian flat, or a cottage in a mews, their sitting-room would have been different, fussier and more ornate, dictated by the architectural environment. Their choice of decor and furniture was the choice of newly-weds who hadn’t yet discovered a confidence of their own.

“You mean you all sit round with your teddies”, Edwin said, “having a picnic? And you’ll still be doing it at eighty?”

“What d’you mean, eighty?”

"When you're eighty years of age, for God's sake. You're trying to tell me you'll still be going to this garden when you're stumbling about and hard of hearing, a gang of O.A.P.'s squatting out on the grass with teddy-bears?"

"I didn't say anything about when we're old."

"You said it's a tradition, for God's sake."

He poured some whisky into a glass and added a squirt of soda from a Sparklets syphon. Normally he would have poured a gin and dry vermouth for his wife, but this evening he felt too cross to bother. He hadn't had the easiest of days. There'd been an error in the office about the B.A.T. shares a client had wished to buy, and he hadn't managed to have any lunch because as soon as the B.A.T. thing was sorted out a crisis had blown up over sugar speculation. It was almost eight o'clock when he'd got back to The Zodiac and instead of preparing a meal for him Deborah had been on the telephone to her friend Angela, talking about teddy-bears.

Edwin was an agile young man with shortish fair hair and a face that had a very slight look of a greyhound about it. He was vigorous and athletic, sound on the tennis court, fond of squash and recently of golf. His mother had once stated that Edwin could not bear to lose and would go to ruthless lengths to ensure that he never did. She had even remarked to her husband that she hoped this quality would not one day cause trouble, but her husband replied it was probably just what a stockbroker needed. Mrs Chalm had been thinking more of personal relationships, where losing couldn't be avoided. It was that she'd had on her mind when she'd had doubts about the marriage, for the doubts were not there simply because Deborah was a pretty little thing: it was the conjunction Mrs Chalm was alarmed about.

"I didn't happen to get any lunch", Edwin snappishly said now. "I've had a long unpleasant day and when I get back here—"

"I'm sorry, dear."

DEBORAH IMMEDIATELY ROSE from among the rust-coloured cushions of the sofa and went to the kitchen, where she took two pork chops from a Marks and Spencer's carrier-bag and placed them under the grill of

the electric cooker. She took a packet of frozen broccoli spears from the carrier-bag as well, and two Marks and Spencer's trifles. While typing letters that afternoon she'd planned to have fried noodles with the chops and the broccoli spears, just for a change. A week ago they'd had fried noodles in the new Mexican place they'd found and Edwin said they were lovely. Deborah had kicked off her shoes as soon as she'd come into the flat and hadn't put them on since. She was wearing a dress with scarlet petunias on it. Dark-haired, with a heart-shaped face and blue eyes that occasionally acquired a bewildered look, she seemed several years younger than twenty-six, more like eighteen.

She put on water to boil for the broccoli spears even though the chops would not be ready for some time. She prepared a saucepan of oil for the noodles, hoping that this was the way to go about frying them. She couldn't understand why Edwin was making such a fuss just because Angela had telephoned, and put it down to his not having managed to get any lunch.

In the sitting-room Edwin stood by the huge window, surveying the tops of the trees and, in the distance, Wimbledon Common. She must have been on the phone to Angela for an hour and a half, probably longer. He'd tried to ring himself to say he'd be late but each time the line had been engaged. He searched his mind carefully, going back through the three years he'd known Deborah, but no reference to a teddy-bears' picnic came to him. He'd said very positively that she had never mentioned it, but he'd said that in anger, just to make his point: reviewing their many conversations now he saw he had been right, and felt triumphant. Of course he'd have remembered such a thing, any man would.

Far down below, a car turned into the wide courtyard of The Zodiac, a Rover it looked like, a discreet shade of green. It wouldn't be all that long before they had a Rover themselves, even allowing for the fact that the children they hoped for would be coming along any time now. Edwin had not objected to Deborah continuing her work after their marriage, but their family life would naturally be much tidier when she no longer could, when the children were born. Eventually they'd have to move into a house with a garden because it was natural that Deborah would want that,

and he had no intention of disagreeing with her.

"Another thing is", he said, moving from the window to the open doorway of the kitchen, "how come you haven't had a reunion all the years I've known you? If it's an annual thing—"

"It isn't an annual thing, Edwin. We haven't had a picnic since 1975 and before that 1971. It's just when someone feels like it, I suppose. It's just a bit of fun, darling."

"You call sitting down with teddy-bears a bit of fun? Grown-up people?"

"I wish you wouldn't keep on about grown-ups. I know we're grown-ups. That's the whole point. When we were little we all vowed—"

"Jesus Christ!"

He turned and went to pour himself another drink. She'd never mentioned it because she knew it was silly. She was ashamed of it, which was something she would discover when she grew up a bit.

"You know I've got Binky", she said, following him to where the drinks were and pouring herself some gin. "I've told you hundreds of times how I took him everywhere. If you don't like him in the bedroom I'll put him away. I didn't know you didn't like him."

"I didn't say that, Deborah. It's completely different, what you're saying. It's private for a start. I mean, it's your teddy-bear and you've told me how fond you were of it. That's completely different from sitting down with a crowd of idiots—"

"They're not idiots, Edwin, actually."

"Well, they certainly don't sound like anything else. D'you mean Jeremy and Peter are going to arrive clutching teddy-bears and then sit down on the grass pretending to feed them biscuit crumbs? For God's sake, Jeremy's a medical *doctor*!"

"Actually, nobody'll sit on the grass because the grass will probably be damp. Everyone brought rugs the last time. It's really because of the garden, you know. It's probably the nicest garden in South Bucks, and then there're the Ainley-Foxletons. I mean, they do so love it all."

H E'D ACTUALLY BEEN in the garden, and he'd once actually met the Ainley-Foxletons. One Saturday afternoon during his engagement to Deborah there had been tea on

a raised lawn. Laburnum and broom were out, a mass of yellow everywhere. Quite pleasant old sticks the Ainley-Foxletons had been, but neither of them had mentioned a teddy-bears' picnic.

"I think she did as matter of fact", Deborah mildly insisted. "I remember because I said it hadn't really been so long since the last one. Eighteen months ago would it be when I took you to see them? Well, 1975 wasn't all that long before that, and she said it seemed like aeons. I remember her saying that, I remember 'aeons' and thinking it just like her to come out with a word people don't use any more."

"And you never thought to point out the famous picnic site? For hours we walked round and round that garden and yet it never occurred to you—"

"We didn't walk round and round. I'm sorry you were bored, Edwin."

"I didn't say I was bored."

"I know the Ainley-Foxletons can't hear properly and it's a strain, but you said you wanted to meet them."

"I didn't say anything of the kind. You kept telling me about these people and their house and garden, but I can assure you I wasn't crying out to meet them in any way whatsoever. In fact, I rather wanted to play tennis that afternoon."

"You didn't say so at the time."

"Of course I didn't say so."

"Well then."

"What I'm trying to get through to you is that we walked round and round that garden even though it had begun to rain. And not once did you say: 'That's where we used to have our famous teddy-bears' picnic.'"

"As a matter of fact I think I did. And it isn't famous. I wish you wouldn't keep on about it being famous."

Deborah poured herself more gin and added the same amount of dry vermouth to the glass. She considered it rude of Edwin to stalk about the room just because he'd had a bad day, drinking himself and not bothering about her. If he hadn't liked the poor old Ainley-Foxletons he should have said so. If he'd wanted to play tennis that afternoon he should have said so too.

"Well, be all that as it may", he was saying now, rather pompously in Deborah's opinion, "I do not intend to take part in any of this nonsense."

"But everybody's husband will, and the wives too. It's only fun, darling."

"Oh, do stop saying it's fun. You sound like a half-wit. And something's smelling in the kitchen."

"I don't think that's very nice, Edwin. I don't see why you should call me a half-wit."

"Listen, I've had an extremely unpleasant day."

"Oh, do stop about your stupid old day."

She carried her glass to the kitchen with her and removed the chops from beneath the grill. They were fairly black, and serve him right for upsetting her. Why on earth did he have to make such a fuss, why couldn't he be like everyone else? It was something to giggle over, not take so seriously, a single Sunday afternoon when they wouldn't be doing anything anyway. She dropped a handful of noodles into the hot oil, and then a second handful.

IN THE SITTING-ROOM the telephone rang just as Edwin was squirting soda into another drink. "Yes?" he said, and Angela's voice came lilting over the line, saying she didn't want to bother Debbie but the date had just been fixed: June 17th. "Honestly, you'll split your sides, Edwin."

"Yes, all right, I'll tell her", he said as coldly as he could. He replaced the receiver without saying goodbye. He'd never cared for Angela, patronising kind of creature.

Deborah knew it had been Angela on the telephone and she knew she would have given Edwin the date she had arranged with Charlotte and Peter, who'd been the doubtful ones about the first date, suggested by Jeremy. Angela had said she was going to ring back with this information, but when the Chalmers sat down to their chops and broccoli spears and noodles Edwin hadn't yet passed the information on.

"Christ, what are these?" he said, poking at a brown noodle with his fork and then poking at the burnt chop.

"The little things are fried noodles, which you enjoyed so much the other night. The larger thing is a pork chop, which wouldn't have got overcooked if you hadn't started an argument."

"Oh, for God's sake!"

He pushed his chair back and stood up. He returned to the sitting-room and Deborah

heard the squirting of the soda syphon. She stood up herself, followed him to the sitting-room and poured herself another gin and vermouth. Neither of them spoke. Deborah returned to the kitchen and ate her share of the broccoli spears. The sound of television came from the sitting-room. "Listen, buster, you give this bread to the hit or don't you?" a voice demanded. "O.K., I give the bread", a second voice replied.

They'd had quarrels before. They'd quarrelled on their honeymoon in Greece for no reason whatsoever. They'd quarrelled because she'd once left the ignition of the car turned on, causing a flat battery. They'd quarrelled because of Enid's boring party just before Christmas. The present quarrel was just the same kind of thing, Deborah knew: Edwin would sit and sulk, she'd wash the dishes up feeling miserable, and he'd probably eat the chop and the broccoli when they were cold. She couldn't blame him for not wanting the noodles because she didn't seem to have cooked them correctly. Then she thought: what if he doesn't come to the picnic, what if he just goes on being stubborn, which he could be when he wanted to? Everyone would know. "Where's Edwin?" they would ask, and she'd tell some lie and everyone would know it was a lie, and everyone would know they weren't getting on. Only six months had passed, everyone would say, and he wouldn't join in a bit of fun.

But to Deborah's relief that didn't happen. Later that night Edwin ate the cold pork chop, eating it from his fingers because he couldn't manage to stick a fork into it. He ate the cold broccoli spears as well, but he left the noodles. She made him tea and gave him a Danish pastry and in the morning he said he was sorry.

"SO IF WE COULD it would be lovely", Deborah said on her office telephone. She'd told her mother there was to be another teddy-bears' picnic, Angela and Jeremy had arranged it mainly, and the Ainley-Foxletons would love it of course, possibly the last they'd see.

"My dear, you're always welcome, as you know." The voice of Deborah's mother came all the way from South Bucks, from the village where the Ainley-Foxletons' house and garden

were, where Deborah and Angela, Jeremy, Charlotte, Harriet, Enid, Peter and Holly had been children together. The plan was that Edwin and Deborah should spend the weekend of June 17 with Deborah's parents, and Deborah's mother had even promised to lay on some tennis for Edwin on the Saturday. Deborah herself wasn't much good at tennis.

"Thanks, Mummy", Deborah managed to say just as Mr Harridance returned from lunch.

"No, spending the whole weekend actually", Edwin informed his mother. "There's this teddy-bear thing Deborah has to go to."

"What teddy-bear thing?"

Edwin went into details, explaining how the children who'd been friends in a South Bucks village nearly twenty years ago met, from time to time to have a teddy-bears' picnic because that was what they'd done then.

"But they're adults surely now", Mrs Chalm pointed out.

"Yes, I know."

"Well, I hope you have a lovely time, dear."

"Delightful, I'm sure."

"It's odd when they're adults, I'd have thought."

Between themselves, Edwin and Deborah did not again discuss the subject of the teddy-bears' picnic. During the quarrel Edwin had felt bewildered, never quite knowing how to proceed, and he hoped that on some future occasion he would be better able to cope. It made him angry when he wasn't able to cope, and the anger still hung about him. On the other hand six months wasn't long in a marriage which he hoped would go on for ever: the marriage hadn't had a chance to settle into the shape that suited it, any more than he and Deborah had had time to develop their own taste in furniture and decoration. It was only to be expected that there should be problems and uncertainty.

As for Deborah, she knew nothing about marriages settling into shape: she wasn't aware that rules and tacit understandings, arrangements of give and take, were what made marriage possible when the first gloss had worn off. Marriage for Deborah was the continuation of a love affair, and as yet she had few complaints. She knew that of course they had to have quarrels.

They had met at a party. Edwin had left a group of people he was listening to and had

crossed to the corner where she was being bored by a man in computers. "Hullo", Edwin just said. All three of them were eating plates of paella.

Finding a consideration of the past pleasanter than speculation about the future, Deborah often recalled that moment: Edwin's sharp face smiling at her, the computer man discomfited, a sour taste in the paella. "You're not Fiona's sister?" Edwin said, and when ages afterwards she'd asked him who Fiona was he confessed he'd made her up. "I shouldn't eat much more of this stuff", he said, taking the paella away from her. Deborah had been impressed by that: she and the computer man had been fiddling at the paella with their forks, both of them too polite to say that there was something the matter with it. "What do you do?" Edwin said a few minutes later, which was more than the computer man had asked.

IN THE WEEKS THAT FOLLOWED they told one another all about themselves, about their parents and the houses they'd lived in as children, the schools they'd gone to, the friends they'd made. Edwin was a daring person, he was successful, he liked to be in charge of things. Without in any way sounding boastful, he told her of episodes in his childhood, of risks taken at school. Once he'd dismantled the elderly music master's bed, causing it to collapse when the music master later lay down on it. He'd removed the carburettor from some other master's car, he'd stolen an egg-beater from an ironmonger's shop. All of them were dares, and by the end of his schooldays he had acquired the reputation of being fearless: there was nothing, people said, he wouldn't do.

It was easy for Deborah to love him, and everything he told her, self-deprecatingly couched, was clearly the truth. But Deborah in love naturally didn't wonder how this side of Edwin would seem in marriage, or how it might develop as Edwin moved into middle age. She couldn't think of anything nicer than having him there every day, and in no way did she feel let down on her honeymoon in Greece or by the couple of false starts they made with flats before they eventually ended up in 23 The Zodiac. Edwin went to his office every day and Deborah went to hers. That he told her more about share prices than she told him about the

letters she typed for Mr Harridance was because share prices were more important. It was true that she would often have liked to pass on details of this or that, for instance of the correspondence with Flitts, Hay and Co concerning nearly eighteen thousand defective chair castors. The correspondence was interesting because it had continued for two years and had become vituperative. But when she mentioned it Edwin just agreeably nodded. There was also the business about Miss Royal's scratches, which everyone in the office had been conjecturing about: how on earth had a woman like Miss Royal acquired four long scratches on her face and neck between five-thirty one Monday evening and nine-thirty the following morning? "Oh yes?" Edwin had said, and gone on to talk about the Mercantile Investment Trust.

Deborah did not recognise these telltale signs. She did not remember that when first she and Edwin exchanged information about one another's childhoods Edwin had sometimes just smiled, as if his mind had drifted away. It was only a slight disappointment that he didn't wish to hear about Flitts, Hay and Co, and Miss Royal's scratches: no one could possibly get into a state about things like that. Deborah saw little significance in the silly quarrel they'd had about the teddy-bears' picnic, which was silly itself of course. She didn't see that it had had to do with friends who were hers and not Edwin's; nor did it occur to her that when they really began to think about the decoration of 23 The Zodiac it would be Edwin who would make the decisions. They shared things, Deborah would have said: after all, in spite of the quarrel they were going to go to the teddy-bears' picnic. Edwin loved her and was kind and really rather marvellous. It was purely for her sake that he'd agreed to give up a whole weekend.

So on a warm Friday afternoon, as they drove from London in their Saab, Deborah was feeling happy. She listened while Edwin talked about a killing a man called Dupree had made by selling out his International Asphalt holding. "James James Morrison Morrison Weatherby George Dupree," she said.

"What on earth's that?"

"It's by A. A. Milne, the man who wrote Pooh Bear. Poor Pooh!"

Edwin didn't say anything.

"Jeremy's is called Pooh."

"I see."

In the back of the car, propped up in a corner, was the blue teddy-bear called Binky which Deborah had had since she was one.

THE RHODODENDRONS were in bloom in the Ainley-Foxletons' garden, late that year because of the bad winter. So was the laburnum Edwin remembered, and the broom, and some yellow azaleas. "My dear, we're so awfully glad", old Mrs Ainley-Foxleaton said, kissing him because she imagined he must be one of the children in her past. Her husband, tottering about on the raised lawn which Edwin also remembered from his previous visit, had developed the shakes. "Darlings, Mrs Bright has ironed our tablecloth for us!" Mrs Ainley-Foxleaton announced with a flourish.

She imparted this fact because Mrs Bright, the Ainley-Foxletons' charwoman, was emerging at that moment from the house, with the ironed tablecloth over one arm. She carried a tray on which there were glass jugs of orange squash and lemon squash, a jug of milk, mugs with Beatrice Potter characters on them, and two plates of sandwiches that weren't much larger than postage stamps. She made her way down stone steps from the raised lawn, crossed a more extensive lawn and disappeared into a shrubbery. While everyone remained chatting to the Ainley-Foxletons—nobody helping to lay the picnic out because that had never been part of the proceedings—Mrs Bright reappeared from the shrubbery, returned to the house and then made a second journey, her tray laden this time with cakes and biscuits.

Before lunch Edwin had sat for a long time with Deborah's father in the summerhouse, drinking. This was something Deborah's father enjoyed on Sunday mornings, permitting himself a degree of dozy inebriation which only became noticeable when two bottles of claret were consumed at lunch. Today Edwin had followed his example, twice getting to his feet to refill their glasses and during the course of lunch managing to slip out to the summerhouse for a fairly heavy tot of whisky, which mixed nicely with the claret. He could think of no other condition in which to present himself—with a teddy-bear Deborah's mother had pressed upon him—in the Ainley-Foxletons' garden. "Rather you than me, old

chap", Deborah's father had said after lunch, subsiding into an armchair with a gurgle. At the last moment Edwin had quickly returned to the summerhouse and had helped himself to a further intake of whisky, drinking from the cap of the Teacher's bottle because the glasses had been collected up. He reckoned that when Mrs Ainley-Foxleton had kissed him he must have smelt like a distillery, and he was glad of that.

"WELL, HERE WE ARE", Jeremy said in the glade where the picnic had first taken place in 1957. He sat at the head of the tablecloth, cross-legged on a tartan rug. He had glasses and was stout. Peter at the other end of the tablecloth didn't seem to have grown much in the intervening years, but Angela had shot up like a hollyhock and in fact resembled one. Enid was dumpy, Charlotte almost beautiful, Harriet had protruding teeth, Holly was bouncy. Jeremy's wife and Peter's wife, and Charlotte's husband—a man in Shell—all entered into the spirit of the occasion. So did Angela's husband, who came from Czechoslovakia and must have found the proceedings peculiar, everyone sitting there with a teddy-bear that had a name. Angela put a record on Mrs Ainley-Foxleton's old wind-up gramophone. "Oh, don't go down to the woods today", a voice screeched, "without consulting me." Mr and Mrs Ainley-Foxleton were due to arrive at the scene later, as was the tradition. They came with chocolates apparently, and bunches of buttercups for the teddy-bears.

"Thank you, Edwin", Deborah whispered while the music and the song continued. She wanted him to remember the quarrel they'd had about the picnic; she wanted him to know that she now truly forgave him, and appreciated that in the end he'd seen the fun of it all.

"Listen, I have to go to the lav", Edwin said. "Excuse me for a minute." Nobody except Deborah seemed to notice when he ambled off because everyone was talking so, exchanging news.

THE ANGER which had hung about Edwin after the quarrel had never evaporated. It was in anger that he had telephoned his

mother, and further anger had smacked at him when she'd said she hoped he would have a lovely time. What she had meant was that she'd told him so: marry a pretty little thing and before you can blink you're sitting down to tea with teddy-bears. You're a fool to put up with rubbish like this was what Deborah's father had meant when he'd said rather you than me.

Edwin did not lack brains and he had always been aware of it. It was his cleverness that was still offended by what he considered to be an embarrassment, a kind of gooey awfulness in an elderly couple's garden. At school he had always hated anything to do with dressing up, he'd even felt awkward when he'd had to read poetry aloud. What Edwin admired was solidity: he liked Westminster and the City, he liked trains moving smoothly, suits and clean shirts. When he'd married Deborah he'd known—without having to be told by his mother—that she was not a clever person, but in Edwin's view a clever wife was far from necessary. He had seen a future in which children were born and educated; in which Deborah developed various cooking and housekeeping skills, in which together they gave nice dinner parties. Yet instead of that, after only six months, there was this grotesque absurdity. Getting drunk wasn't a regular occurrence with Edwin: he drank when he was angry, as he had on the night of the quarrel.

Mr Ainley-Foxleton was pottering about with his stick on the raised lawn, but Edwin took no notice of him. The old man appeared to be looking for something, his head poked forward on his scrawny neck, bespectacled eyes examining the grass. Edwin passed into the house. From behind the closed door he could hear the voices of Mrs Ainley-Foxleton and Mrs Bright, talking about buttercups. He opened another door and entered the Ainley-Foxletons' dining-room. On the sideboard there was a row of decanters.

EDWIN DISCOVERED that it wasn't easy to drink from a decanter, but he managed it none the less. Anger spurted in him all over again. It seemed incredible that he had married a girl who hadn't properly grown up. None of them had grown up, none of them desired to belong in the adult world, not even the husbands and wives who hadn't been involved in the first

place. If Deborah had told him about all this on that Saturday afternoon when they'd visited this house he even wondered if he would have married her.

Yet replacing the stopper of the decanter between mouthfuls in case anyone came in, Edwin found it impossible to admit that he had made a mistake in marrying Deborah: he loved her, he had never loved anyone else, and he doubted if he would ever love anyone else in the future. Often in an idle moment, between selling and buying in the office, he thought of her, seeing her in her different clothes and sometimes without any clothes at all. When he returned to 23 The Zodiac he sometimes put his arms around her and would not let her go until he had laid her gently down on their bed. Deborah thought the world of him, which was something she often said.

In spite of all that, it was extremely annoying that the quarrel had caused him to feel out of his depth. He should have been able to sort out such nonsense within a few minutes, he deserved his mother's jibe and his father-in-law's as well. Even though they'd only been married six months, it was absurd that since Deborah loved him so he hadn't been able to make her see how foolish she was being. It was absurd to be standing here drunk.

THE AINLEY-FOXLETONS' dining room, full of silver and polished furniture and dim oil paintings, shifted out of focus. The row of decanters became two rows and then one again. The heavily carpeted floor tilted beneath him, falling away to the left and then to the right. Deborah had let him down. She had brought him here so that he could be displayed in front of Angela and Jeremy and Charlotte, Harriet, Holly, Enid, Peter, and the husbands and the wives. She was making the point that she had only to lift her little finger, that his cleverness was nothing compared with his love for her. The anger hammered at him now, hurting him almost. He wanted to walk away, to drive the Saab back to London and when Deborah followed him to state quite categorically that if she intended to be a fool there would have to be a divorce. But some part of Edwin's anger insisted that such a course of action would be an admission of failure and defeat. It was absurd that the marriage he had chosen to make should end before it had properly begun, due to silliness.

EDWIN TOOK A LAST MOUTHFUL of whisky and replaced the glass stopper. He remembered another social occasion, years ago, and he was struck by certain similarities with the present one. People had given a garden party in aid of some charity or other which his mother liked to support, to which Edwin and his brother and sister, and his father, had been dragged along. It had been an excruciatingly boring afternoon, in the middle of a heatwave. He'd had to wear his floppy cotton hat, which he hated, and an awful tan-coloured summer suit, made of cotton also. There had been hours and hours of just standing while his mother talked to people, sometimes slowly giving them recipes, which they wrote down. Edwin's brother and sister didn't seem to mind that; his father did as he was told. So Edwin had wandered off, into a house that was larger and more handsome than the Ainley-Foxletons'. He had poked about in the downstairs rooms, eaten some jam he found in the kitchen, and then gone upstairs to the bedrooms. He'd rooted around for a while, opening drawers and wardrobes, and then he'd climbed a flight of uncarpeted stairs to a loft. From here he'd made his way out on to the roof. Edwin had almost forgotten this incident and certainly never dwelt on it, but with a vividness that surprised him it now returned.

He left the dining-room. In the hall he could still hear the voices of Mrs Ainley-Foxleton and Mrs Bright. Nobody had bothered with him that day; his mother, whose favourite he had always been, was even impatient when he said he had a toothache. Nobody had noticed when he'd slipped away. But from the parapet of the roof everything was different. The faces of the people were pale similar dots, all gazing up at him. The colours of the women's dresses were confused among the flowers. Arms waved frantically at him; someone shouted, ordering him to come down.

On the raised lawn the old man was still examining the grass, his head still poked down towards it, his stick prodding at it. From the glade where the picnic was taking place came a brief burst of applause, as if someone had just made a speech. "... today's the day the teddy-bears have their picnic", sang the screeching voice, faintly.

A breeze had cooled Edwin's sunburnt arms as he crept along the parapet. He'd sensed his mother's first realisation that it was he, his

brother's and his sister's weeping. He saw his father summoned from the car where he'd been dozing. Edwin had stretched his arms out, balancing like a tightrope performer. All the boredom, the tiresome heat, the cotton hat and suit, were easily made up for. Within minutes it had become his day.

"Well, it's certainly the weather for it", Edwin said to the old man.

"Eh?"

"The weather's nice", he shouted. "It's a fine day."

"There's fungus in this lawn, you know. Eaten up with it." Mr Ainley-Foxleton investigated small black patches with his stick. "Never knew there was fungus here", he said.

They were close to the edge of the lawn. Below them there was a rockery full of veronica and sea-pinks and saponaria. The rockery was arranged in a semi-circle, around a sundial.

"Looks like fungus there too", Edwin said, pointing at the larger lawn that stretched away beyond this rockery.

"Eh?" The old man peered over the edge, not knowing what he was looking for because he hadn't properly heard. "Eh?" he said again, and Edwin nudged him with his elbow. The stick went flying off at an angle, the old man's head struck the edge of the sundial with a sharp, clean crack. "Oh, don't go down to the woods today", the voice began again, drifting through the sunshine over the scented garden. Edwin glanced quickly towards the windows of the house in case there should be a face at one of them. Not that it would matter: at that distance no one could see such a slight movement of an elbow.

THEY ATE BANANA SANDWICHES and egg sandwiches, and biscuits with icing on them, chocolate cake and coffee cake. The teddy-bears' snouts were pressed over the Beatrice Potter mugs, each teddy-bear addressed by name. Edwin's was called Tomkin.

"Remember the day of the thunderstorm?" Enid said, screwing up her features in a way she had, like a twitch really, Edwin considered. The day he had walked along the parapet

might even have been the day of the thunderstorm, and he smiled because somehow that was amusing. Angela was smiling too, and so were Jeremy and Enid, Charlotte, Harriet and Holly, Peter and the husbands and the wives. Deborah in particular was smiling. When Edwin glanced from face to face he was reminded of the faces that had gazed up at him from so far below, except that there'd been panic instead of smiles.

"Remember the syrup?" Angela said. "Poor Algernon had to be given a horrid bath."

"Wasn't it Horatio, surely?" Deborah said.

"Yes, it was Horatio", Enid confirmed, amusingly balancing Horatio on her shoulder.

"Today's the day the teddy-bears have their picnic", suddenly sang everyone, taking a lead from the voice on the gramophone. Edwin smiled and even began to sing himself. When they returned to Deborah's parents' house the atmosphere would be sombre. "Poor old chap was overlooked", he'd probably be the one to explain, "due to all that fuss." And in 23 The Zodiac the atmosphere would be sombre also. "I'm afraid you should get rid of it", he'd suggest, arguing that the blue teddy-bear would be for ever a reminder. Grown up a bit because of what had happened. Deborah would of course agree. Like everything else, marriage had to settle into shape.

Charlotte told a story of an adventure her Mikey had had when she'd taken him back to boarding-school, how a repulsive girl called Agnes Thorpe had stuck a skewer in him. Holly told of how she'd had to rescue her Percival from drowning when he'd toppled out of a motor-boat. Jeremy wound up the gramophone and the chatter jollily continued, the husbands and wives appearing to be as delighted as anyone. Harriet said how she'd only wanted to marry Peter and Peter how he'd determined to marry Deborah. "Oh, don't go down to the woods today", the voice began again, and then came Mrs Ainley-Foxleton's scream.

Everyone rushed, leaving the teddy-bears just anywhere and the gramophone still playing. Edwin was the first to bend over the splayed figure of the old man. He declared that Mr Ainley-Foxleton was dead, and then took charge of the proceedings.

What's Wrong with the Brandt Report?

"None of us, of course, can pretend that our understanding of the complexities of the poverty problem is complete. We are all still learning. . . ."

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA

*President of the World Bank
in Washington D.C. (30 September 1980)*

Economics Askew

By P. D. Henderson



THE BRANDT REPORT offers not only a programme but a vision, a comprehensive view of the world. In much of the public reaction to the Report it is precisely this aspect of it, the general analysis as distinct from the specific recommendations, which has been singled out for praise. A good British instance of this is the leading article which appeared in *The Times* of London (13 February 1980) when the Report was published. Here it was stated that

"As a description of the problems that face us, and a warning of what could happen if we fail to respond, the report can hardly be faulted. It

ought to become one of the basic documents of the decade."

In my view this is a total misjudgment. The Brandt Report is very far from providing an authoritative treatment of the problems of international society, and its vision of events and relationships is seriously flawed.

Within this vision there are three distinct elements: a warning; a diagnosis; and a strategy or broad prescription. While the warning is stark and emphatic, the diagnosis and strategy are in general reassuring. Together they convey a message of hope.

As to the warning, the Report pictures a world in crisis, where the very survival of the human race is threatened—by war and violence, by the deterioration of the biological environment, and by the present malfunctioning of the world economy. It tells us that "the 1980s could witness even greater catastrophes than the 1930s", and that "major international initiatives are needed if mankind is going to survive. . . ."

What form should these initiatives take? This follows from the diagnosis, which is put forward with great assurance. The Report maintains that at the heart of the present crisis lie the interconnected issues of economic development, international justice, and the relations between North and South. Hence it is in this sphere of international affairs that a new approach is called for. If this were adopted, and if as a result the problems of poverty and international inequality became progressively less serious, then the various threats to mankind would recede. In this respect the tone of the Report is optimistic. Though the risks are perceived as grave, at least their principal cause can be identified, and with it the directions in which progress has

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to be made.

From this follows the broad prescription, which is that the governments of North and South—and ideally, those of the socialist (read: Communist) countries as well—should join together in a comprehensive programme of international economic reform. This is alleged to be necessary if the poor countries are to develop as they should, since the present international system is biased in favour of the North. At the same time, however, the programme as a whole would on balance bring substantial net gains to the rich countries also, at any rate over a period. Measures to ensure development in the South would not only improve the prospects for peace and environmental integrity, but could also “stimulate exports from the North and thus help to restore the health of the world economy.” In addition, both groups of countries could benefit from particular measures of reform. Such measures include agreements to stabilise commodity prices, freer international trade, codes to regulate foreign investment and the transfer of technology, international monetary reform, and the adoption of an agreed “global strategy for energy” embodying “exceptional measures of international collaboration.” Hence the strong emphasis which is placed on the idea of mutual interests between North and South, which is given a chapter to itself and which has been the subject of widespread comment since the Report appeared.

Thus the Report is optimistic also in its assessment of what is known and what is possible. It acknowledges that a lot depends on the policies of the poor countries themselves, and includes a separate chapter on “The Tasks of the South.” But it is convinced that the key to greater equity, prosperity and stability in the modern world lies to hand, in the establishment by its member states of “a new international economic order”; that the constituent elements of this new order have been clearly identified, and can be translated into specific programmes and measures which are known to be both practicable and effective; and that “many of the world’s problems can be solved [*sic*] in the mutual interest of both North and South.”

Such then is the vision of the Brandt Commission. It portrays a world which has entered a phase of extreme danger, which is characterised by conflict, injustice and instability, but which can be

transformed by governments acting in concert, inspired by a sense of common purpose, to reshape the international system by means that are readily available to them.

WHAT IS WRONG with all this? Although in my judgment the Report’s premonitions of disaster are rather crude and overdone, I believe that it is in the diagnosis and the strategy that the most serious weaknesses in the argument are to be found. They can be summarised under eight main headings.

1. *The Causes of War.* The Report greatly overstates the extent to which poverty in poor countries, and economic inequality between states, are responsible for war, violence and tension in the present-day world. This can be seen if one considers the main types and instances of international conflict that have arisen in the period since World War II. A list of these might include the two major multination wars (in Korea and Viet Nam); the recurrent though brief outbreaks of war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and between India and Pakistan; the various civil wars and disturbances which have impinged on the international scene (as, for example, in Greece, Nigeria, the Lebanon and Angola); some chronic territorial and jurisdictional disputes (such as those between Greece and Turkey, or Ethiopia and Somalia); and as topical cases, the violence which is currently to be found in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Kampuchea, the Western Sahara, and the Arab-Persian Gulf. While in some of these cases economic factors were no doubt involved, it is difficult to trace in any one of them the smallest sign that influences arising either from mass poverty or from economic inequality between states have played an initiating or aggravating part. Moreover, in so far as poverty may have been involved, one would expect it to become less rather than more important over time, since the proportion of the world’s population which is living in absolute poverty has been *declining* over the past few decades—a fact which the Report does not mention—and can reasonably be expected to decline further.

2. *Environmental Problems.* The Report is on firmer ground when it points to the possible connection between poverty, underdevelopment, and the risk of environmental deterioration. But even here its treatment is in my view, overdramatised and oversimplified. Too little emphasis is given to the great uncertainty which surrounds these issues.

¹ My views on the Brandt Report are set out more fully in an article which has recently been published in *The World Economy* (Vol. 3, No. 1, June 1980), and which I have drawn on here at a number of points.

and to possible sources of danger to the environment which are not connected with poverty or population growth. Partly in consequence, but also because of its general and understandable bias, the Report implies that international environmental issues should be considered and dealt with as part of the North-South dialogue. This is likely to diminish the chances of useful agreement in both spheres of discussion.

3. *Restoring the World Economy.* Not only peace and environmental balance, but also world prosperity, is perceived by the Report as depending on the conduct of North-South relations. In this connection, the main single element in the case which the Report puts forward is that "a large-scale transfer of resources to the South can make a major impact on growth in both the South and the North and help to revive the flagging world economy." It is this particular aspect of mutual interest which has been especially stressed by many of the commentators on the Report, including

critics of the line which is now being taken by the present British government.

Unfortunately this attractive notion, that aid to the poor countries could become the means to general world recovery, is open to an obvious and damaging objection. It is clear that the rich countries at present feel unable to adopt broad measures of economic expansion, and that if they wished to do this the means are already at their disposal. They could perfectly well increase the buying power of their own people (for example, through lower taxes); and the reasons which deter them from acting in this way apply equally to the idea of higher transfers to foreigners. To its credit, the Report at one point explicitly recognises the force of this argument. In Chapter 3 it refers to the case for "pump-priming the world economy" through aid transfers, and then continues:

"Critics have questioned the validity of this argument. Why should Northern governments,

A Danger to Peace . . . "Crazy Wars"

Washington



AS THE FIGHTING between Iran and Iraq continues, indications are accumulating that the conflict could be the forerunner of a new type of war in the Third World in which ever more destructive military power is applied in an erratic and unrestrained manner.

Several aspects of the conflict in the Gulf have surprised military specialists. In particular, the character of the fighting, which has included spectacular air strikes against civilian targets in each country's interior, is described as far different than in traditional border wars between less developed nations.

When the conflict got under way, analysts predicted that the Iranian military, demoralized by political turmoil at home, would be quickly overwhelmed by Iraqi forces. The Iraqis have made gains on the ground. But the Iranian Air Force has performed far beyond the expectations of Western observers in using advanced aircraft and munitions supplied earlier by the US.

A MUCH MORE unexpected and, in the view of most officials, ominous development has been the willingness and ability of both Iran and Iraq to escalate the fighting by attacking vital strategic targets, particularly oil and nuclear power facilities. Noting the importance of oil to both countries' economic health, a high-ranking White House national security aide called the air attacks "completely irrational."

A State Department specialist suggested that if either or both of the nations had possessed nuclear

weapons when the conflict began, they would probably have been used.

MILITARY EXPERTS listed several factors to explain the unpredictable actions of Iran and Iraq, including the relative inexperience of the two nations' armed forces, their access to unusually sophisticated military hardware, and internal political turbulence, particularly in Tehran.

"There was a tendency to believe that Israel's 1973 war with Egypt and Syria was the model for future wars in the Third World", said a specialist on Middle East military matters.

"But we are learning that Iran and Iraq are not Israel or Egypt and that this war as well as ones between similar states in the future are likely to be much more chaotic and dangerous than we earlier thought."

SOME ANALYSTS contended that the current situation was the one predicted by Yehezkel Dror, an Israeli academician, who almost 10 years ago warned of new military conflicts in the Third World in which radical governments, equipped with modern military hardware, would threaten international stability by engaging in all-out wars.

In a 1971 book, entitled "Crazy States", Mr Dror asserted that "thanks to the advancement of modern technology, the capabilities of crazy states and their potential impact are increasing on a very steep curve."

Officials are concerned about what the attacks presage for future Third World conflicts.

Richard Burr
in INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE (Paris)

hesitant to stimulate their own economies in a period of stagnation, find more virtue in a process of stimulation which operates via the developing countries?"

The answer which it gives to this extremely pertinent question is not very clear, but seems to me to undermine the case for aid transfers as a means to world expansion. Unfortunately both question and answer seem to be disregarded at other points of the Report, as they have been by many of the commentators. The Report speaks with two voices on this issue; and the voice that has been generally heard and quoted expresses a view which is mistaken.

If the arguments set out under (1) to (3) above are broadly accepted, then little remains of the Report's much-acclaimed diagnosis of the human predicament. Admittedly the "North-South dialogue" is important, and it is arguable that some Northern governments (including the British) treat it too lightly. But the idea that it holds the key to the future of the human race is a considerable exaggeration.

4. *Poor Countries and the International Order.* The Brandt Commission accepts quite uncritically the notion that the international economy in its present form "contributed to frustrating the ambitions of the South for development." Its principal statement of the reasons for this is given in the opening chapter, where it is asserted that the present economic differences between North and South are attributable to "the fundamental inequality of economic strength", and that

"Because of this economic power northern countries dominate the international economic system—its rules and regulations, and its international institutions of trade, money and finance. Some developing countries have swum against this tide, taking the opportunities which exist and overcoming many obstacles; but most of them find the currents too strong for them."

Precisely how their alleged economic power is supposed to confer advantages on the industrial countries is at no stage made clear. However, the notion that the poor countries have been struggling with limited success against powerful adverse forces has implications which can be roughly checked against the evidence of recent history.

If the notion were correct, one would expect to find that the economic performance of the developing countries over the past 30 years or so had two outstanding features. *First*, the differences between the various national economies would not be great,

since all of them would have been subject to the same dominating external influence. *Second*, since this influence was strongly unfavourable it would follow that the general average level of performance would be low, both in absolute terms and in relation to the richer countries.

As is well known (though not acknowledged in the Report), actual developments in the period since World War II have presented a *wholly different* picture. Rates of growth both in output and in output per head have varied very widely among the developing countries, while the average rates for the South as a whole, round which this wide dispersion can be observed, have been remarkably high. The economic growth of the developing world during these years has indeed been one of the most striking developments in recorded economic history. The only references to it in the Brandt Report, however, are perfunctory and misleading.

In this connection, the Report's perception of the process of economic change within countries—and of the ways in which this process may be affected by the nature and working of the international economic system—is in fact naively political. Within this perception, what chiefly influences the material well-being of countries is not how much they produce, nor how their productive potential changes over time, but their supposed bargaining power in relation to other states. Countries become rich through the exercise of economic power, and stay poor because they have failed to acquire this not very clearly defined attribute. Because of their weak bargaining position, the economic prospects of the poor countries are always and necessarily clouded, unless deliberate action is taken to redress the balance of economic power. No attempt is made in the Report to relate this primitive vision of history and economic relationships to the considerable amount of serious professional work that has been done on the factors influencing economic growth and change, while the well-established evidence of the progress made by many poor countries is set aside. All this makes sad reading.

WHEN IT COMES TO the broad prescription, the most worrying features, to my mind, concern the framework of thought in which the Brandt Commission operated. This is associated with a particular view of political and economic processes and choices, which though not always conscious and explicit forms part of the Commission's vision. Within it four main elements can be discerned,

which are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. These then are the remaining four headings.

5. *Belief in Regulation rather than Markets.* Within the recommendations of the Report, there is a strong emphasis on the need for collective action by governments. Broadly, such action in the economic sphere may be designed either to improve the working of market processes or to supersede them by some form of administrative regulation. The balance between these two modes of intervention is of course a subject of perennial debate and reassessment. The Commission makes recommendations of both kinds—for improving markets and for new forms of regulation—but its treatment of the two is very different. The attitude to what can be achieved by governments through administrative measures is optimistic, not to say credulous. By contrast, the treatment of market modes is unsystematic and equivocal. At various points in the Report there are incidental references to the arguments for freer international trade and for

making better use of the price system. But these arguments are not drawn together, nor are they treated—as they could and should have been—as a principal unifying theme. One reason for this is to be found in the Report's sombre though unsupported conviction that “in the world as in nations, economic forces left entirely to themselves tend to produce growing inequality.”

6. *The Neglect of Uncertainty.* The Report embodies a high degree of confidence that the future either is or can be made predictable and controllable, which helps to explain its partiality for national and international regulatory action. This confidence is particularly apparent in the proposals for energy, mineral resources and commodity markets, in which it is pretty well taken for granted that if governments wish to achieve stability they can do so. Too little account is taken of the pervasive and irreducible uncertainty which surrounds the future, nor would one gather from the Report that much of the uncertainty that could in principle be reduced arises from the behaviour of governments.

7. *The Belief in Specified “Needs.”* Like many other commentaries on the international scene, the Report is imbued with the mistaken idea, which one might term “pre-economic”, that economic agents including countries have given “needs” or “requirements” which are readily identifiable and measurable. Thus countries are taken to have specified “needs” for energy, for foreign exchange, or for aid from overseas. This grossly oversimplified approach to questions of choice likewise helps to explain the preference for *administrative* methods, since these are seen as an effective means for ensuring that the so-called “needs” are met.

8. *The Belief in Known “Solutions.”* The Report contains frequent references to the idea that the problems of international society can be “solved”, and that the various “solutions” have in fact been identified. This idea finds its most revealing expression in a passage which occurs near the beginning of the final chapter. After summarising once again what it sees as the present human predicament, the text continues:

“What limits our response to this challenge, on which the destiny of mankind depends? *Not primarily the technical solutions, which are largely already familiar.* but the non-existence of a clear and generalised awareness of the realities and dangers and the absence of political will to face up to them and to take corrective action.” (italics added).

—Why? Why Not?—

Washington

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, in his valedictory address as president of the World Bank, said today that the agency had “barely begun to develop its full potential” as an institution of assistance to the poorest countries.

In an impassioned speech to representatives of 141 governments attending the 35th joint annual meeting of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he warned that, despite advances of the last quarter-century, 600 million people were likely to be living in absolute poverty by the year 2000.

In an emotional conclusion that drew a thunderous ovation in the ballroom of the Sheraton Park Hotel, the former Defense Secretary said a “clear, strong and bold vision” was needed to face the uncertain future.

Quoting George Bernard Shaw, he said: “You see things, and say why? But I dream things that never were, and I say why not?”

“Development itself comprises a two-fold task: to accelerate economic growth and to eradicate absolute poverty.

“These two goals are related, though governments are sometimes tempted to pursue one without adequate attention to the other. In the end, that approach fails from a development point of view. The pursuit of growth without a reasonable concern for equality is ultimately socially destabilizing. And the pursuit of equity without a reasonable concern for growth merely tends to redistribute the deprivation of economic stagnation. . . .”

“None of us, of course, can pretend that our understanding of the complexities of the poverty problem is complete. We are all still learning. . . .”

THE NEW YORK TIMES

This diagnosis seems to me quite extraordinarily naïve. *First*, it is evident that the process of economic and social change, as also the working of the international system, are not at all well understood; they remain highly obscure and uncertain, and hence a continual source of controversy and surprise. Partly for this reason, the idea that there exists a body of known and agreed measures which would constitute "corrective action" is illusory. *Second*, it is a profound mistake to suppose that the issues of social and economic life are such that it makes sense to think in terms of "solutions" to them—as though they were like the entries in a crossword puzzle, for which there can be found a recognised, uniquely correct, and permanently valid set of responses.

It is easy to see how this form of words could find its way into a document such as the Report, which is designed to convey an urgent message, and which is rightly concerned to make its points as simply and clearly as possible. Nevertheless the

reference to "solutions" is one of the clearest symptoms of the oversimplification and unreality which pervade the Report.

IT IS A GREAT PITY that the Brandt Report has come out so badly. The issues that it deals with are serious, and its belief that the governments of the North should reassess their present attitudes and policies towards the developing countries has, in my view, considerable force. At the time when the Commission was appointed, it was possible to think of its establishment as an imaginative and promising venture, even though a risky one. Such hopes are belied by a reading of the Report itself. A great deal of work has gone into its preparation, and some of the incidental contents make good sense. But considered as a whole the Report is not credible. It does not deserve to be taken seriously, because the conception of the world on which it rests is false.

Between Rhetoric & Fantasy

By Kenneth Minogue



THE BRANDT Report proves that the essential next step in the elimination of world poverty is indeed "a global assault"—but first on bureaucratic jargon. Mere piecemeal tinkering won't do. In the alarming

crisis of spiralling nonsense that faces us, only a massive transfer of rational thought from academia to the intellectually drought-stricken areas of the international poverty-industry can save the day.

If this seems an ungrateful response to the

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
efforts of 19 benevolent men and two benevolent women who are merely trying to improve the human lot, then I can only plead the effect of uncontrollable irritation at ploughing through sentences like:

"The North should welcome the increased desire of developing countries to be more responsible for their economic and political destiny and to utilize unexploited opportunities for economic co-operation among themselves."

If this sentence reports a fact, then I'm willing to welcome it; and I don't need a high-powered Commission, evidently at this point in the throes of a drafting problem, to instruct me in my welcoming duties. But is it a fact? Is it not rather something we would do well to call a "vagueness" (which may be defined as a Committee evasion masquerading as a high-level generalisation)?

The Report is full of vaguenesses. It also gives off a strong odour of fantasy. Oddly enough, although deeply hostile to all things military, the Commission has a notable weakness for military metaphors, possibly following William James in

"King of the World"



Nairobi

PRESIDENT JULIUS NYERERE of Tanzania once said that if he did not have shoes and South Africa were the only place to get shoes, then he would do without shoes. But, Mr.

Nyerere said, if he did not have corn and South Africa were the only place to get corn, then he would go to South Africa.

Corn is so important in Africa that many nations, including Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, have in the past been forced to shore up production with purchases from their most despised foe.

This year, the terrible consequences of war and weather have caused a crisis that cannot be dissolved even by South African corn from black Africa's principal enemy and surplus grain from the West. Wars big and small have given Africa 4 million of the world's 10 million refugees. Drought, greed and mismanagement have taken away the corn.

International aid agencies say one million Africans may die from starvation or hunger-related diseases this year.

THE DROUGHT began in Djibouti, on the Horn. It spread across Ethiopia and Somalia, countries that went to war in 1977 over the Ogaden, where a guerrilla war continues. Refugees from the area, nearly all of them nomadic cattle and camel herders, were pouring across the border into Somalia at the rate of 1,000 a day when the drought hit. When the water holes went dry, the number increased by 500 a day.

This summer, 23 camps in Somalia had 765,000 refugees, believed to be the largest concentration of refugees in any single country in the world.

For lack of water, livestock began dying in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya's milk production fell from 700,000 to 400,000 litres a day, and milk, butter and cheese disappeared from stores. For two months these items could be gotten only through bribes or good connections.

Corn also disappeared. Kenya had a surplus in 1978 and exported about 180,000 tons. The government cut prices paid to farmers from \$11 for a 200-pound bag to \$9. About 20% of Kenya's farmers were angry enough to switch to sugar cane.

This year, in addition to a U.S. donation of 60,000 tons, Kenya was forced to buy \$11 million in corn from South Africa.

UGANDA'S HARVEST was destroyed when the Tanzanian army overthrew Idi Amin in April 1979. Farming is still disrupted by continuing chaos. In the Karamoja region of northeast Uganda, 20,000 people are believed to have died from malnutrition since January. The people there, the Karamojong, have lost most of their cattle in raids staged among themselves and by starving Ethiopians, Kenyans, Sudanese and the remnants of Amin's army.

THE VIEW is equally pessimistic elsewhere in Africa. In the mid-60's, Africa produced all but 2% of its food requirements. It is estimated that the continent will be fortunate if it can produce 80% of its requirement in 1985. In the last decade, food production increased 1% a year while the population increased 3% a year. Each day 2,000 babies are born in Kenya.

The seven nations in the sub-Saharan region—Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Gambia and the Cape Verde Islands—still are consuming hundreds of tons of emergency food shipments two years after nominal rains returned. The Sahara has advanced southward 78 miles in the 17 years, and rainfall has decreased by 25 per cent during the same period.

AFRICA'S TRADE DEFICIT in major foods was \$1.3 billion last year. Economists say most of Africa cannot afford to continue importing food.

As far as East Africa is concerned, there appears to be an engineering solution to its problems, but there is also a political stumbling block. The answer, according to an 11-year study of the Nile basin conducted by the United Nations Development Program, could come from Lake Victoria, the second largest natural

lake in the world. Despite the drought, the lake has risen two-and-a-half meters because of erosion and freak rains since 1970.

Robert Kitchen Jr., regional representative of the Development Program, says, "If you could take off just one-half meter, the result in water supply would be equal to the total flow of the Blue and White Nile for the next five years, and in the process you could generate enough hydro-electricity to service East Africa for the next 25 years.

"You could bring water all the way across to the Indian Ocean if you could just find the political will to do so. But there is absolutely no interest in anything more than the day-to-day critical activities. The Kenyans aren't going to become beholden to the Ugandans, and you would have to go upstream to put in the power generating stations. The thing makes the Sudanese nervous. If you could only have a Suez Canal solution, an international law of the sea that could make the riparian states comply."

But no one, he says, cares about the future.

AS FOR THE PRESENT, the old argument about entire cultures becoming dependent on aid still rages across the continent. There are 400 relief agencies working in Africa. Critics have many examples for their arguments, and one that has great currency is the settlement in Kurtenwaare, in Somalia. Thrown up in 1975 as an aid outpost during a drought then, Kurtenwaare is still there, five years beyond one drought and into another, its 16,000 residents living on aid. None are refugees from the Ogaden, and none work.

"Look, we haven't had time to think it through," said an American aid representative in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. "It takes 450 metric tons of food a day to provide the minimum diet for the refugee population. To do this, we need 150 20-ton trucks mobile every day, without any down time, just to get the food delivered. We are covered up with the emergency. If I could say how we could make these people self-sufficient and pull out at the same time, I could be president . . . No, I could be king of the world."

Gregory Jaynes

in INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE
(Paris)

believing that we need moral substitutes for war. The Commissioners clearly imagined themselves as a Global General Staff, mobilising the resources of the world, and planning the tactics and strategy for all manner of attacks and assaults. Like most paper plans, they don't look so good at platoon level, and one useful result of the discussion provoked has been an accumulation of evidence showing pretty conclusively that the conditions do not exist (in particular, the knowledge of how to match Aid to proper use) which would allow the grandiose schemes of the Commission to be much more than a vast waste of money.

THE LEVEL OF ABSTRACTION chosen by the Commission was almost bound to generate vaguenesses and to break all contact with reality.

How do you "assault" poverty? It doesn't exist. What does exist is poor people, and in order to help them, you have to take in many other circumstances than merely the fact that they are poor. And the means of helping is something called "aid", which pre-supposes that they are already launched on some project, or at least have the will to begin, and that you are merely supplying a necessary condition. But a lot of "aid" falls on stony ground because people begin to behave like indolent cargo cultists whose god has suddenly begun to supply the goods. Where not siphoned off by corrupt governments or other malefactors, much aid is barrenly absorbed like water on sand. In many cases, there is actual resistance to technological help; and sometimes this resistance turns out to be extremely prudent, as in the case of the Thai farmers who were reported to be doing better with their oxen than their fellows who had taken to tractors and thus became involved in the fuel crisis. When the Commission talks about the "essential need" (what, one wonders, is an *inessential* need?) "to upgrade technology in traditional agriculture" one is inclined to suspect that the underlying purpose of the Commissioners is to involve the whole world in exactly the same crises as the industrialised North.

FUNDAMENTALLY, the Commission proposes to solve the world's problems by the creation of a Global Welfare State—and its Report appears at just the moment when Welfare States of the North are in a state of collapse. The economic arguments, which are Keynes crossed at times with

Machiavelli, derive from the 1930s and consist largely in the suggestion that we shall all get prosperous by giving lots of money to the South and then earning it back in exchange for what we produce. But what is most striking is the way in which the Commission is silent upon many important considerations relating to the global economic situation.

Perhaps the most significant of its silences is to ignore the collapse of the North's moral involvement with the South. Possibly it is always true that people become intoxicated with the idea of Welfare States just at the point where they are so bored with the poor that they would rather have their civic duties performed by giant impersonal organisations. What is certainly true is that it is less than a century since improving Europeans, welcome and unwelcome, were swarming all over Asia and Africa bringing Christianity, Chloroform, and Western Culture to anyone they could buttonhole. Hardly any of this moral fervour is left. In 1980 it takes a rather high-priced short-term contract to lure Europeans off to those bleak and unhealthy places.

What the Report does is to evade this question by administrative fantasies about "massive transfers of wealth", and by melodramatic talk about global crisis of a kind now so familiar to us over the last few decades that it has become rather like the little boy who kept crying "Wolf!" Whether we ought actually to become very closely involved with the Third World is no doubt an arguable question. Obviously there are many occasions, such as disasters, when we ought. But there is also evidently a danger that, after the manner of King Midas, we turn everything we touch into a bad copy of our modern world; and this argues great caution. What is undoubtedly true, however, is that this is a field where we simply do not know enough for it to be wise to do any single thing on a big scale.

One harsh judgment that may be made on the Report is, then, that it is wasting our rapidly diminishing moral resources of involvement with the South in the name of highly dubious grandiosities where prudence would suggest a plurality of piecemeal initiatives.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS of this sort have to be polite to everybody. They can excoriate sin as long as they don't offend powerful sinners. There are conventions by which they can prove their outspokenness by savaging soft targets like *Apartheid*,

Arms salesmen, and Multinational corporations; but a committee is the last kind of body that will really tell us anything new. Nor will such a body have much stomach for bringing to light the rather nasty calculations that will be actually made by governments. The Commission tell us that the unequal development of "North and South" is a threat to peace, but this is only part of the implausible melodrama supposed to galvanise us into action. And it isn't true. If it's conserving energy we're thinking about, the really selfish observation would be that the slower the South develops, the slower will be the using-up of irreplaceable mineral resources. And if it's peace we're talking about, the last place we may expect a threat to peace to come from is the starving millions of East Africa. If, on the other hand, the Commission's dream of an equal diffusion of economic power (and hence, of course, an equal diffusion of political and military power) were to be achieved, then we would replace the already alarming complexities of international life with a nightmare plurality of powers all capable of threatening peace on a grand scale. This is not, indeed, a good reason for not giving aid; but it is part of any serious discussion of the subject.

Nor does the Report face up to *the paradox of development*: which is that those who can help themselves hardly need aid at all, since they can profitably arrange loans, while those who can't help themselves won't be transformed by aid and may even become all the more dependent if they get it. The former may have terrible problems (such as the well-known problem of Brazilian debt) but the latter don't have problems at all. They have a predicament with which no one wants to get too closely involved. And this under-explored tragic dimension of the modishly titled "North-South dialogue" is complicated by the fact that we are dealing not with a relatively simple relation of giving and receiving, but with a power relationship as well.

IT IS NECESSARY to criticise what is evasive in the Report because the whole subject of global poverty calls up so much automatic piety as to encourage an endless series of foolish and wasteful expedients. As seems to be common in welfare-state thinking, a familiar sequence of moves follow one another in a reliable succession. It comes to be realised that expectations had been "unrealistic" and that none of the transfers from rich to poor

seems to be having much effect, especially upon those in most desperate poverty; and at this point the will to continue, indeed to extend the effort, must be regularly flogged into action by increasing doses of moralism, pseudo-realism, and talk about crises. But the only serious change will come from being very clear about what we know and what we don't, a form of discrimination not much cultivated by the Commissioners partly because they subsist mostly in the ghetto of their chosen level of abstraction, and partly because they have been diverted from their main task by two notably irrelevant bees in their bonnets.

The first of these is their preoccupation with inequality, both social and international. Those simple-minded readers who think the Report is all about filling the bellies of the poor and helping them to stand on their own feet need to read the Report more carefully, since its more constant preoccupation is much less with increasing production than with redistribution. It does indeed recognise on occasion that "Equal shares of poverty do not necessarily imply a progression to equal shares of wealth"; but it is prepared to suggest for whole classes of developing countries that "the main need is for policies to redistribute income and assets. . . ." This kind of suggestion is in line with the managerial tone of the whole Report in which people are conceived of as passive units whose essential needs (though perhaps not inessential needs!) must be met.

Yet what is the evidence that such redistribution actually increases the wealth of a country? The Report itself recognises that an egalitarian policy may involve slower growth, but commends such a policy as minimising "social strains." But there are also social strains to redistribution—especially when the redistributor consists of governments often rather less than incorruptible, far from administratively efficient, and already prone to the ordinary temptations to expropriate. Such a policy encourages governments to play the despot, reducing their peoples to a condition of tutelage, and introducing fatal unpredictabilities likely to debilitate the energies of the more productive parts of the population.

Apart from infinitely variable local circumstance, there lies in the background of this question a fundamental choice to be made, and it is difficult to see why the Commission should indulge itself in making a recommendation upon the choice at all. *Is it better to have a low but equal level of wealth, or a higher but unequal level?* Some of the disastrous consequences of choosing the former

option, which is only possible to despotic governments, would suggest that the latter is in the long run the more promising option for growth. The Cubans and the Kampucheans seem to have got neither equality nor growth.

Many different views may be taken of this and many arguments deployed: the Commission deploys none of them. It merely slides from the problem of poverty, which is real, to a problem of inequality which, if a problem at all, is a very different kind of problem. Indeed, it is very likely that any increase in aid to developing countries will simply multiply inequalities both between them and within them, since people vary very greatly in their propensity to seize the opportunities offered them.

IT IS PROBABLE that the Commission slides from the one problem to the other because it was really concerned with something that appeals less to the bellies of the poor than to the hearts of the rulers of poor countries: namely, *an increase in their power*. The suggestion underlying this particular version of the egalitarian imperative is that inferiors will constantly be jockeying for more power and thus destabilising the world until they can all sit equally around negotiating tables and exhibit their rationality in facing up to the problems of the globe. This is, as I have noted, absurd. It instances exactly that postulate of the equality of un-governed powers from which Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* inferred that the state of nature must be a state of war. For the usual mixture of good and bad motives of which political life is constituted, the rulers of many of the developing countries are prepared to use, in their drive for greater influence, the threat that unless they get the help they want, they will cut up rough and cause a lot of trouble. Among its other significances, the Brandt Report is a vehicle for this argument (transposed into the nicer terms of a vague threat to global stability) and some of the egalitarianism is the way this threat emerges. Other elements of its egalitarianism are, of course, the largely automatic reflexes of the managerialists who sat upon the Commission.

THE SECOND PIECE OF IRRELEVANCE is the Report's preoccupation with arms spending. For fairly obvious reasons, the idea has lodged itself in uncritical minds that it is a moral scandal that we spend a lot of money on arms, which don't increase human happiness, and very little on help-

ing farmers increase their crops, which do. This leads ingenious pranksters to calculate how many dung-powered radios or hospital tea-cosies could be bought for the price of a Phantom jet or some other such military toy. Presumably helped down this path by its editorial consultant, Mr Anthony Sampson, the well-known scourge of arms salesmen, the Commission solemnly produces meaningless statistics of this kind. And, like Lord Houghton of Sowerby in a recent letter to *The Times*, it seems to hint that there is some appropriate ratio between arms spending and what goes to development. No one has ever been precise about what this ratio might be, for the excellent reason that there is no logical connection between the two things at all. But logic is not one of the more obvious constraints on the Commission's work, so it comments:

"If only a fraction of the money, manpower and research presently devoted to military uses were diverted to development, the future prospects of the Third World would look entirely different."

There's no doubt about the ideal situation: no arms at all, and all cash for development. How *can* human beings be so foolish as to waste all that money? And with an unerring talent for the uncritically fashionable opinion, the Commission produces an aphorism which so impressed OXFAM

as to be included in its list of "quotable quotes" from the Report:

"More arms do not make mankind safer, only poorer."

This is a good example of the way the level of abstraction chosen leads the Commission in the wrong direction. For it is not, of course, "mankind" that anyone is trying to defend. But arms do indeed make Israel safer, or Thailand, or West Berlin, or indeed Britain, in relation to specific threats to their independence coming from other countries. The Commission deplores international mistrust, which is one of the several points where it gets its terms of reference wrong and instead of dealing with the specific problem of underdevelopment, plays God and tries to rewrite the Creation.

The fact is that people are aggressive and governments sometimes attack others, and the Commission is extremely foolish to challenge what every sensible government knows: that if you can't defend yourself, terrible things may happen to you. That is why countries spend a lot of money on armaments. They are rather keen on staying free and independent—those countries, that is, which have not already been enslaved.

What the Commission was trying to say before it got muddled up in a fallacy of composition was that the achievement of partial securities can add up to total insecurity. Arms races do indeed have an irrational aspect, generals love new toys, and dictators sometimes waste national resources in treating armies like a hobby; and there is no exact science telling us how much defence is just enough. It is not even irrelevant that—Mr Sampson's particular concern—industrialised countries are often keen to sell Southerners expensive arms which arguably they don't need. What is objectionable about the Report is that it doesn't take seriously the reasons why countries do spend money on arms, and foolishly pretends that peripheral considerations (and some non-considerations) are the heart of the matter.

Good v. Evil

Blackpool

AID to the Third World was one of the hardest issues facing the Labour movement, Dame Judith Hart (Labour MP for Lanark and a member of Labour's national executive) told delegates.

At the close of a debate on Aid to the Third World, Dame Judith—a former Labour Minister of Overseas Development—said:

"In the context of conference this week, this is a highly unifying subject.

"We are all in favour of good things and against evil. We favour assistance to the Third World, the brotherhood of man, and helping the poor.

"But do not think this is a nice, gentle issue on which you can all go away feeling you have done a good thing, having said we want to help the poor of the Third World."

It was a difficult problem because it was central to socialist policies.

The conference called for implementation of the Brandt Commission report on Western aid to the Third World. The resolution, supported by the NEC, was carried unanimously.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

BOTH OF THESE ABERRATIONS make perfect sense if one realises that the Brandt Commission has indulged in an act of distributionist fantasy of a kind familiar to the world for at least two centuries. Inequality is a special case of maldistribution, and arms spending appears, in these myopically utilitarian terms, as a special case of waste. The population of the developing world is

understood as the victims of bad distribution, and their *essential needs must be met* by rational management.

The phrase italicised in the last sentence is the key grammatical mood of the Report: imperatives in the passive voice yoked to pleonastic abstractions.

The real triumph of fantasy lies in such extreme locutions as occur when the Report tells us that branches of a reformed World Bank "should be adequately funded and should achieve a uniformly high standard of management. . . ." Here the grammar of exposition has entirely obliterated any hint of a gap between Report and reality. Yet the real defect of the Report is in the fact that it does not even seem to realise that the entire dimension of political conflict has been left out. It hopes that the evidently increasing interdependence of the peoples of the world will be an incentive to us all to act in a more rational and cooperative manner. What is unfortunately clear from national experience over the last few years is that increasing interdependence

within nations has merely meant a growth in bloody-mindedness as the multitude of small groups on whom we all rely seize their newly discovered power in order to maximise their advantages; and OPEC has pioneered the same technique in the world at large.

Still, one cannot expect very much reality from a set of Commissioners who imagine that a global development tax "could be a valuable step towards creating a genuine community of nations. . . ." What they have achieved is to put together a great deal of useful information organised in terms of the long familiar *genre* of the discussions of global poverty and directed to this problem conceived as if it were a problem of some long-awaited "managerial revolution."

But this is only part of the picture; and it is evident that the last place from which we should seek enlightenment on the whole problem is from a non-responsible, internationally representative Commission of (to use their own quaint terminology) "Eminent Persons."

The Real Poverty of Nations

By William Letwin



AMONG THE deficiencies of the Brandt Report, one is its inadequate explanation of why the poorest countries remain so poor. This is a fatal flaw, for in the Commission's view it is a matter of life and death for all human beings everywhere to cure the poverty of the poor countries. Unless conditions improve quickly in those countries, "the world" cannot long "survive", says the Report. These sedate abstract terms

convey the Commission's somewhat hysterical fear that our species faces early extinction. But what hope can we have that the remedies proposed by the Report will overcome the poverty of poor countries, if (as I maintain) the Commission has failed in the first place to understand correctly the causes of their poverty?

The practical burden of curing poverty, or most of the burden, is assigned by the Report to "the industrialized nations, without whose help the poorer countries can hardly succeed." Why, one could ask, cannot the poorer countries today "succeed"—which in the Commission's vocabulary means industrialise, modernise, or (roughly) become approximately like us—without help? After all, among today's rich countries there are many, and some of those the richest, who did enrich themselves without "foreign aid." If they were able to do it on their own, why cannot the poorer countries of today? What *keeps* them so poor? That is the question which the Report does too little to answer.

The Commission's analysis is most clearly

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displayed in its account (chap. 4) of what it calls the "poorest countries", a category which overlaps with what others call the "least developed countries" or *LDCs*. The Commission's "poorest countries" are 29 which lie in a zone that stretches across Central Africa and Southern Asia. There live some 300 million people whose average annual incomes are reckoned to be about \$150 or £62. As has often been pointed out, such figures are

suspect. They suggest that a person could stay alive on 41¢ (17p) a day, a sum which, even if spent on the cheapest foods, would not stave off starvation for many years. And as these figures are averages, many persons in those countries would have less than that to spend on food, leaving nothing at all for clothing, shelter, or indeed anything else. Yet people in those countries do not *typically* starve; on the contrary, their numbers are generally increas-

A View from Paris . . .



HOW CAN words of lamentation even attempt to describe the photographs which have recently been emerging from Africa? In Uganda the famine appears as a tableau of skeletons, like some medieval dance of death.

Meanwhile, back in New York, the United Nations have been examining problems of Development and of "economic relations between the industrialised nations and the underdeveloped world." Next year a North-South summit is to study the findings of the Brandt Commission in favour of massive transfers of resources from the richer countries to the poorer. Underlying all these conferences is the assumption that the source of underdevelopment is purely economic, and has nothing to do with Third World politics.

The tragic story of Uganda provides at least one example of the inadequacy of this explanation. Not very long ago, Uganda was one of Africa's most fertile regions: trade flourished there, thanks to a long-established Asian minority population. Then came General Idi Amin Dada, and in just a few years he exterminated a good part of the African population, expelled the Asians, ruined both agriculture and commerce, and transformed a land of plenty into a chamber of horrors. It is impossible even for the most guilt-ridden of Westerners to see this act of self-destruction as anything but a strictly native concern, especially when other African nations have a long history of abject complaisance (and even, in some cases, of admiration) displayed towards Amin; as for good old reliable Colonel Gaddafi, he went on providing military aid to the very last minute.

THAT LAST MINUTE was brought about or at least accelerated by the intervention of the Tanzanian

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army. To begin with it was a humanitarian rescue mission, and the West applauded; but the Tanzanian army subsequently turned into an army of occupation and it brought looting, extortion, and starvation to what remained of the Ugandan people. Tanzania behaved, and is still behaving, like a conquering power. Here, too, the havoc was purely African in origin. The famine in Uganda resulted not from economic backwardness but from political criminality.

A Europe whose suicidal struggles have inflicted two World Wars on our planet is certainly in no position to preach lessons; and I do not intend to do so. What I do want to say is that conferences on the subject of "the Third World" are doomed to continuing failure as long as they keep concentrating on nothing but the economic causes of underdevelopment and ignoring the political causes which are often more decisive, and which may be identified under the names of despotism, incompetence, waste, extortion, and corruption. As Bechir Ben Yahmed bravely proclaimed in an editorial in "Jeune Afrique" in 1976: "It is not the people who are underdeveloped . . ."

To be sure, it is not very hard to understand why some Third World leaders stand by the purely economic diagnosis of underdevelopment. It enables them to blame the "overdeveloped" nations for their own short-comings, to divert international attention from their own greed and incompetence, and to keep obtaining further Western (or Northern) credits to finance their perpetuation.

I DO NOT WANT to be interpreted as advocating a return to what in France used to be called "Cartierism", after the journalist Raymond Cartier who favoured the total suspension of all aid to the poor countries. The industrialised world has a duty to shoulder its own responsibilities, but only its own; and there is no doubt in my mind that aid has to be not only continued but increased and diversified. But it also has to be made more effective; and to that end the problem of the developing zones must necessarily be seen in the same way as we see those of other parts of the world. When we look at inflation and unemployment in the industrialised countries we talk about the responsibilities and managerial methods of the leaders of those countries, and not just about historic economic forces. When some sector is in crisis in the West, we blame the short-sightedness of

ing. It must follow that whatever the official statistics say about average earned incomes in those countries, the average level of real consumption is quite considerably larger. Here again the Commission over-dramatises, though in an apparently undramatic style. Nevertheless, nobody can doubt that most people in those countries are in point of fact drastically poor, by comparison with most people in all other countries.

... by Jean-François Revel

management and the improvidence of the State. When we talk about economic collapse in Communist societies (as in Poland today), we take no pains to overlook the political problem of governmental competence and confusion. Why should the question of political competence and honesty become taboo as soon as we approach the Third World?

WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, do we never re-examine the principle of those sacrosanct "agrarian reforms"? They always involve, not distributing the land to the peasants, but allotting it to cooperatives under the control of ignorant and venal urban bureaucrats, and hence causing such discouragement among the peasants, and such a fall in productivity, that countries which once had thriving agricultural bases are now reduced to importing basic foodstuffs. Why do we only refer to the fatal consequences of corruption when discussing the fall of the late Shah of Iran? It is a notorious commonplace that it flourishes at the highest levels of any number of régimes (and not least in the most "progressive" ones). Why do we do this—because we are the so-called friends of the Third World?

Of the Third World, or of the Third World's tyrants? How odd it is that the sufferings of the poorer nations only arouse indignation when they can be angrily blamed on the West. Former colonies have been removed from foreign domination only to bow down to the rule of tyrants sprung from their own ranks, and whose cruelty and ravages seem thereby to be legitimised by Independence. If the governments of the Third World are becoming more and more emancipated from the political supremacy of the developed Northern nations, the peoples of the Third World are more and more the slaves of their own governments, most of them established by more or less violent coups. Political egalitarianism among States has benefited mainly autocrats whom we refrain from calling to account for delicate and embarrassed reasons of post-colonial decorum. With the help of UNESCO, they even want to prevent light being shed on their activities, so that "imperialist" information is censored, rigged and "re-structured" in their favour.

And all to what end? The outcome is the stare of dying children looking at us out of those pictures from Uganda.

Jean-François Revel

THE CHIEF CAUSES OF poverty in the poorest countries, according to the Report, are these. First is *Water*. Agriculture, the main support, is plagued in Central Africa by drought, in South Asia by monsoon floods, and in both by extreme irregularities of rainfall. (2) *Disease*. Bilharzia, sleeping sickness, and river-blindness more or less debilitate most of the people, making it impossible for them to work well. (3) *An increasing shortage of Fuel*. According to the Report, nine-tenths of the people in most of the poorer countries "depend on firewood as their chief source of fuel." But the forests are being used up, which not only reduces the supply of wood but accelerates the erosion of soil, to the detriment of food output. Moreover, as firewood becomes scarcer, farmers burn more dung for fuel and so have less left for manure, which again reduces the output of food. In order to keep up their output in the face of diminished fertility, farmers must bring additional land under cultivation, which they can only do by clearing more forest—from all of which results a downward spiral of both fuel and food.

In short, according to the Commission, the culprit is Nature. It keeps those people poor by providing too little rain or too much, too many parasites and bacteria, too few trees, too strong a sun. And because they are poor they are unable to circumvent the deprivations of Nature. They lack the resources artificially to control her perversity (as by irrigation) or to evade her influence (as by industrialisation).

But this analysis is radically incomplete. To be sure, a poor environment tends to keep its inhabitants poor: you will not grow much grain on barren land or pasture large flocks in the desert. Yet, on the other hand, there is hardly any environment so poor that people have not managed to survive in it for centuries and millennia. Eskimos force a living out of the Arctic wastes and Aborigines out of the Australian desert. Compared with them and many others like them, the people who live in Central Africa and Southern Asia inhabit a lush paradise—and yet they are not only poor but (the Report tells us) facing sharp decline in their living standards. Why?

FUNDAMENTALLY the reason is that too many people live in the African-Asian zone of extreme poverty. There are too many people, to be more precise, in view of the quantity and quality of land, water, and trees that constitute their natural

endowment, and in view also of the techniques which they presently use for growing, grazing, picking, hunting, and collecting. There are so many people that most of them live barely above the level of subsistence, and masses of them are starved off whenever a sporadic natural disaster strikes. It is not the unpropitiousness of their natural environment which chiefly causes their economic misery, and certainly not (as the Report sometimes suggests) any past or present exploitation by the rich countries, but simply their own overpopulation. It is this basic difficulty which the Report, while occasionally mentioning, consistently underrates.

If overpopulation is at the seat of the disorder, then many will say that birth control is the obvious solution. And many in "Northern" countries believe that the main reason why people in the poorest countries do not practise birth control is "ignorance." They conclude that if we assiduously spread the word and the pill among them, they will have fewer children and so on down until everything comes back into balance. Such a view is ridiculously simple-minded. Ignorance is not the only, or chief, reason why people have children. Many people positively wish to bear large families, for a large variety of complex reasons; and the strength of the desire, in some communities and even among the poor, is amply illustrated by the resistance which many Indians put up against repeated urgent offers of sterilisation for which one needed to pay nothing (and might even be paid).

Another dubious analysis of overpopulation—or "the Malthusian trap"—is that it originates in poverty itself. This notion stems from the accurate observation that birth-rates are distinctly lower today in the rich countries than in the poor countries, and from the totally unwarranted inference that the mere fact of being "rich"—that is, of having an income well above subsistence—somehow induces people to want fewer children. Here we have a blatant instance of a correlation being interpreted in a totally arbitrary way. It is hard to understand why being well-off would make a person want fewer children; it is much easier to understand that having many children will tend to keep all of them and their parents relatively badly-off. Moreover, a more detailed examination of the historical statistics casts heavier doubt on the presumed law.

In Europe and America during the 19th century, birth-rates did not fall in measure as incomes rose. Still more important, during the long period when birth-rates were falling and incomes rising, many

other conditions were changing as well—such as people's religious affiliations and beliefs, the drift of people from country to town, and the fracturing of the extended family—and these may well have had far more effect on birth-rates than rising incomes did. In other words, the supposed tendency of increased incomes to lower the birth-rate, even had it operated in Europe and North America, need not be replicated in Central Africa and Southern Asia. There is no sound basis for supposing that if the North improved the incomes of the South by a rapid injection of gifts, this would relieve the pressure of population growth in the South.

WHAT THEN should be done? The Commission proposes that the food-producing capacity of the poorest countries should be expanded by solving the problems of water, health, and fuel. They outline projects for irrigation and flood control, for disease control, and for rapid reforestation. These projects are, in some broad sense, technically feasible; and if the Commission has accurately estimated the costs—which is always, in the nature of such costings, questionable—the rich countries could finance them.

But what would these projects accomplish? If the Commission's hopes were realised, they would greatly raise the incomes of the people in the poorest countries without raising their number too much. If, on the contrary, the people of the poorest countries have a virtually insatiable demand for children or virtually indestructible objections to birth control, then the effect of all these colossal projects would be to increase the number of people in the poorest countries while leaving each of them just as poor as they are now. The people of the North would be impoverishing themselves for no better end than to swell the number of poor in the South; and the more they did, the worse would be the outcome. Most of the experience of foreign-aid programmes to date testifies to their uselessness or worse. As the Brandt Commission cannot maintain that foreign aid has been highly successful so far, it speaks instead of the extinction which threatens the human race if the rich countries do not increase the flow of foreign aid. The Commission is like the old barber-surgeon: as bleeding has not reduced the patient's fever, bleed him more.

ALTHOUGH I HAVE concentrated in this comment on what might be described as purely economic considerations, the Brandt Commission refers fre-

quently to moral, political, and social considerations as well. It reports, for instance, that "changes in family values and relations" are needed in the poor countries; that it is necessary "to liberate people from outworn ideas"; that it is essential to establish "a global consensus on the moral plane that the basis of any world or national order must be people and respect for their essential rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. . . ." We should rejoice that the Commission is enlightened enough to recognise that large-scale public policies, though intended to achieve economic improvement, cannot be formulated sensibly by pure, narrow economic reasoning. But the lazy platitudes with which the Report addresses the moral, political, and social domains can give us no grounds for confidence in the breadth or depth of the Commission's judgment.

The Politics of Self-Deception

By Elie Kedourie



THE SO-CALLED "Brandt Report"—*The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt*—is published to the world under the title *North-South: A Programme for Survival*. The title is a good one. Its six words summarise and

encapsulate the assumptions and arguments of the Report. They open up for us a window from which to contemplate the exhibition of conventional wit and wisdom which is displayed wherever two or three men of light and leading, men such as Willy Brandt himself, Edward Heath, Olof Palme, Shridath Ramphal, Amir H. Jamal and Antoine Kipsa Dakouré (to choose at random from the list of Commissioners and the Eminent Persons who appeared before them) are gathered together in solemn conclave.

North-South: the Commission proclaims, *A Programme for Survival*. We are then to understand that survival, the survival of us all, is threatened, and that the Report is a kind of a life-saving kit. What is the "mortal danger" which threatens us, our children and grandchildren, if we are to believe Herr Brandt's emphatic, nay vatic,

warnings? The fear oppressing him and his fellow-Commissioners is summarised by the first two words of their title—the fear of a clash between the North and the South:

"There is a real danger that in the year 2000 a large part of the world's population will still be living in poverty. The world may become overpopulated and will certainly be over-urbanised. Mass starvation and the dangers of destruction may be growing steadily—if a new major war has not already shaken the foundations of what we call world civilisation."

"A week", (as Prime Minister Harold Wilson used to instruct us) "is a long time in politics." But here we are invited to look forward twenty years. Twenty years! Who in 1900 could have foreseen the downfall twenty years later of the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, the Romanoffs, and the Osmanlis? And who in 1920 could have foretold the monstrous apparition a few years hence of Hitler and Stalin? But Herr Brandt's Commissioners, blessed with extra-sensory historical perception, can pierce and penetrate futurity. It may be said that their divination is—cannot but be—sound and accurate. For what do they prophesy but that in the year 2000 poverty will still be with us? But the point is not that "poverty is always with us": for it is part of the delusive enterprise of this Report to spread the illusion that, if its advice is promptly followed, poverty need not be with us at all in the year 2000. One looks hard at the miracle-workers: Mr Robert McNamara (who first suggested this Commission), Dr Kurt Waldheim (who agreed to receive the very first copy of the Report), and the cloud of *illustrissimi* hovering and glimmering about them—and one recalls the earlier stars of earlier remakes of the anti-poverty scenario: one can almost hear the flutter of F.D.R. and Henry Wallace, Sir William Beveridge and John F. Kennedy . . . *O Camerados!*

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But suppose that in our benighted foolishness we fail to heed the Commissioners' wisdom—and suppose the plagues foretold by them will actually afflict what is called the South: overpopulation... over-urbanisation... mass starvation. Is it really true that this will bring about an Armageddon to endanger utterly our survival, and that of our children and grandchildren? Anyone considering the question in a cool hour will surely conclude that on present evidence this is simply not true. It is not Mrs Indira Gandhi, even with a General Zia flanking her on either side, who can wage a war to destroy civilisation; still less Kaunda or Nyerere or Mugabe or Machel or liberated Liberia's Master-Sergeant Doe. To look for mortal danger in their

direction is to deceive oneself and others. "North-South" is *not* the axis of a world-shaking and world-annihilating conflict. It is not fear of the South which forces us to shoulder our fearful burden of armaments.

WHY THEN SPEAK of "North-South" at all? The "South" has always exercised a great power of attraction over the European imagination. Voluptuous langour, soft and balmy breezes, bougainvillea and orange blossom, cicadas singing in the still and hot afternoon, passion and mystery are evoked and conjured up for the Northerner. For all this romanticism there is here dryly sub-

Planning for Miracles

New York

THE INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund and Tanzania are concluding negotiations on a major loan agreement that will reportedly provide between \$150 million and \$200 million to the East African Socialist nation.

U.S. and Tanzanian officials say the loan is accompanied by far more lenient terms than those usually demanded of borrowers from the fund. In recent months, the IMF has gradually eased the traditional practice of attaching strict conditions to its loans.

The fund has been severely criticized particularly by Third World borrowers, for insisting on restrictive economic policies as a condition for access to its resources.

TANZANIA, its economy devastated by a combination of bad crop years, higher oil prices and a costly invasion of neighboring Uganda, first began talks with the IMF last year, but a team sent to Dar es Salaam so irritated Tanzanian officials that negotiations were broken off by President Julius Nyerere.

"It was the tone", said Paul Bomani, Tanzanian ambassador to the U.S. "It smacked of all the old condescending attitudes of the colonial period. The President was very surprised by their crude approach."

The Tanzanians had been told that they had to adopt the fund's complete package of traditional policy prescriptions, including devaluation, a curtailment of growth of the public sector, a loosening of government regulation of imports and foreign investment, and liberalization of monetary controls.

In an angry speech, President Nyerere charged that these policies would sabotage the country's Socialist development program, and denounced as "strange and repugnant the attempt by the International Monetary Fund to exploit difficulties in order to interfere with the management of our economy."

"We clarified once and for all that there should be

no requirement that Tanzania change its political policies or ideological orientation", Mr Bomani said.

He added that the Tanzanian government was now eagerly waiting to learn whether a major credit from the World Bank, which was being negotiated simultaneously with the IMF loan, will also be forthcoming shortly.

THE GOVERNMENTS of Tanzania and Jamaica were among the sponsors of an international conference in Arusha, Tanzania, this summer, and a report emanating from the meeting, co-sponsored by such foundations as the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation of Sweden and the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, was released at the United Nations last week.

It called for still further liberalization of fund conditions, in particular, to avoid "penalization of countries which opt for strategies which emphasize national planning, systems of administrative budgeting (of foreign exchange, imports, investment and credit), the reform of traditional institutions, and an active role for the public sector."

Ann Crittenden

in THE NEW YORK TIMES

ONE CAN sympathise with—even if his logic is not quite comprehensible—the Finance Minister of Tanzania, Amir H. Jamal, who when he was advised to try to become self supporting by "putting his house in order", exploded at the recent World Bank Conference in Washington in September, "What kind of sense is it when the thatched roof of that house is catching fire, and the floods or blizzards are deluging in at the same time?..." Economic wonders are difficult enough to achieve—can the North be called upon to deliver meteorological miracles as well in a Nature-plagued South?

N.N.

stituted a drab abstraction. If one were to ask Herr Brandt, *Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen*, he would answer with talk about development and decolonisation, and about transnational corporations and a “new economic order.” All this stodge is predicated on some kind of Marxism, albeit a heretical one. For the Report is a sermon based on the gospel of Li-Ta-Chao, Sultan Galiev, Tan Malaka, Ikki Kita, Fanon, Gadafi and Bani-Sadr—which preaches that the *real* class struggle is not between capitalists and proletarians in industrial societies, but between the rich industrial nations of the North and the exploited proletarian nations of the South. Commissioner Layachi Yaker of Algeria, Commissioner Amir H. Jamal of Tanzania, or Commissioner Adam Malik of Indonesia may eagerly wish to assent to this view of things; but is it clear that Commissioner Katharine Graham (Chairman of the Board of the *Washington Post*) or Commissioner Edward Heath (former Leader of the British Conservative Party) or Commissioner Edgard Pisani (Senator and Minister under de Gaulle) know to what strange and barbarous propositions they are committing themselves? Lenin believed that capitalists will “provide the rope” by which they will be hanged. But even with the stoutest rope in the world, the South may not quite be able to manage the execution; if this Report is any evidence, it will have to be carried out by the willing victims themselves.

OVERLAYING THE IMPLICIT—and by most Western Commissioners probably unrecognised—pseudo-Marxism lurking in the “North-South” concept, a different theory can be detected in the Report. It is by no means compatible with this false vision of a world divided between North and South. This other, equally false, theory is that the world is “one global village” in which the interests of everybody are fully compatible with those of everybody else, are perhaps even identical with one another. Mankind wants to survive, and peace (in Willy Brandt’s words) is the aim of all religions, beliefs, and philosophies. But just as it is untrue that there is a clear and distinct conflict which divides North and South (with all the immense variety of their circumstances) into two antagonistic blocs, it is equally untrue that peace is in fact the aim of all religions, beliefs, and philosophies. Not peace, but struggle and contention is the aim and policy of the Soviet Union, of the Red Brigades, of Saddam and Asad, of the Ayatollah and his followers, of the IRA and ETA, of the ELF and the PLO.

Suppose the massive transfer of resources to the South advocated in the Report has taken place, is there any reason whatsoever to think that the world

would be a more peaceful place? Huge amounts of aid have already gone to the countries of Asia and Africa. Is the world in consequence discernibly safer, significantly more peaceful? It can, on the contrary, be argued that this very transfer of resources has exacerbated international relations, and indeed has in some cases enabled the sworn enemies of the donors to prosecute all-the-more effectively the campaign against their benefactors.

Herr Brandt pats himself on the back for the *Ostpolitik* and claims that it has averted a “sterile and dangerous confrontation.” Small wonder. It takes two parties to engage in confrontation; if one party becomes stronger and the other weaker, “confrontation”, no doubt about it, becomes much less likely. If one party provides sweeteners and benevolences to the other, confrontation may likewise be—for a time—averted.

This is not the only example of a deplorable tendency to avert one’s eyes from realities and to go in for simplistic judgments which characterises the Report. Readers may find this all the more surprising in a document prepared by, among others, experienced world figures who have had to deal with complex political and economic affairs. Thus, the Report blandly asserts that in Africa valuable human potentialities continue to be fettered because of the “struggle for decolonisation.” How can one, looking at the corruption, the tyranny and the massacres and the anarchy rampant today in decolonised Africa, fail to see that the great enemy of African welfare is not “colonial rule” but those very African governments who are to benefit from the vast resources the transfer of which is now demanded? The Report, again, has very harsh things to say about the export of weapons and armaments to the South. It dallies with abstruse calculations such as that the cost of one tank would be enough to set up nothing less than 40,000 village pharmacies. Pharmacies are, on the face of it, wholly beneficent institutions; they contribute to the preservation and prolongation of life. But at the same time Herr Brandt and his fellow-Commissioners are haunted by the spectre of over-population. These hard dilemmas are where the problem always begins; we get nowhere with baby-talk. As for those expensively armoured tanks they are clearly engines of destruction, but which of the commissioners would like to see their country (Austria, India, Sweden, Gabon?) completely denuded of tanks? A line of armour—worth perhaps half-a-million pharmacies somewhere—once protected free West Berlin when Willy Brandt was its Mayor.

However, let us indulge the Commissioners in their old-fashioned Hobsonian indignation against “the merchants of death.” But merchants are dealers; they sell and they buy. Doesn’t the Brandt Commission recognise that if there were no buyers, there would be no sellers? It is an embarrassing

subject, and the Report treads warily. Indeed it is utterly innocent of even the mildest stricture against Libya or Saudi Arabia, against Iraq or Ethiopia, and their insatiable hunger for *Migs* and *Mysterès* and F-16s. . . .

out that there is today absolutely no shortage of oil, and that, traded in a free market, this commodity would not fetch a tenth of its current price. It is painful to have to read a document in which words and facts and values are so intolerably incongruent.

THE MORAL ASTIGMATISM which condemns Northern exporters of arms but remains silent about Southern importers is also in evidence when the Report discusses the supply and price of oil. The report recognises the great harm done to poor countries everywhere in the Afro-Asian world by the exorbitant rise in the price of oil since 1973—a nasty blow delivered against the South by the South. It carefully avoids saying anything which would imply that far from being some incalculable, inexplicable “act of God”, this rise was shrewdly engineered by a producers’ Cartel. If the Cartel had been coolly operated by a monopolistic European or American enterprise would it have benefited from the Commissioners’ indulgent silence?

Double standards are bad enough, but the Commissioners are not content with passing the Cartel mutely by. They go out of their way to endorse OPEC’s apologies by arguing that the present price of oil reflects its long-term scarcity and its depletability. This presbyopia no doubt complements the Commissioners’ far-sightedness in also predicting over-population and over-urbanisation twenty years hence. How much less speculative—and how much more accurate—to have pointed

I FEEL IT WOULD BE UNJUST to conclude on a negative note. For one suggestion made in the Report opens up, perhaps unwittingly, a promising avenue for the solution of North-South problems.

The Commissioners demand on behalf of the “developing countries” the right to participate, the right to share in the decision-making processes of the International Monetary Fund and other Northern financial institutions. If this is a valuable and viable principle, the Commissioners would surely not oppose its universal application. As a *quid pro quo* for the massive transfer of capital resources to the South which they also demand, would they not agree that the purveyors of those resources—the treasure of hundreds of millions of diligent Western citizens—should, in all fairness, have a proportionate say in the decision-making processes of the governments of the South? Not only would justice be done, but conceivably the South might once more begin to enjoy the security and the modest prosperity banished by the Ayatollahs and the Amins, the Bokassas and the Pol Pots, the Nkrumahs and the Lumumbas to whom Afro-Asian power was cynically conveyed or nervelessly resigned.

The Winter Capital

Sinking with distracted plumage now
Venus’ doves decline towards the hospice
Of the West. The corrupted sea looks up
At keels furnished for eager roads
And tall economies. Blazon us
Upon the air, sigh defeated magistrates,
We should have stayed with princes
Among flat keys, a lengthy footage
Of worn wars and unimpressive foreheads.

Tread on the earth with the sweet
Misura of a perfect instep—it is not
Too late to be free of history.
Sisters of the quail in broad sun-hats,
You have the Cart of Venus under you
And plural cities waiting. No one
May break the dance and changing partners
Is called love. Not just Winter
But the genius of the world has turned.

Peter Porter

*No
need
to go
Christmas
crackers*



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UNDER WESTERN EYES

False Dilemmas, Real Alternatives

The Politics of Survival—By LEOPOLD LABEDZ

*"A big cloud and such a small shadow.
Strange."*

STANISLAW J. LEC



FAILURES in Afghanistan and in Poland surely indicated Soviet imperial weaknesses. Yet at the same time they provided a demonstration of the growing impotence of the West, which was later

underlined when the war between Iraq and Iran threatened its oil supplies. Whatever satisfaction could be derived from the evidence of Soviet difficulties was marred by the lengthening shadow of Soviet military might.

One can, of course, always find a silver lining. "The Russians are not ten feet tall": their imperial expansion creates for them additional political/military problems and underscores the weaknesses of their economy; they do not achieve all their objectives; they do meet with reverses. But all this does not change the fact that the West is increasingly divided, worried about its deficiencies, and uneasy about the future. Post-World War II history testifies to the West's failure to prevent the rise of the Soviet empire.

We hear little about Containment but much about the Soviet "window of opportunity" in the 1980s. Whatever the growing Soviet burdens of Empire and the long-term prospects of the eventual imperial collapse, complacent or naive expectation of its imminence is (to put it mildly) over-optimistic. The West faces growing dangers; its very survival is at stake, and the period before the fateful Orwellian year of 1984 may be critical in this respect. Can it be that the future of Western civilisation and of the "great globe itself" may well depend on the new American administration?

Before going on to assess the assumptions and arguments which underlie different Western attitudes to the problem, let me quote a relatively candid Soviet assertion about the present international situation (*Kommunist*, August 1980):

"These long summer days, filled with the important events which have been taking place this year, will long be remembered by all observers of political life on this planet. We are witnesses of and participants in developments on whose outcome the future of humanity largely depends. For a long time there was no such clear and obvious contrast between the opposing courses along which the socialist world and the capitalist world are moving. . . . Great changes which have taken place in the last decade are now involving the whole globe.

"The capitalist world is trying desperately to stop these developments. Its leaders, in the first place those of the USA who do not want to take into account the changed correlation of forces and who stubbornly aim at world domination, are more and more actively moving into a counter attack against all the conquests which the peoples won in the 1970s. . . . This counter-attack developed on a wide front. It included a frantic rearmament of the NATO member states, the speeding-up of political and military cooperation with China, and increased intervention in Asia and Africa. As a result new areas of conflict have emerged. China attacked Viet Nam, a dangerous situation arose around Iran, and an undeclared war against Afghanistan began. With it came an attempt to rally the NATO allies around the USA and to drag them into a crusade against communism. . . .

"But today the times are no longer what they were in the 1940s and '50s. . . . Many international and bilateral meetings, in particular those of Comrade Brezhnev with the French President Giscard d'Estaing and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, have confirmed that *Détente*, however much Washington politicians may try to destroy it, has taken deep roots and that there is a real possibility of safeguarding and strengthening this positive process.

"This is understandable. After all, *Détente* is a natural result of the new world correlation of

forces which has emerged in the last decades. The military-strategic balance between the socialist world and the capitalist world is an achievement of fundamental historic significance. . . . To achieve and maintain such military-strategic balance has certainly not been easy. It demanded great efforts on the part of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries. But it was well worth while."

Never mind the standard Soviet mendacity. The "undeclared war against Afghanistan" does not refer here to the Soviet invasion, but to some alleged American-Chinese-Pakistani incursion. Like "South Korea's attack on North Korea" in 1950, this is the usual Orwellian reversal in Soviet *Newspeak*; anybody who reads the Soviet press regularly is used to such routine inversions. But what is striking here is the emphasis on Soviet military prowess and its world-political significance.

On this one point there is general agreement, whatever differing political conclusions be drawn from it. As Richard Lowenthal puts it (in his article "The Shattered Balance" in the November ENCOUNTER), there is a common consensus that the West found itself at the end of the 1970s "in a position of relative weakness. . . ."

This was certainly not because the Soviet Union was "a secret wrapped in mystery inside an enigma." For decades it was one of the least inscrutable of political systems. The real enigma is why the West so persistently refuses to face its totalitarian and expansionist character, to learn the obvious lessons of experience, to understand the clear and present danger. Why is there such a big cloud, such a small shadow?

THE ESSENTIAL REASON why the West is entering the 1980s as a dangerous decade is its constant tendency to try to escape reality. Wishful thinking is, in my view, the factor underlying the lack of decisions which could assure its survival, underlying indeed its lack of political will to counter the threat effectively, and its recurring self-deceptions about Soviet intentions and strategy. We are dealing with varying combinations of complacency and fear—political emotions which are present in different proportions at different times in all the Western countries, whatever form their specific national neuroses may take. As economic welfare falters and geopolitical threats mount, one can trace this tendency in all the *corsi e ricorsi* of easy tranquility and belated anxiety in Western foreign and defence policies. Euphoria is followed by distress; and then the growing awareness of historic danger is once again blurred by yet another turn to anodyne political hope. Sporadic efforts to confront the situation realistically are succeeded by new illu-

sions, while Soviet expansionism continues unabated with no attempt made to exploit its weaknesses.

One can also see these *corsi e ricorsi* through a declining spiral of Western fortunes in the changes of political climate on the Western scene. First "optimism" then "disappointment" marks the cycle of Western perceptions of Soviet political developments. The Western "experts" proceed to change their analysis accordingly, and we can look back on a plethora of rationalisations. Two are most persistent. First, we can do little because we are presumed to be caught in a cruel dilemma (*pace* George F. Kennan) between political morality versus *Realpolitik*; and then we can do even less because, after all, we are all part of a clash of "mere self-interest" among modern Nation-States. But historically these have proved themselves to be false dilemmas. European leaders have often sacrificed *both* political morality *and* their basic state interests on the altar of shortsighted considerations which, however they may be rationalised at any given moment, contributed neither to morality nor to the essential self-interest of the state, nor in general to the survival of Western liberal societies.

Recall the illusions of Yalta about post-War harmonies, and how the brave new world of the "United Nations" was belatedly followed by a grudging realisation of "Good Uncle Joe's" ambitions. In the wake of such broken illusions came the Containment doctrine of NATO. From the Prague February 1948 coup until the death of Stalin five years later, Soviet expansionism did encounter genuine Western resistance. Together with the temporary weakening of the Soviet Union such resistance made for an end to the Korean War, and indeed for a small Soviet withdrawal as arranged in 1955 in the Austrian neutrality treaty. But soon the post-Stalin USSR resumed its momentum (marked dramatically by the Shepilov 1955 Cairo arms deal).

By that time the predominant Western hopefulness had focused optimistically on the forthcoming "liberalisation" and "democratisation" of the Soviet Union, a simple-mindedness assiduously popularised by such Sovietological experts as Isaac Deutscher among others. After the end of a short-lived "de-Stalinisation", these illusions were more difficult to sustain under Brezhnev. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis did provide a shock, but it was wholly absorbed in the complacency generated by exaggerated interpretations of the "humiliating defeat" of the Soviet Union, forced "to face down" from the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. Both President Eisenhower's earlier decision to rely increasingly on (relatively cheap) nuclear weapons and Robert McNamara's decision to freeze the production of new missiles in the 1960s in the

belief that the Russians themselves would not build them (a miscalculation which issued in the grotesquely absurd idea that a "peace process" would only begin when an insecure Kremlin finally achieved parity!) reflected the American unwillingness to be realistic about new aspects of the Soviet threat. And who in all the NATO countries was eager to underwrite the high budgetary costs of resistance? The American electorate, after the experience of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, became increasingly weary of bearing alone the sacrifices involved.

I AM AFRAID that Western politicians displayed here the same myopic opportunism in their failure of leadership as their predecessors before Hitler's War. The 1960s echoed the follies of the 1930s. The Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine led to a further round of illusions: viz. SALT's alleged "arms control process" of the 1970s. Earlier self-deceptions about that Soviet "liberalisation", which never really took place as far as institutions are concerned, were followed by the self-deceptions of *Détente*. The Nixon-Kissinger doctrine postulated a "structure of peace" based on


¹ See the eloquent pamphlet of Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger* (Simon & Schuster, 1980), and also the incisive analysis of Robert Conquest, *Present Danger* (Blackwell, 1979).

Soviet acceptance of the *status quo* through "new incentives." Soviet evolution in this hoped-for direction was to be encouraged by economic credits, by technology transfers, and by "Basket Three" of the Helsinki agreement.

I think it is unnecessary to stress how utterly foolish all these political figments appear in the 1980s. I am alarmed, however, that still these illusory expectations linger on; the reality of the present danger is not yet generally acknowledged.¹

As long as the causes are not realistically diagnosed no effective therapy can be applied. As a new wave of somewhat sophisticated rationalisations replaces the old illusions, clarity seems to recede even further. The best way to assess the value of these new rationalisations is, I suggest, to look at the record to examine the *past* expectations of those who are now producing new foreign-policy recommendations.

MEN ARE RELUCTANT to remember, and "memory retrieval" is necessary for assessing the premises of policies which have led to such grievous disappointments in the past—despite so many warning voices. These included such figures as Senator Henry Jackson, Eugene V. Rostow, James Schlesinger and Paul H. Nitze, as well as analysts such as Richard Pipes, Robert Conquest, Albert Wohlstetter, Theodore Draper, Leonard



Schapiro, and myself. They were all branded as "hawks", and were generally dismissed as panic-mongers (and sometimes even war-mongers).

In my own articles, and in the testimony I was invited to present to the US Senate, I put the following arguments:

"The policy of *Détente* provides an outlet for Western wishful thinking which is never far from the surface. It is unfashionable to mention risks, much less to insist that unless they are faced they may sooner or later turn into positive dangers. . . . *Détente* is by definition a transitional period and the question of what follows it is of cardinal importance. . . . Security in Europe is gradually redefined as anything that conforms to Soviet imperial goals. *Détente* is a matter of 'peaceful coexistence' in which the attacks on 'imperialism' are to be permitted as 'ideological struggle', while criticism of Soviet actions is to be banished as 'a return to the spirit of the Cold War'."

"The Soviet Union and Western Europe",
Survey (Summer 1973)

And in Washington before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seven lean years ago:

"After the 1972 Moscow agreement on 'The Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the USSR' the Soviet press explained:

The strategic course of US policy is now changing before our very eyes from 'Pax Americana'—the Americanised formula of world domination—to a definite form of necessity for peaceful coexistence. But we must clearly understand that it is a forced change and that it is the actual power—social, economic and, ultimately, military power of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries—that compels the American ruling circles to make an agonising reappraisal. . . .

"It is not surprising that when Mr Brezhnev was faced with a direct question during his Washington visit—'how he reconciled the [Soviet military] build-up with his "peace policy"'—he laughed it all off as being an aberration of intelligence services of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. . . . Soviet economic and 'peace' offensives have been invariably greeted with sympathy, if not enthusiasm, in the West. Somehow or other they have been seen by sympathisers and 'realists' alike as signifying the Great Post-Revolutionary Turning Point when the Manichean perspective is given up by the Soviet leaders and 'live-and-let-live' becomes the new rule. . . . It is true that revolutions and empires do not last forever and that one day there will be a Great Turning Point in the Soviet Union; but that day has not yet come. The diagnosis which might fit the Roman Empire

under Emperor Nerva does not fit it under Augustus. . . . Concessions to and 'accommodations' of the expanding Soviet empire would not make its leaders more 'realistic' in accepting the *status quo* as a *modus vivendi*. . . . The idea that the risks and dangers inherent in the present *Détente* policy of the Soviet Union may be avoided through the creation of economic interdependence ('intermeshing' of vested interests) is an illusion. It is based on the usual fallacy of projecting Western categories on the Soviet scene—the familiar mirror-image misperception."

Testimony to the US Senate, July 1973

I concluded towards the end of "the Kissinger era", concerning the results of Dr K's "conceptual breakthroughs" and diplomatic prestidigitation, that:

"The effects of this policy are there for all to see. The United States faces a situation in which its credibility is undermined, its political prestige lower than ever, its alliances shaken, its influence in Asia and Africa is waning, its friends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe feel betrayed, and its own public is thoroughly confused.

This is not just the result of some 'objective process.' The policy was from the beginning based on a monumental piece of fatuous misjudgment. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could take seriously the premise of its two fundamental documents—the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the US and the USSR, signed in Moscow—which solemnly proclaimed that neither of the two powers would 'try to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other.' To present such surrealistic hopes about Soviet foreign policy behaviour as any kind of *Realpolitik* was a unique feat, indeed worthy to be included in the *Guinness Book of Records*. . . ."

Survey (Winter 1976)

Finally:

"Kissinger and Nixon proclaimed that 'the era of confrontation is over', and although Kissinger is perfectly aware of the character of Soviet policies, he has nevertheless chosen to confuse the public by the whole tenor of his *Détente* arguments. . . . The formula 'there is no alternative to *Détente*' follows the need to accommodate Soviet demands unilaterally, if necessary. This is a case of what I would call the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', for it is clearly a substitute—and a poor substitute at that—for a rigorous analysis of current Soviet policies against the background of history, and specifically Soviet history."

Détente (ed. George Urban, 1976)

HAVE THE LESSONS of the past, recent and more remote, really been absorbed? Even after the Soviet military build-up and expansionism under Brezhnev, the new American administration under President Carter continued with the same illusory premises in its foreign policy, naively hoping that it could turn over some new leaf, fondly imagining that giving up what the President called “the inordinate fear of communism” (and the related diplomacy from “a position of strength”) would somehow induce the Soviet Union to reciprocate. But the “Utgoff Principle”—named after a National Security adviser who advanced the proposition that the use of American power is immoral and dangerous—only brought further Soviet exploitation of Western weakness, especially in the continued drive towards the Persian Gulf. It took “Afghanistan” to make President Carter acknowledge how mistaken such an attitude was. But at the end of his four-year presidential term, the old voices of appeasement and confusion are still influential; and they include many who knew better in the past, but who have somehow managed to unlearn from experience.

Some, like Richard Lowenthal, believe that there was nothing basically wrong with the policies pursued by the West during the period of so-called “*Détente*.” He claims that since it was inaugurated by Nixon and Kissinger “the American world position was largely restored and looked incomparably better by 1973 than it had in 1968. . . .” But if this is so, where did the “shattered balance” come from?

“The success of *Détente* . . . was not based on illusions”, Lowenthal argues—but “it was in the past accompanied by a *propaganda* of illusions.” Can it be that President Nixon and Dr Kissinger didn’t actually believe in the prospect of the “stable structure of peace” which they proclaimed with such fanfare when they launched the doctrine underlying their policy of *Détente*? Now that Dr Kissinger has practically admitted that the basic military premises of his strategy were quite wrong, Professor Lowenthal finds himself in the curious position of defending Kissinger-in-power against Kissinger-out-of-power. Dr K himself has been obfuscating his past record while currently propagating a contrary position. This somersault is only matched by the similarly self-serving pronouncements of Richard M. Nixon who in his latest book, *The Real War* (1979), advocates the diametrically opposite policies to those he pursued as President—and claims that the *Détente* policy of his administration was “misunderstood.” But what is the worth of policies which, however rationalised, result in “a shattered balance”? If the policies were so good why was their outcome so bad? Kissinger and Nixon may make their political turns—not for the first time—but sober commentators should not get caught up in that intellectual vertigo.

THE AMERICAN WORLD POSITION was not “largely restored by 1973”, a high point of the illusions of *Détente*. On the contrary, Uncle Sam looked more and more like a helpless giant. The 1969–73 period only led to a further erosion of US power by disarming America politically and by generating its relative military weakness *vis-à-vis* the USSR. It was this peculiar paralysis of political will which permitted Soviet expansion in the 1970s. Lowenthal admits that “the ending of the Viet Nam War was pursued with least consistency and success.” But was “the effort to create a balance of power between American and Soviet strength” (which Lowenthal defines as “the essence of the other elements of *Détente*”) any more successful? To believe that it could have been achieved through *Détente* is a delusion. There was, in my view, a long-term price in “selling” *Détente* whether or not it was a way towards ending the Viet Nam conflict. To attempt now to divorce *Détente* from its “selling” is a weak analytical ploy. There was simply no way of “relaxing” without piling on illusions about the virtues of easy relaxation. It was all based on rosy exaggerations and optimistic slogans, lacking any basis in realistic analysis. It was by no means merely a Machiavellian device designed by Dr Kissinger to camouflage the retreat from Viet Nam; nor was it abandoned when this end was achieved. In any case, should not those analysts who are now re-rationalising the premises of that policy while deploring its erstwhile “overselling” have been critical of such “overselling” at the time? A great deal could (and should) have been said “to preserve the electorate’s willingness to maintain the balance of strength” between the US and the USSR. But since it wasn’t, the argument is nothing more than a *post hoc* apologia.

In practice, there was a very necessary connection between the illusions of *Détente* and its effects on “a clear sense of priorities and a readiness to make the efforts and sacrifices required, in Congress and public opinion. . . .” It is unrealistic to believe that it was possible to have the latter while providing people with the former. It confuses the matter to imply that it was possible to have one without the other, or that those who criticise the premises of the policy are “against negotiations” in general. Negotiations from a position of self-induced weakness, based on illusory expectations and lack of stamina, are clearly worse than nothing; and the experience of the 1970s has demonstrated this. A phase of decline cannot be regarnished and served up as a period of recovery; it is foolish to try now to separate the premises of a mistaken policy from its natural consequences.

WHAT OF THE ARGUMENT about “the limits of American power”? There are no doubt such shifting limits, and they are always relevant for political

strategy. But why should America's limits be considered greater than those of the Soviet Union? The disastrous change that has occurred in the balance of power is not just a result of "disregarding" such limits, but of a political attitude inside the USA which contributed to their shrinking.

ALL THIS is, I believe, vitally relevant to any set of policy recommendations to the new American administration. The starting point for Western policy must be the redress of what Richard Lowenthal calls "the shattered balance."

At the minimum this implies a change of attitude towards Soviet expansionism, and a renewed recognition of the necessity to contain it. But this cannot be done without an appropriate redress of the frame of mind which shattered the balance in the first place. Old truths—"Only power checks power"; "Expansionism cannot be stopped without resistance"—were grotesquely forgotten. To point out that the Soviet Union was not uniformly successful in this period (that, for instance, it lost Somalia by switching to Ethiopia) is hardly a consolation. The realistic and relevant consideration is that, on balance, whatever the Kremlin's partial setbacks, it *has* advanced, while the West's position has been steadily eroded. It has been estimated that the economic potential of the USA, Western Europe, and Japan is no less than five times greater than that of the Soviet Union. But potential strength is not, alas, the same as actual strength. Similarly, although Soviet economic and political weaknesses are growing, the fundamental asymmetry between the East and the West continues—since only one side, it is all too clear, is ready and willing to exploit the vulnerabilities of the other.

Unless a salutary shift occurs and the Soviet Union encounters resistance, no genuine reciprocity, however reluctant or opportunistic, can be expected from it in any future negotiations. When Professor Lowenthal asserts the need "both for negotiation and for strength", he is knocking on open doors. The point is that during the period in question the concern for strength in the field was sadly outstripped by the passion for negotiations at the diplomatic table. In the past, students of international affairs gave a name to this sort of attitude: appeasement. It is very small consolation when an Anglo-German observer now stresses that "since the inauguration of *Ostpolitik* the *Bundeswehr* ... has not fallen back in its strength." For, as recent opinion polls indicate, during the same period over 40% of the West Germans have become neutralist-minded.


In spite of the shock of Afghanistan, the "relaxed" attitude of the sometime hawks who have undergone *Détente* conversion (their friendship I cherish, but their views I deplore) has not benefited

from a rigorous analysis of experience in the light of expectations. The State Department's "Soviet Adviser", Dr Marshall Shulman, whose diplomatic recommendations were so accommodating to the USSR during his tenure of office in the Carter administration, talks now of "a terminal case of myopia" of *both* US and Soviet positions (*International Herald Tribune*, 1 September, 1980). This is a bogus symmetry; it reflects a failure in perception after a failure in policy. Another convert, now increasingly less "dovish", Professor William F. Griffith, who is deeply versed in the study of world politics, writes (*Survival*, July/August 1980) that:

"one of the principal lessons of Afghanistan is that *Détente* is only one part of American foreign policy, as it is of Soviet foreign policy. Competition is, and will remain, the larger part. . . ."

The emphasis is as different as in the well-known conflicts between the State Department and the National Security Council; but the statement overlooks the significance of *Détente* as a continuing element in the political strategy of the Soviet leaders. Can anybody seriously doubt that they know what they are doing, and that on the whole they have come out rather well in this phase of their long Cold War against the West?

YET ANOTHER TYPE of rationalisation is provided by the Italian commentator, Arrigo Levi. After the Gdansk upheaval, he argued (*The Times*, London, 11 September 1980) that this was "a textbook example of what the *Détente* policy of 1970 was supposed to achieve. . . ." He then approvingly cited the author of "the Sonnenfeldt doctrine" which was concerned precisely with the prevention of such events!



Illusions persist, simple-minded expectations die hard. President Carter addressed himself to the Soviet leaders (in his last State of the Union speech) as follows:

"The Soviet Union must answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a stable international environment in which its own legitimate peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its legitimate security needs, using that power for colonial conquests?"

Displaying similar "uncertainty", Secretary Muskie commented (*Time*, 16 June 1980) that the Soviet "tendency to take advantage of targets of opportunity . . . raises questions . . . about the USSR's commitment to *Détente*" and about "whether they really [*sic*] share our perceptions about the world, whether they believe in domination or coexistence." He also stated that "the invasion of Afghanistan is . . . a significant departure from the Russian norm in its international behaviour. . . ." Mr Muskie's predecessor, Cyrus Vance, actually affirmed that "President Carter and President Brezhnev share similar dreams and aspirations on all the important issues." If they were all born yesterday, they surely all need to be "born again."

IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, my strictures apply not only to Democrats but also to Republicans. President Carter assures us that he has, at long last, finally understood the world-political problem posed by the Soviet Union, but he has (as of this writing) abandoned neither his ambiguities and confusions, nor his diplomatic personnel who are committed to the old disastrous course. The new Republican platform was, at least, based on a clear-cut diagnosis (though it discreetly omitted any reference to the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations):

"The premier challenge facing the United States, its allies and the entire globe is to check the Soviet Union's global ambitions. This challenge must be met, for the present danger is greater than ever before in the 200-year history of the United States. The Soviet Union is still accelerating its drive for military superiority and is intensifying its military pressure and its ideological combat against the industrial democracies and the vulnerable developing nations of the world.

"Republicans believe that the United States can only negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of unquestioned principle and unquestioned strength. Unlike Mr Carter we see nothing 'inordinate' in our nation's historic judgment about the goals, tactics and dangers of Soviet communism. Unlike the Carter administration,

we were not surprised by the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or by other Soviet violations of major international agreements regulating international behaviour, human rights, and the use of military force. And, unlike the Carter Administration, we will not base our policies toward the Soviet Union on naive expectations, unilateral concessions, futile rhetoric and insignificant maneuvers. . . ."

The general intellectual attitude behind a foreign policy is important, but no less important are its specific formulations—and in particular the power-political context in which they are to operate. What, then, is the global situation which the new American administration faces? What can it do to redress "the shattered balance"?

IF THE OLD historical problem is at long last recognised (or, rather, rediscovered), none of the previous foreign-policy formulas will be of much use. They not only reflected but have contributed to the decline of the West.

1. The old "containment" was certainly based on a true perception of the danger; but it suffered from neglect of the political side of the struggle which was perceived almost exclusively in military terms and therefore could not form a basis for a rational strategy to "contain" advances in the Kremlin's long Cold War against the West.

2. The Kissinger-Nixon doctrine was based on the assumption that one could achieve a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union by inducing Secretary Brezhnev to behave like Czar Alexander at the time of the Vienna Congress in 1815 (the young Dr Kissinger described it well in his early book on *A World Restored*). This wild idea disregarded the fact that a totalitarian state based on revolutionary legitimacy was simply not going to be a partner in a "concert of powers" for the preservation of the international *status quo*.

3. The formula used by the Carter administration—"limited adversary relationship"—has been little more than a verbal smokescreen, covering up the lack of any clear orientation. It permitted incompatible attitudes to be reflected in a schizophrenic policy, and its emptiness could be clearly seen in the contrasting interpretations given to it by intellectual spokesmen of the US State Department and the National Security Council. For Dr Marshall Shulman it was one in which the adversary elements were disappearing, or at least diminishing. For Professor William Griffith, echoing the views of Zbigniew Brzezinski, such hopes were chimerical:

"Because only Moscow can destroy the United States and only the US and/or the USSR can destroy the world, the US still shares with the

Soviet Union a general interest in arms control and in limiting third-world competition. These are what *Détente* is about and all that it *can* be about. The rest has all been American illusions and wishful thinking."

Future historians should have no difficulty in realising that the blame for the sorry state of the "shattered" balance of power in which the West has found itself in the 1980s cannot be put at the door of one administration alone, but is a result of a cumulative process in which US failures of leadership were matched only by the betrayal of the alliance's solidarity by its NATO allies. The continuing interaction of these two factors aggravates the situation still further, and enhances the tendency towards neutralism in Europe and towards isolationism in America.

One element was common to the strategic formulas used since World War II; another distinguishes the "Containment" period from its aftermath under Nixon, Ford, and Carter. (1) The common element was the continuing unwillingness to face consistently the problem of the nature of the Soviet state. Even before *Détente*, this resulted in

² Other academic revisionism in the spirit of *Détente* included such gems as the officially sponsored 1977 "US-Soviet project" in which Soviet and American historians (led by Professor Howard D. Mehrlinger of Indiana University) were supposed to clean up "distortions" in each other's textbooks. One can imagine the effects of such cooperation with the "experts" from the Soviet Ministry of Education (i.e. the Orwellian Ministry of Truth) on American textbooks. But would the Soviet Agitprop stop its rewriting of history under pressure from Professor Mehrlinger? After all, its basic principle is still that "who controls the past controls the future." For a general critique, see the essay in *ENCOUNTER* (June 1980), "The View from East of Eden" by the French scholar, Alain Besançon.

³ In my July 1973 testimony to the US Senate I said: "It requires an extraordinary act of faith, an act of faith going against all usual historical experience, past and contemporary, to make oneself dependent on the good will of a régime ten years (or if Mr Brezhnev has his way twenty or thirty years) hence, by granting long-term credits and technological know-how to a country which continuously proclaims that it is engaged in a historical contest with capitalism and its mainstay, the United States. . . . Who can tell now what will happen to the long-term investment in Soviet Russia which is somewhat less attached to the idea of private property? And who can tell what the price of oil will be then? And what will be the effect of inflation? And, last but not least, what the attitude of the Soviet government will be then if the balance of power shifts in its favour? One thing, however, is not unlikely: it will be less dependent on the groups with vested interests lobbying the Senators, than the US government.

"To invest ten to twenty billion dollars in the Soviet oil industry and become dependent on the good will of the Soviet government in ten or twenty years time, instead of using such sums to develop alternative sources of energy supply in the United States itself, seems to me neither rational, nor far-sighted, nor statesmanlike."


the reduction of "Containment" to a military dimension (from their opposite positions both George Kennan and James Burnham criticised its lack of political perspective). (2) There was also a fundamental difference between the two periods. Whatever its inadequacies as a grand strategy guide, "Containment" represented a spirit of resistance to Soviet expansionism, while "*Détente*" and "limited adversary relationship" represented a spirit of accommodation, often indistinguishable from appeasement. This mood of resistance (now so often recalled in admiring references to the courage of President Truman) was abandoned in the course of the 1960s when indeed the "revisionist" historians began to blame Truman himself, rather than Stalin, for the Cold War.

"Experts" were as always available to provide rationalisations. The alleged change in the character of the Soviet state and society demanded the banishment of the dangerous idea of totalitarianism ("a Cold War concept"). Merle Fainsod's classic textbook, *How the Soviet Union is Ruled*, has now been replaced by a travesty presented by Jerry Hough under the title *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, in which the author actually contends that the Soviet system of government is one of "institutional pluralism" and that:

"The Brezhnev era would be best understood if we attribute to the General Secretary the type of motivation that we attribute to most politicians in the West."

That this kind of "expert" pseudo-academic drivel can at present be taught at American universities is a direct result of a decade of self-imposed obtuseness conceived as "the spirit of *Détente*."²

Another consequence of the same "spirit" were the Western credits to the Soviet bloc (which now amount to 77 billion dollars). Instead of the Kissingerian "*web of mutual interests*" we have a situation in which Western bankers are now even ready to offer new loans to make eventual repayments possible (as currently exemplified by Poland). Such "recycling", to keep the great game going, hardly amounts to the kind of "intermeshing" of interests which was supposed to produce "a structure of peace."³



Yet another extraordinary example of the same "spirit" was the selling ("over selling" of *Détente*?) to the Soviet Union and its satellites of technologies which could only strengthen their military potential.

The Kama River truck plant, the largest in the world (and run by IBM computers), was built with the help of American, European, and Japanese firms. It is supposed to produce only civilian vehicles; but it can just as well turn out military trucks and tank engines. In 1972 the United States sold to the Soviet Union "Centalign-B" precision-grinding machines which produce miniature ball-bearings, necessary for missile-guidance systems (which made possible the MIRV-ing of the Soviet ICBMs). In 1978 Dresser Industries (with the exception of a small French firm, the only concern in the world to produce deep-well oil hard-drilling equipment) sold a 144 million-dollar plant to the Soviet Union which will have a capacity far in excess of its domestic requirements.

During the *Détente* decade, the State Department and the US Department of Commerce became very lax in granting approval for such deals, (COCOM, the body which is supposed to control the export of strategically sensitive goods from NATO to Warsaw Pact countries, has practically lost its function.) The sale of the third-generation type of computer—CYBER 76—by the Control Data Corporation (a firm, which, like IBM, supplies the sophisticated American computing machines to the Soviet Union) was stopped at the last moment only because of Senatorial intervention.

It is not surprising that the Executive Vice-President of the Control Data Corporation (and the President of the "American Committee on East-West Accord"), Robert D. Schmidt, stressed the "need to build an environment that will make a trade relationship possible with the USSR." No less unsurprising are the following remarks (made by him at the 28 April 1980 conference at Harvard University) on the subject "Is *Détente* Dead?—After Afghanistan What?":

"Many of the headlines in the United States have proclaimed that 'DÉTENTE IS DEAD.' If it is, we are all facing the prospects of war which means ultimately a nuclear holocaust.

"I don't believe '*Détente* is dead.' The headlines are a gross exaggeration that the US media, politicians, and even the general public seem to be fond of these days. No, *Détente* is not dead, but the Soviet leaders made a terrible mistake, aided and abetted by our own non-policy toward Afghanistan.

"There is a definite need for both sides to reject imperialism; this will help to repair the damage to *Détente*."

Some US academics and businessmen just can't help seeing such spurious symmetries. For them

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"both sides" equally need to refrain from falsifying history and from invading other countries. In their perspective the question of the nature of the Soviet system does not even arise. Even a highly sophisticated commentator like Richard Lowenthal, who has produced some of the most perceptive analyses of the Leninist "Party of the new type", talks of:

"the long-standing controversy on whether the practice of negotiating with the adversary, and more particularly the effort to limit the arms race by agreements, are a principal source of Western weakness or a necessary means to control a conflict that could blow up the earth. . . ."

THE CONTROVERSY, however, is not about *whether* to negotiate, but about *when* and *how*. In the past, the only negotiations which have had a chance to preserve the balance of power are those from "a position of strength." It is all very fine to say that one is both for negotiations and for strength, but the type of negotiations which are being commended have so far only undermined this balance; they have limited the American, but not the Soviet, effort in the arms race.⁴

It has also become a "progressive" axiom that alternative policies would only bring about nuclear war. But is it not perfectly rational to argue that the opposite is true? One could mention that the weakening of the West increases such a danger; that appeasement produces a situation which reduces the US choice to a nuclear exchange or to capitulation; and that, in any case, pacifistic subservience would not at all eliminate the spectre of a nuclear war in a world of many nuclear powers. Yet the empty cliché that there is no alternative to *Détente* is still echoing, although it is now generally agreed that it was one-sided at best and that the West as a whole has scarcely benefited from it. This is not seriously disputed, and the fact of America's

decline in this period has become a commonplace. Even Dr Kissinger has virtually acknowledged its failure. This does not, however, prevent Richard Lowenthal from concluding that a different policy "might well destroy the alliance—even before it contributes to destroying our world. . . ."

As for the recent American reaction to political failures of the past, he calls it "a chauvinistic wave" which is "hollow" because:

"there are no signs of a broad-based willingness to accept the draft; or taxes big enough to finance massive increase in armaments all round; or serious energy-saving measures."

If such measures are desirable, why does he reject a policy which alone would make them possible? The fact that they are difficult to achieve is no reason for replacing them by proposing that the USA should become a mere adjunct to the local necessities of Chancellor Schmidt's *Ostpolitik*. I am sure that in the 1930s Richard Lowenthal, then a socialist refugee in Paris (and later in London), did not condemn the opposition to Chamberlain's appeasement as "chauvinistic", or such opposition as "hollow", because Oxford students declared that they would not fight "for King and Country." It is very rare to hear anybody in the USA jingoistically whooping, "We've got the ships, we've got the money too." There was very little jingoism observable in the recent reaction to the provocative demonstrations by Iranian students. I cannot follow the notion that a patriotic reassertion of national dignity in the face of such humiliations as the holding of the American hostages should be termed "chauvinism". If anything, this reassertion is so modest that any 19th-century liberal statesman (and not just General Chauvin) would have found it astonishing, if not incomprehensible.

Support of bankrupt policies (minus their "overselling") is not compatible with a desire to restore a "shattered balance." This can be done only by awakening to the true lessons of past failures, by abandoning the attitudes and policy-premises which contributed to them, and, last but not least, by reintroducing in the West a spirit of resistance to Soviet expansionism. An attempt to combine appeasement and resistance can only result in a slide in the direction of unabashed appeasement (as the story of George Kennan, among others, illustrates).⁵

Not unlike Chancellor Schmidt, Richard Lowenthal would like to have both the local benefits of *Ostpolitik* and a credible American security umbrella to preserve peace. But a more likely practical outcome of his policy recommendations would be an American drift towards isolationism and a German drift towards "self-Finlandisation." In the American context this type of attitude inexorably leads to isolationism. The political logic of this was spelt out in an article in

⁴ The cat is out of the bag when we note Lowenthal's approval of Brezhnev's proposal that "the negotiations must also include the already existing 'Forward Based Systems'." Surely he knows that Brezhnev has agreed not to include them in the Vladivostok Agreement as a quid pro quo for American concessions, so that in effect this proposal represents an attempt to press Soviet strategic advantage still further, beyond SALT II. If, as a result of the introduction of the SS-20s, the Soviet Union achieves a new "compromise" on medium-range missiles which would also include the withdrawal of the Forward Based Systems, this would represent another shift in the balance of power in its favour in "theatre weapons." It would represent another step towards disengaging America from Europe, and another factor favouring a European drift towards neutralism.

⁵ See the previous discussion of all these matters in the "Kennan debate" (ENCOUNTER, March, April, July, September and December 1978), in which both Lowenthal and I participated. See also *Encounters with Kennan* (Frank Cass, 1979).

the liberal journal *Foreign Policy* by Earl C. Ravenal:

"The United States must adjust policies to events, not events to policies. . . . In the aftermath of Afghanistan, the comfortable middle options have dropped away. The only alternative now to the official strategy of resuscitated military interventionism is an isolationist foreign policy."

Such a policy explicitly accepts the exclusion of the Middle East and of Western Europe "from America's security perimeter", which effectively means their surrender to the Soviet sphere of influence. Is there no alternative to such a splendid prospect? Is there no formula which the new administration could employ as a basis for a policy of resistance?

Those who are still afraid even to "damage" *Détente*, after all the knocks it has received from the Soviet aggressive actions in the 1970s, could not be expected ever to admit that it is "dead." Concede a few failures; opine that it has never really been tried. Such spirits are evidently not frightened at the prospect of further Soviet ascendancy in the 1980s. What they find fearful is what they call "a return to the Cold War" or "a new Cold War." Yet what's in a name?


Whatever the new period is called, the real

problem is how to avoid successful Soviet exploitation of "the shattered balance." Unless this is done by launching "a politics of survival", what lurks behind the false dilemmas of the "middle-option" illusionists is a Soviet strategic breakthrough in the present decade. The end result as far as Europe is concerned will not be different from the one advocated by Mr Ravenal (but quite different from what he so fondly imagines as a secure isolationist "Fortress America"). This end result would be no less certain should the European countries think that they can pursue independent appeasement initiatives and still expect the full security of a transatlantic defence cover.

"The politics of survival" of what used to be rightly called "the free world" involves, in the first place, rebuilding the alliance on the basis of a sober appraisal of the threat it is facing and on serious measures to resist it. This initiative can only come from the new American administration. Considering how greatly the power and the unity of the alliance have been eroded, the process of Western recovery can only be slow, and if it is approached realistically must stretch well beyond 1984.

It cannot be merely a return to the old indiscriminate "Containment doctrine." The military balance is now so much more unfavourable that, in order to resist Soviet expansion, the West must be much more aware of the need for

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strategic and political priorities. If the new administration is to even start to redress the present unfavourable balance of power it must, to begin with, increase military expenditure to frustrate the Soviet effort to achieve strategic superiority. I cannot see any earthly reason why this should not be possible in an economy twice as productive as the USSR's. In 1954 the USA spent 14% of GNP on defence; in 1978 less than 6%. The trends in US opinion polls now favour a change. In 1974 32% of Americans thought that it was spending "too much" and 13% that it was "too little." In 1978 the corresponding figures were 15% and 32%. The polls also indicate that the main opposition to rearmament comes from the educated élite, not from the mass of the people. Additional expenditure could, of course, aggravate inflation; but it could also reduce unemployment. In any case, the estimated Soviet military expenditure of 13–16% of GNP (possibly more) will remain higher than the postulated 8–10% of the US GNP needed to correct the imbalance before the decade is out. It is estimated that at present Soviet military effort is 50% larger than the American. The argument that the Soviet Union can increase its military build-up is unrealistic: its economy is already overstretched; its rate of growth is falling; it cannot risk depressing consumption even further.

I am convinced that reintroduction of conscription will be necessary, both as a means of responding to the Soviet Union at an appropriate level and as an indication of the serious character of the new resistance policy. The much-advertised new "Rapid Deployment Force" is, as Dr James Schlesinger (the former US Defense Secretary) remarked, not new, rapid, or very much of a force.

It would have been unrealistic to hope for a platform-proposal about this during an election time. It may still be unrealistic afterwards unless the American public sees it as a decision which is also implemented by those other NATO members who must eventually face a choice of sharing equitably the military burdens necessary for the survival of the alliance, or leave it altogether and face the tender mercies of the Soviet leadership. The risk that this may push some of them into some form of neutralism is less than that of accepting their drift towards neutralism inside the alliance—a drift which is increasingly undermining its unity and creating what Irving Kristol termed "the allies of inconvenience." A similar concern must be applied to Japan.

AT THIS POINT I would like to enter two *caveats* about the question of redressing American military weakness. One is, as General Maxwell D. Taylor pointed out in *The Washington Post* (12 September 1980), that the exclusive focus on "the number fallacy" may prevent a rational allocation of

resources according to appropriate priorities, and could vitiate the creation of a sensible force-structure capable of facing real threats at different levels. The second is that total preoccupation with the military balance, important as it is, may once again lead to neglect of the political dimension in the power balance. This is an absolutely necessary ingredient of any strategy which is to have any hopes of reversing the geopolitical trends of the 1970s. It is even more important now that America finds itself in a much more disadvantageous military predicament. This political awareness alone can provide coherence for an overall strategy and a focus for choosing priorities; it is vital for expressing and clarifying needs and values of Western civilisation. Without a favourable climate of opinion, decisions necessary for survival may just not be feasible. In the "ideological struggle" Western weapons can be used much more effectively now that communism has been so discredited. In this respect, broadcasting, for instance, is no less important than military hardware, and the money spent on one or two F-14s may better be spent on transmitters.

IT IS GENERALLY acknowledged that the unity of the alliance and the coherence of its strategy depend not only on the existence of US leadership but also on the credibility of the American deterrent. Increasing doubts about it are a major factor in the centrifugal tendencies undermining NATO.

This is not the place to discuss nuclear strategy and the different positions on problems of deterrence and defence. But one thing should be clear: European defeatism and the neutralistic temptation lurking behind the idea that "*Détente* is divisible" which Mr Brezhnev tries to foster and exploit are to some extent the result of the official American attitude in the SALT negotiations. It divorced the USA from European strategic interests. It defined "strategic" and "tactical" nuclear weapons from a purely American point of view. European fears about the USA's military commitment to its defence may be exaggerated, since US forces in Europe are a guarantee that the USA would be involved from the first shot. But, in the surrealistic logic of military scenarios on a nuclear chessboard, nothing will overcome such fears short of a demonstration of American total involvement in a nuclear *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* (community of destiny) with Europe. The restoration of the unity of NATO and of the transatlantic military perspective depends on such a demonstration. The credibility of the US deterrent depends not only on the shift in American strategy embodied in Presidential Directive 59, but on a perspective which would restore the feeling that

"we are all in it together" by re-coupling "strategic" and "theatre" weapons in any future negotiations with the Soviet Union. Only such a political—as distinct from military—premise can prevent further deterioration in the fulfilment of military obligations by the European members of the Alliance. Henry Kissinger remarked recently:

"Almost everything we are thinking about global strategy was developed in the 1950s and almost everything we are trying to implement in arms control dates from the early '60s. We haven't had a new idea in either subject for nearly two decades."

This is certainly true, even though Dr Kissinger himself has not always contributed in the past to sound thought on the subject. What is needed now is a kind of thinking which is not based on the nostalgic ideas of a "World Restored", but which can help to produce an "Alliance Restored." A realistic step in this direction would be an American initiative which would renew European belief in the *Schicksalgemeinschaft* of the transatlantic partnership.

I HAVE NO DOUBTS about how difficult it will be to implement such political initiatives. But before they are dismissed as "unrealistic", one should consider the outcome of not attempting to pursue such goals: for if difficult decisions are avoided, the situation can only deteriorate, and soon it may be too late. One already hears the usual whining from those who, in the first place, denied the existence of danger, only to switch to an argument that because of the shift in the balance (to which they themselves contributed) it is now too late to do anything about it . . . except, of course, to engage in appeasing the expanding power. In the past it was Nazi Germany, at present it is Soviet Russia.

Too much time has already been lost. But it is, I maintain, not at all unrealistic to assume that it is still possible to reverse the trend. If only the neurotic fear of the Soviet Union, amounting almost to psychological paralysis, could be exorcised! And it is not just the fear of a nuclear holocaust; many of those who admit the need for defence are also frightened of the draft, which on *their* premises they should support. It is simply not true, as Lowenthal argues, that "the most upsetting military changes have *not* taken place in the field of *strategic* nuclear weapons." Perhaps it may not have been "most upsetting" from the local point of view of *Ostpolitik* but it was the main factor upsetting the central strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. As Eugene V. Rostow put it (in *Foreign Policy*):

"Soviet expansion cannot be contained unless

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the United States restores its second-strike nuclear capability and leads a grand coalition to keep the peace.”

Rostow added that “The potential for such a coalition still exists, although it will not exist much longer. . . .” Perhaps the best indication of the time lost is that all the warnings by the so-called “hawks” during the last decade—about Western slippage, about the Soviet pattern of behaviour—have been confirmed. The relevant facts are now generally admitted in the “liberal” (in the American sense of the word) press. A dozen Ph.D. theses could be written comparing the contradictory writings in *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post, Time* and *Newsweek, Le Monde* and *Die Zeit* at the beginning of the 1970s and of the ’80s. But no credit is ever given to those who issued such warnings, no apologies are made—in, say, the recent *New York Times* front-page series on the alarming decline of the US armed forces—to those who pointed out the worrisome signs earlier. They are, of course, still denounced as “hawks.”

A group of British scholars and writers addressed (in January 1977) a private letter to President Carter on his inauguration. The text of the letter included the following remarks:

“Our aim is to offer you a few of our reflections on the main direction which the policy of the free world should, in our view, follow in its relations with the communist world. . . . We hope that these reflections may prove of some value to you in formulating the decisions which you will be called upon in the future to make.

“Let us at once make our fundamental position clear: we are as strong advocates of a real *Détente* with the Soviet Union as we are opponents of the present form of *Détente*, which on the Soviet side seems to us to be little more than the continuation of the cold war under another name. . . .

“The first question to ask is: what is the motive of the Soviet Union in pursuing, if only by verbal assertion, the policy of *Détente*? The motive usually declared by the Soviet Union itself is the avoidance of nuclear conflict. But this is palpably untrue. The avoidance of nuclear conflict with the United States had been recognized by the USSR as a principle of policy long before the agreements which officially inaugurated *Détente*. The real motives for *Détente* on the Soviet side, in our view, are different. The Soviet leaders hope to achieve their expansionist aims, not just by politically disarming the West through this policy, but also through economic benefits accruing from it. . . . If the Soviet authorities are led to believe that they can get what they want from the West without paying the price for it in the form of modifying their political intransigence, they will have no

incentive for modifying it. . . . This entails Soviet abandonment of the ‘ideological struggle’, forgoing support for ‘wars of liberation’, and desisting from the persistent effort, by means of a growing military build-up, to secure the expansion of Soviet political influence and ultimate domination, in the first instance over Western Europe, if not the military conquest of the Western world. . . .

“Military balance is a necessary condition for preventing further Soviet expansion, and it is the only basis for a policy through which the United States of America could eventually achieve the general strategic aim of inducing the Soviet Union to accept a genuine *Détente*. . . .

“If we meet the Soviet ‘ideological struggle’ on its own ground, asserting our own ideas and ideals without being apologetic or inhibited about them, we cannot but enhance our morale and improve our world-political standing. If we fail to do so, we will continue our retreat, sacrificing, at one and the same time, morality and jeopardizing our position in the world in terms of *Realpolitik*.”

The letter was read by the President and duly acknowledged. Shortly thereafter he delivered his celebrated speech about “the inordinate fear of communism.” Three years later, after Afghanistan, he delivered another speech in which he announced that he had, at long last, finally understood the world political problem posed by the Soviet Union . . . having learned in three weeks more than in the previous three years.

HOW LIKELY is a reversal towards politics of survival—the realistic alternative to capitulation by historical instalments—under a new administration? In spite of the growing need, greater awareness and a more favourable political attitude among the American public, the ready-made answer which comes to mind is still that of Eliza Doolittle.

It is certainly “not bloody likely” in Europe where the tendency towards neutralism is rampant as evidenced in the shift to the left and to unilateral disarmament in the British Labour Party, the attachment of the German electorate to Chancellor Schmidt’s *Ostpolitik*, and the continuing Soviet flirtations of President Giscard d’Estaing. De Gaulle’s *folie de grandeur* is no longer much in evidence: the prospect now is that of a Europe from the Urals to La Manche rather than vice versa. The French neutron bomb (and the rest of its independent “deterrent”) is no more likely to play the intended role than the Maginot Line did. It is *political morale* that counts, and in the present context it is Marshal Pétain who is more apposite

than General Cambronne. As for the Italian, Belgian, Dutch and Danish scene, it is full of "Eastern promise" as far as defence is concerned.

This sorry state of affairs is a cumulative result of many individual causes; but it has obviously been powerfully affected by the chronically hesitant policies of the United States which is increasingly perceived in Europe (and elsewhere) as an irresolute leader in the field of defence. The negative consequences extend to other fields. For instance, the more limited instruments of pressure like "strategic trade" and "credit sanctions" cannot be effective without being applied by other committed countries; when the coalition is as ramshackle as it is now, the results can only be derisory. Such weapons can achieve their purpose only if the alliance is repaired; only then can they be applied multilaterally.

Obviously, the best strategy is of no use if the means to implement it are not available. It is embarrassing to need to repeat such truisms, but the fact is that at the moment the United States has neither means nor ends. The widespread fear that an attempt to correct this may provoke a Soviet arms build-up has something bizarre about it—for it is a matter of offsetting what the Soviet Union has been accomplishing for a long time now. As the US Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, himself admitted, the Soviet Union has "been substantially insensitive to changes in the magnitude of US and allied programs for more than a decade":

"As our defense budgets have risen, the Soviets have increased their defense budgets. As our defense budgets have gone down, their defense budgets have increased again. . . ."

Without the United States squarely facing the primary question of military balance, no hope of a restoration of alliance solidarity can be realistically entertained.

The hope that Soviet difficulties will somehow make up for it—that the burdens of the bloated empire will be an effectively restraining factor—is surely illusory in the short run.

SUCH HOPES have been inspired recently by the events in Poland. Their importance as a potential factor undermining the Soviet political dynamic is unquestionable. They are relevant for the future not only of Poland, but also of the whole Soviet bloc. They can be seen as one of the important stages in the undermining of the Communist totalitarian state and of Soviet imperial domination in Eastern Europe, in the mass refusal to accept the system and its legitimacy. To be sure, this process has been going on for a long time. It was marked by the workers' uprising of 17 June 1953 in East Berlin, the "Polish October" of 1956, the

Hungarian revolution of the same year, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the activities of the dissidents in all the Communist countries including the USSR. They may be temporarily crushed, but phoenix-like they arise in search of freedom.

If, as a result of the victory of the Gdansk workers, the Independent Trade Unions are permitted to survive and develop, they will be a permanent source of contagion. In the long run a "demonstration effect" of the successful action by the workers against the State which claims to be the historical embodiment of their interests is bound to undermine the legitimacy of power in other Communist countries. Montesquieu once remarked that political state authority begins to be eroded from the moment its principles of legitimacy begin to be questioned; he had in mind the divine right of kings. What we are witnessing now is the process of erosion of the divine right of Communist rulers.

In my view, the most important consideration which inhibits the Soviet leaders is the fact that a decision to intervene militarily may ruin their present policy which aims at undermining the Atlantic alliance by dividing Europe from America and exploiting the differences between them. This is the major goal of a policy which yet another Red Army intervention would make more difficult. The West European arguments about "Détente" being "divisible" would become less credible and the

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perceived need to reinforce NATO would become more urgent. To be sure, a decisive Soviet action might have the opposite effect. Like the invasion of Czechoslovakia which, contrary to Soviet fears, did not kill their *Détente* policy but actually facilitated it, a brutal intervention in Poland could so frighten the West-Europeans that they would be propelled towards "self-Finlandisation." But the Soviet leaders cannot be sure of that. Historically, they always preferred a more cautious strategy ("salami slicing") to one fraught with consequences difficult to predict.

The war between Iraq and Iran may now deflect their attention; but in the event of military intervention, Poland, ruled directly from the Kremlin, would become a special political and economic burden. In the logic of events, this would be an additional incentive for the USSR to press even harder for the neutralisation of Western Europe; this would be the only perspective to deprive the Poles and other East Europeans of any political hopes. Therefore it is, I am convinced, in the West's vital interest that Soviet military intervention in Poland should be avoided, and that the evolution towards greater political pluralism be permitted to proceed apace.

THE WAR BETWEEN Iraq and Iran can only hurt Western interests and provide the Soviet Union with fresh opportunities for a further expansion towards the Persian Gulf. Should it get control of the oil, Western Europe and Japan would be at the mercy of the USSR (Polish hopes would also in this case be effectively destroyed and there would be no need for military intervention).

The situation the West now faces is a direct result of its false hopes and one-sided concessions in the '70s:

1. *Détente* brought new dangers rather than a relaxation of tension.
2. The "SALT process" resulted in American military decline rather than in "arms control."
3. The Helsinki Accord brought no greater freedom or improvement in the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe. (Polish events cannot seriously be attributed to it.)

4. *Ostpolitik* received a rude jolt from East Germany the moment the West German elections were over.

No proper re-examination of Western policies can be made without taking these facts into account. Facing these realities, the inescapable conclusion can only be that the timid attitude of Western self-abnegation should be abandoned.

Reciprocity in exploiting vulnerabilities—instead of the Soviet Union taking unilateral advantage of Western weaknesses, as has been the case so far—becomes more important now that, paradoxically, the West is getting weaker and the Soviet Union more vulnerable.

I KNOW FULL WELL that historical parallels are always of limited relevance. Discussing one such parallel, the Turkish expansion in Europe, George Urban observed:

"The Turks did not have a powerful Moslem pressure group or fifth column in Rome or Paris, whereas the Soviets arguably have . . ."

To which Leszek Kolakowski replied:

"True, but neither did Christendom have *its* co-religionists in Constantinople as a powerful force—as we have our 'fifth column' (if you like) in the shape of the whole population of Eastern Europe."

It may be added, however, that (1) François I^{er} and Louis XIV had their flirtations with the Ottomans which facilitated the Eastern drive in Europe in 1529 and 1683 when they reached the gates of Vienna; and (2) that, even earlier, the Poles and Hungarians lost the battle of Varna in 1444 when the bankers of Genoa helped to finance the transport of the Turkish army from Asia to Europe! Soon after (in 1453) Byzantium fell and Constantinople's Hagia Sophia became a mosque. Could there be some lessons in all this for Western bankers and, perhaps, President Giscard d'Estaing?



SINCE THUCYDIDES and the story of the alliance of the democratic republic of Syracuse with Sparta against Athenian democracy, we know that "long-term considerations" are not exactly a strong point of the foreign policies of free countries. But a constant repetition of this Tocquevillean truism strikes me as something akin to self-fulfilling defeatism. Instead of Spenglerian determinism of doom-and-gloom we need a positive effort to achieve an enlightened policy, to attempt to get away from the paralysis of fear, to restore the balance. As Richard Pipes formulated the long-term aim:

"The ultimate purpose of Western counter-strategy should be to compel the Soviet Union to turn inward—from conquest to reform. Only by blunting its external drive can the Soviet régime be made to confront its citizenry and to give an account of its policies. It is a well-known fact of modern Russian history that whenever Russian governments suffered serious set-backs abroad—in the Crimean war, in the 1904-05 war with Japan, and in World War I—they were compelled by internal pressure to grant the citizenry political rights. We should help the population of the Soviet Union bring its government under control. A more democratic Russia would be less expansionist and certainly easier to live with"

This prospect may be difficult to visualise; but a policy directed towards such a goal is urgently needed. With an appropriate long perspective, it can be made operational and pragmatically implemented.

The alternative is to read Boethius's *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. He certainly had no illusions about barbarians and the fate the Roman world could expect from them, writing as he was

not for his contemporaries but for posterity. He knew that it was too late for recovery under Theodoric, King of the East Goths (even though this barbarian chieftain admired Roman laws and institutions). The world which produced Athens and Rome had waxed and waned.

It took a thousand years for Boethius's testimony (which survived, copied by monks) to be rediscovered at the time of the Renaissance. The poor cousins of Rome, the Dalmatians and the Aquitanians, had continued the struggle to preserve the cultural legacy. But for the Romans it was too late to do anything but find consolation in philosophy.

Western civilisation revived after a long night of barbarism. As Hugh Trevor-Roper has pointed out, it has in its subsequent history faced mortal dangers from outside on a number of other occasions: and unlike Athens and Rome, in its new incarnation Western civilisation survived these perils.

We are now facing again such an historic danger. No outcome in history is predetermined. I have only tried to argue that the moment of truth is here, and that the choice is ours.

The Psychoanalysis of Doctor Samuel Johnson as a Volcano

On the far side of the volcano, two
So careful figures quickly probe the ash
With special glass tubes. They may look like two
Men of Letters, literary men who flash
About their hobby, but they are in fact
Geologists. Their ways are crude. They've come
To whisk away volcanic gas. The act
Is swift, and later in the lab they'll run
The gas through special glass filters. Data
Soon derived from these analyses
Will then explain, thanks to the computer,
The Volcano's behaviour, if they please.

While in a London Institute, a man
In white constructs (theoretical)
A model of the Mountain's inner span.
Next to him a student studies a sample
In-depth with an electron-microscope.
A literary man? No. He is a young
Cartographer whose photographs, they hope,
With observations in the field far-flung
Will help to demonstrate Johnsonian
Geology, and to compile the maps
So vital to their Johnson-exploration.
And, if they please, to make Johnson collapse.

Martin Stokes

John Fuller

Gone to Ground

Veuve du Vernay in the gutter, flattened wire and querns of cork
Mark where candidates vacated (like the elders of the Kirk
Joining in a witches' rout) the holy temple of their rites—
Schola Magna Borealis—spilling gowned inebriates.
Prior to every paper, files of desks were sown with writing-books
Germinating inkily beneath the working rows of backs;
Pentels played superbly in the cradles of their moving fists;
Silent whispers to the ceiling charmed the peacocks, prayed for Firsts;
Fingers propped up profiles Buonarrottoi might have liked to carve;
Unimaginable beauties shut in pallor like a cave
On a friendly surface flowers and antihistamines had made
Brought to life the latent heroines of *My Last Duchess*, *Maud*,
Nineteenth-century victims of the poet's urge to wield his power
Over girls not fully understood, bold, self-possessed though pure
(When their knowledge faltered, Kleenex, sweets and mascots were employed).
Schools became a theatre where the memory and passion played,
Empty all the summer once the fustian black and white had gone
(Tennyson and Browning are allowed to lie unread again).
Down the High Street stroll unhindered naked knees and tartan paunch,
Cluny's closed and Honey's empty save for someone buying *Punch*.
All the mysteries enacted now are commonplace once more,
Sacred circumstances simply something travellers can admire.
Evidence is trapped unnoticed in the omnipresent lens:
Businessmen from Nagasaki freeze as one of them aligns
What remains of Magdalen Tower with an antiseptic grin,
CANDY underfoot and to the right a door of brass and green.
On the other corner Oxford Travel Agents are relieved:
Sheaves of booking stubs reveal where students' lives are now being lived.
Transalpino, Apex, Eurotrain and private bus convey
Heart-struck, star-crossed, shattered souls to gaze upon a different view.
Foreign cities heal with culture wounds that culture has induced,
Love forgotten as the banger jolts through fascinating dust.
Soppy sentimental disconnected drainpipes go their ways,
Finding in a summer's absence much inducement to be wise.
Term was going out to dinner, giving bear-hugs in the quad,
Heads together over just the quantity of work required.
Literature is what you make it and it's bound to turn to tears.
Now it's nature's turn to comfort as the dear ideal retires:
Thumbs along the autostrada bring an everchanging view;
Tents in Sligo echo with the savage wounding of a vow.
Human lineaments will alter since you make them what they seem;
Rocks and water are unyielding for their substance is the same.
Wordsworth told us once and we were almost willing to believe
(Keeping fingers crossed behind our back because we knew that love
Conquered after all each famous effort to be understood,
Offering the various shapes of dull eternity instead).
Passion doesn't bear examination—though perhaps it should,
Shaping as it does the source from which all mental life is shed.
Ardent alpha-minus and besotted beta-plus, God knows,
Can't be much preferred to grieving gamma, narcissist NS,
Given our agreement on the joy of unrequited love,
Caring only that its fatal feelings may be kept alive,
Never to be disappointed by their hope of being fulfilled
Like a conjuror's spectators who are eager to stay fooled.

Don't expect a tutor to stay moping in a tourist town:
 Bright at the receiver you will only hear the dialling tone.
 If you're passing through yourself, perhaps to bring me back some books
 (Quantities I lent you: won't you need to put them in a box?)
 Don't imagine I'll be waiting, kettle steaming, on the hour.
Did you call? I'm sorry! I'm afraid that's just the way things are.
 Was my room locked and the tap not dripping, friendly, on the stair?
 Did the scout look blank and turn away and give her tea a stir?
 Did you interrupt the Lodge's cricket, stamp and tear your hair?
 Hearing Strutt recite his lesson: "Mr Fuller is not here,
 Having taken up a new appointment as the top masseur
 (Being handy, tender, ready, when the nape and hips are sore)
 With the Russian women's swimming, pole-vault and gymnastic teams,
 Keen, you see, on sport and travel when he isn't keeping terms.
 Leave a message with the porter? Always happy to oblige.
 Got a packet for him, have you? Hope it isn't very large.
 Look, his pigeon-hole is full already: invitations, cheques,
 Magazines and scented envelopes as soft as ladies' cheeks.
 Come back in October (what's the phrase?—"the sere and yellow leaf").
 Michaelmas, I'm sure, will see us all resuming normal life."
 Life! Ah, life, who always lives us so intensely at his will;
 Life in lying chapters, promising that things will soon be well;
 Life, who understands us all but keeps the secret in his book;
 Life, the truest friend—who, once he goes away, will not come back.

Ships in Bottles

You've seen paper when it's burnt
 And turned to ash, yet keeps its shape,
 How fine it is? Well the sails
 Were like that, and the rigging
 Something spiders might have spun,
 Royals from fore to mizzen,
 Delicacy and precision overall;
 But a touch of fury too
 Where the painted figure-heads
 Fought through the foam.
 And their maker?
 No salty tar sitting on the quay
 With the tops of his sea-boots rolled.
 No, he kept bees; grew begonias;
 Lived alone; and never complained.
 Why then these vessels—bottled wanderers
 Bobbing on a sideboard sea?
 Uncorked—might a bright sprite pop out
 To meet all wishes, or would it
 Be some gaunt Ahab—black
 From the scorch of hell—
 Cursing the storms that howled inside?

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Politics & World Affairs

The Coming of Leviathan

Human Rights—By FERDINAND MOUNT

IT WAS NOT Jimmy Carter who started it. That much is evident and widely remarked on. The current interest in human rights dates back a great deal further—in the first instance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and hence to the Second World War and the massacre of the Jews. We can go back further again, although the lineage is fainter, to the League of Nations and the horrors of the First World War; the existence of refugees and stateless persons and the creation of fresh nation-states and their fresh anomalies and freshly aggrieved national minorities, together with the new technologies of torture and genocide available to civil and military authorities, have also posed problems of international law and justice. For practical politics, the question of human rights looks like a characteristically 20th-century question.

But why should this question have taken on such particular *intensity* in the last third of the century? Out of a crop of recently published books on political topics, it seems that nearly one in three is concerned in some way with human rights or the connected topics of human rights and duties, civil liberties, intervention and the limits of the nation-state. What is it about our own years that has brought this question increasingly to the forefront of political argument?

Clearly the answer must have something to do with the nation-state itself, for it is the nation-state, with its sharply defined boundaries and its large claims on the lives and loyalties of its citizens, which is the characteristic political feature of our times. Indeed we find it hard to conceive of politics except in terms either of bruising exchanges *between* these touchy, ill-tempered, suspicious Leviathans or of the *internal* workings of their constipated, hypertense bodies.

It is we who have also witnessed the decline and, in recent years, the final extinction of empire. More precisely, the *kind* of empire that has been declining and falling has progressively changed; from the Austro-Hungarian through the British and French, to the quasi-empire of the Americans, there is a

clear gradation from the relaxed to the tense, from the unorganised to the governmentalised. In considering the principal survivor, the Soviet empire, we ought to notice how few of the features of 19th-century empires it exhibits and how much more in its bureaucratic reach it has come to resemble the modern nation-state. In general, 19th-century empires were different; like 19th-century novels, they were “loose, baggy monsters”, often illogical in structure, blurred at the edges, essentially *permeable*; their boundaries were easily passable, their notions of citizenship sloppy and welcoming. If you were unjustly treated in a province or colony, you might be able to flee or, with luck, even to appeal to the central authority, or you might be dead and buried and never heard of in the metropolis. Injustice was either remediable or fatally obscure. It was not blatant and problematic. The modern nation-state’s combination of instant communications and barbed-wire boundaries presents a *frustration*; highly visible, intolerable injustices may be committed the other side of a wall which is transparent but impassable. We are in the situation of a Hitchcock hero: confined to a wheelchair watching a murder being committed the other side of the street.

The campaigner for human rights in a foreign country is attempting to “get at” the foreign nation-state, to break through its shell of independence and untrammelled sovereignty. Such campaigns naturally do not originate with official bodies or governments, for one’s own government, to start with at any rate, cannot help having much the same distaste for breaches of national sovereignty as the government of the nation-state which is complained of. The pressure characteristically comes from private bodies or individuals and is mediated either by their elected representatives or by non-governmental bodies set up for the purpose; the Jackson-Vanik amendment is an example of the first, the growth of Amnesty International an example of the second. The overnight success of some of these campaigns is startling. How was it that the US Congress was so quickly pressurised

into writing human-rights clauses into the trade reform and foreign aid acts? How was it that Jimmy Carter so speedily adopted the cause—and so successfully, from the point of view of distinguishing himself as a political leader of a new and different sort? The injustices complained of were, after all, far from new, least of all in the Soviet Union.

MAY ALL THIS be connected with the lessening of the power of the United States to get its own way in the farthest corners of the world? Is the effort to enforce human rights overseas the continuation of empire by other means? Could it be, at least in part, a reaction to the frustration and humiliation of Viet Nam? At first sight the two events—the loss of empire and the rise of the human-rights campaign—do not fit together exactly. After all, the main initial thrust of the human-rights campaign in the United States was against the maltreatment of Jews in the Soviet Union—an area which had never exactly formed part of the American empire. Yet it may be that the itch to exercise power is partially *blind*: the precise direction does not matter so much as the sheer moral satisfaction of exercising power for good. Campaigners for Jewish rights suddenly found an actively sympathetic hearing in quarters which had previously heard them out with polite expressions of regretful impotence. Mr Carter, whose political antennae are as good as the next man's, perceived that human rights might turn out to be, or might be fashioned into, the newest version of the American mission to improve the world. Moreover, like other versions of this mission, it appeared at the outset to be a relatively low-cost enterprise. The unpleasant pressures were to be felt by other governments. I need hardly add that these political calculations are not intended to question the sincerity of Mr Carter's commitment, merely to examine the considerations which led him to adopt human rights as a prime objective of his administration; he would be an irresponsible politician if he had not himself examined the pros and cons. The question remains as to whether the pros and cons were adequately examined.

For the barriers to success were and are great. The nation-state has formidable defences to protect its untrammelled autonomy against intervention; these defences are both physical and doctrinal. We cannot as individuals, and nor can our own governments, directly alter or influence events on the other side without resorting to acts of war—or acts that may be interpreted as warlike or at any rate

unfriendly. Attempts to intervene on behalf of a person being tortured by another régime may create an "international incident", even if that person happens to be one of our own citizens. The existence of the boundary magnifies the incident and stretches out the memory of it so that the incident, say, of the torturing of Dr Sheila Cassidy remains a factor in relations between Britain and Chile long after Dr Cassidy herself has been extricated. The impediments are not simply those posed by frontier guards and barbed wire but also the intellectual barbed wire of doctrines of non-intervention and national independence which are erected on both sides of the border.

The doctrine of non-intervention grows out of and is intimately connected with the idea of the nation-state. Throughout the Middle Ages and well into the Renaissance, by contrast, intervention to punish wrongdoing was regarded as a moral duty. Even Grotius, in Book II of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625), still defends the right to punish wrongdoing wherever it may occur:

"It is also proper to observe that kings and those who are possessed of sovereign power have a right to exact punishment not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves or their own subjects, but for gross violations of the law of nature of nations, done to other states and subjects."

The medieval ideas of the just war and of the civilised world as *Respublica Christiana* outlived any physical remnants of a Christendom which was not divided into nation-states. But as J. Bryan Hehir points out in his historical survey of the ethics of intervention,¹ Grotius was the last of his line. As soon as writers like Bodin began to concentrate on the idea of sovereignty, the days of interventionism were numbered. For if supreme authority is located in the nation, then any outside intervention must be an insult to that sovereignty. The physical power of the nation-state secreted its own ideology. The Swiss jurist, Emmirich Vattel, in the *Law of Nations* (1758) enunciates the doctrine of non-intervention in its complete form little more than a century after Grotius:

"It clearly follows from the liberty and independence of Nations that each has the right to govern itself as it thinks proper, and that no one of them has the least right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights possessed by a Nation that of sovereignty is doubtless the most important and the one which others should most carefully respect if they are desirous not to give cause for offense."

Later this argument came to be given a liberal or liberationist gloss. National independence—meaning the liberation of people from some empire and their incorporation as a nation—was a form of

¹ In *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*. Edited by PETER G. BROWN and DOUGLAS MACLEAN. Lexington Books, £11.50, \$28.50.

self-realisation; liberty was, in one sense anyway, not freedom from government but freedom from government by foreigners. Peoples who had won their freedom were not to be lightly interfered with; the only kind of interference which might be legitimate was interference to protect people against interference. John Stuart Mill was dubious even about that: "intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent. . . ."

IT IS IMPORTANT to notice how far this kind of argument went. In "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" (quoted in Brown and MacLean), Mill, in claiming that intervention was generally wrong, argued:

"The reason is, that there can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that interventionism, even if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves. The only test possessing any real value of a people's having become fit for popular institutions is that they, or a sufficient portion of them to prevail in the context, are willing to brave labor and danger in their liberation."

The free air you breathe in an independent nation is so precious that the benefits of any efforts from outside to remedy injustice, however kindly meant, are outweighed by the dangers of weakening the popular spirit of liberty. This argument may strike most people now as extreme. It is open to the obvious objection that if the injustices which the outsider hopes to remedy are worth remedying, then the "popular institutions" cannot be working properly and the spirit of liberty must be polluted already.

But what must be emphasised is the historical reality of Mill's passion for non-intervention. National independence seemed to 19th-century Europeans of progressive leanings to be something infinitely precious; such independence was both a consolation for the most wretched poverty and a token of the worth of every individual. Something like this passion, it is said, has been reproduced in modern Africa and Asia. Now that people of progressive sympathies in Europe and North America are turning back towards vigorous intervention to right injustices, it is worth recalling briefly the equally passionate belief in non-intervention of their great-great-grandparents.

² *American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of US Human Rights Policy*. By SANDY VOGELSANG. W. W. Norton, £7.75, \$13.95.

³ See Barry Gower on "Understanding Rights" in *Human Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts*. Edited by F. E. DOWRICK. Saxon House, £8.50, \$26.00.

Such historical sketching is not much in fashion. We are more often invited to consider, with the utmost urgency, the plight of those who are suffering *now* under this or that tyrant. Many of the people who are professionally concerned with human rights are, above all, impatient. Their impatience is not only with their own governments which are said to be too lazy, greedy or incompetent to protest against injustice and use any available leverage to protect human rights in other countries; they are also impatient with fine distinctions. What is a human right? Is it different from a natural right? Is there a difference between "personal" human rights and political or economic and social human rights? Is there a difference between positive and negative rights? Are human rights, as Charles Beitz argues (in MacLean and Brown), a rather lame and incomplete formulation of the duty to strive for "social justice"? Sandy Vogelsang² lists all the usual objections to that sort of all-embracing conception of human rights but then passes blithely on, as if these objections were merely mean-spirited quibbles:

"A broad interpretation of human rights is necessary. That reading of human rights which includes the range set forth in the UN Universal Declaration is most consistent with the best in American humanitarian tradition and most consonant with long-run global developments. A more narrow or traditionally Anglo-Saxon recital of political and civil rights alone misses the point of what worries much of the world and many disaffected Americans. . . . Concern with human rights is a dynamic phenomenon, changing with the changing times."

This is, to say the least, an elusive and elastic definition. The interpretation of human rights is to be consistent (a) with the best in American humanitarian tradition (b) with long-run global developments (c) with what worries much of the world (d) and many disaffected Americans (e) and with the changing times. Human rights do not then relate to some unchanging properties which are essential to and belong by right to human beings but to those features of the world which happen to worry nice Americans or nice Swedes at any particular time. This kind of elasticity is by no means new in the discussion of rights. In 1952, J. D. Mabbott noted in *The State and the Citizen* that inspection of letters to newspaper editors revealed a "natural right to a living wage, a right to work, a right to trial by jury, a right to buy cigarettes after 8 pm, a right to camp in a caravan by the roadside and a right to walk on the grouse moors of Scotland during the close season."³

What is true of arguments about rights in general is, it seems, just as true of arguments about human rights under international law. The lists of rights in the Universal and European Declarations might

seem to be long and wide enough; they include, after all, such items as the right to holidays with pay, the right to enjoy the arts, the right to legal protection against the invasion of privacy and so on. But it may be objected that these Declarations and others like them are all too obviously the product of liberal, West-European, capitalist minds; they may not suffice for illiterate brutalised South American Indians. Someone like Dom Helder Camara, the revered Archbishop of Recife, would have a quite different programme of human rights in mind. Janet G. Townsend ("A Latin American Perspective", in Dowrick) argues that the sort of restructuring of the world economy which Camara regards as an essential precondition of "effective democracy" in Latin America "would present a serious threat to workers, investors, multinational corporations and finance corporations in Western Europe, North America and Japan." It would also entail the destruction of almost all the existing régimes in Latin America itself. This is a long way from John Stuart Mill. Yet the Archbishop would no doubt argue that less far-reaching actions—such as the release of political prisoners or the holding of even tolerably fair elections—are mere token gestures designed to conceal the unchanging realities of power.

The range of claims for human rights is bewildering. Is there any way of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate claims, between true human rights and spurious ones? And is such a distinction helpful, or ought it to be helpful in deciding what, if anything, government A ought to do about the behaviour of government B?

IT IS WORTH BRIEFLY rehearsing the main argument about the *definition* of human rights. Those who think the term has any useful meaning divide into two main schools: the narrow school and the broad school. The narrow school includes Hugo Adam Bedau (in Brown and MacLean), Maurice Cranston, Congressman Tom Harkin and the other architects of recent US legislation on foreign aid, and most of the authors of the Freedom House Yearbook.⁴ They take human rights as primarily political and civil; life and liberty are the prime values; freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, freedom of expression and movement are the prime aims. Other so-called rights—usually called economic and social—are more properly to be described as "goals", "aspirations" or "benefits." The great international declarations of rights include both sorts, but the narrow school would

prefer and has often argued, in vain, that such declarations should be split into two separate declarations so that these "basic" human rights can be pursued in the appropriate way.

The broad school—including Henry Shue and Charles Beitz (both in MacLean and Brown), Ronald Dworkin⁵ and Sandy Vogelsang—argues that this distinction is unreal. Not to be killed or tortured and not to be arbitrarily imprisoned are not simply "negative rights"—that is, rights which are rather easier to satisfy because they involve governments *not* doing bad things to people and the infringement of which is more wicked because the cruelty is deliberate rather than the result of sloth or incompetence. In reality, to prevent torture requires active control of the secret police; to assure someone a fair trial demands an elaborate structure of courts, judges and advocates and a tradition of impartiality and obedience to known rules. Nor is it true, the broad school says, that civil rights are somehow more "basic" than economic and social rights; is there much difference in basicness—or in moral failure—between hanging a peasant and letting him starve? Beitz argues that almost all rights involve both positive and negative obligations on someone else; if there is a distinction to be made, he would prefer it to be between *duties*, viz: between the duty to *forbear* from depriving a man of his rights, the duty to *protect* him against such deprivation, and the duty to *aid* him in obtaining or regaining his rights. The advantage of this three-way split for Beitz's argument is that it cuts across the old positive-negative division. Most rights involve a combination of all three duties, but, where only one or two may be involved, there is no particular pattern corresponding with distinctions between political and economic and social rights.

The argument continues at all levels from the academic to that of practical politics. Freedom House continues to mark countries solely by their provision of "Political Rights" and "Civil Liberties": e.g. Mongolia 7 & 7, Not free, Stable; Bolivia 3 & 3, Partly free, Improving (1 is good, 7 is very bad). By contrast, the US Department of State's Bureau of Human Rights now includes in its reports on violations of human rights a score on a "Physical Quality of Life Index." According to Beitz, though, the State Department's Bureau of Legal Advisers "continues to resist the need to take subsistence rights seriously."

Now I think there *is* a distinction to be made, not a sharp cleavage between one sort of human right and another but a gradual climatic change between one area of rights and another. The "narrow" or "negative" rights do seem on the whole to demand less time, effort and ingenuity to enforce; it is not beyond the power of most governments to contain massacre, torture and arbitrary maltreatment; local standards of fair play can be observed. Measures required to wipe out malnutrition and famine and

⁴ *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 1980. Edited by RAYMOND D. GASTIL. Freedom House (20 West 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10018), \$24.95.

⁵ Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (1977).

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gross inequality may be not only much more difficult to agree on, let alone to implement; they may—and in South America usually do, I imagine—call into question the whole basis of the existing government. The call for human rights in the broader sense may be nothing less than a call to revolution. Politicians are not usually eager to hasten their obsolescence but, even if they were, they would scarcely accept that what they were to be the victims of was “a human rights campaign.” We come up here against a limit on the usefulness of language. If every thing that is to be desired is to be described as a “human right”, then the notion of a *right* loses its force and distinctness. The propagandist is welcome to continue using the word but beyond its pleasant associations it conveys little.

In what sense can it be claimed that men have a *right* to dwell in a just state, where landowners do not oppress the landless and where food, medicine and education are fairly shared? To wish and strive for such a state of affairs is admirable, but *upon whom* does the obligation lie to secure this right for a people? It may lie upon you and me and the United States and upon the government of the country in question, but it also lies obviously, and principally, upon the people themselves, who must help to make and keep this state of justice. Now we could perhaps say that men have an obligation to their wives and children to secure or defend their own rights; but can you have an obligation to secure *yourself* a right? The best argument for the narrow definition of rights is that it concentrates, imperfectly but as best as may be, upon those rights which depend on governments not doing something *to* people rather than upon those rights which depend on governments doing or not doing something to prevent people doing something for or by themselves. The narrow definition, in other words, concentrates upon those rights where the *separation* between the right-owner and the obligated party is reasonably sharp.

IN THE CASE OF ECONOMIC and social rights, this separation is less clear. Let us assume that every peasant in Ruritania, a poor country in the Third World, ought to be entitled to a fair share of land and to a fair share in the schemes for irrigating and fertilising the land (schemes which may be financed in various ways, out of local taxation or out of the proceeds of expropriating the local mine-owners or out of Western aid). Let us call this entitlement a human right. Immediately, a host of “obligants” (a rare word but I cannot think of another which describes someone who is obliged to do something;

is that significant?) is to be perceived. Most obviously, the Ruritanian government which is to oversee the whole project—and in “the government” we must include all its civil servants and tax-gatherers; but then the governments and taxpayers of richer countries must also be included because it has to be decided whether they should or should not contribute. And so must all *non*-peasants in Ruritania, for they must not try to frustrate the scheme by refusing to pay their taxes or diverting the national revenue to other projects which would favour them, nor must they profiteer or cheat at the peasants’ expense. Finally, among the obligants we must include the peasants themselves; they must not cheat one another nor try to grab a disproportionate share of the benefits, nor must they drink or idle and neglect their land, risking flood or disease which could wipe out their neighbours’ crops. This vast network of reciprocal and reflexive duties is present in any society, and things will go wrong if people neglect their duties out of sloth, or malice, or ignorance. But when things go wrong—the irrigation pipes are allowed to rust, the politicians steal the money—would we naturally speak of the peasants’ “human rights” being infringed? Would it not be more natural to say “the peasants are ignorant” or “the politicians are crooks”? Is there much point in stretching the language of human rights to cover every kind of human failure?

The confusion—if you want to call it a confusion—is to elide the idea of “a right” with the idea of “what is right.” This elision is anything but new, as Richard Tuck points out in *Natural Rights Theories*.⁶ Indeed, it represents a reversion to the original use of *ius*; Tuck starts by emphasising the great importance of the obvious fact that Latin was the language of political discussion throughout the Middle Ages. And the classical Roman use of *ius* was a broad one.

The *iura praediorum*, for example. These were the arrangements governing the sort of things we call rights of way, easements, ancient lights and so on. Gaius, writing under the Emperor Hadrian, lists the following *iura* connected with urban property:

“the *ius* of building houses higher and obstructing the light of neighbouring houses, or not doing so, because it obstructs their light; the *ius* of streams or gutters, that is, of a neighbour taking a stream or gutter overflow through his yard or house; and the *ius* of admitting into one’s property someone else’s drains and not depriving them of light.”

To us it would sound comic to describe these as rights; some are obviously liabilities or duties. What counted for the Romans was the agreement itself. For example, *obligatio* usually meant the opposite of what we mean; to have an *obligatio* meant to benefit from the agreement. All these *iura*

⁶ *Natural Rights Theories*. By RICHARD TUCK. Cambridge University Press, £10.50.

were agreements between private citizens; they were quite different from *dominium*, which described the simple fact of ownership—of land, slaves or money. But as the Empire spread its tentacles into private life, this concept of *dominium* as total control began to seem implausible. "The Emperor was now someone with whom all citizens had bilateral relationships and who claimed to be able to intervene in their social and economic life in a wide variety of ways" (Richard Tuck). Gradually, *dominium* came to be seen as another kind of *ius*; the ideas of "ownership" and of "right" began to fuse. The right to property came itself to be a property; something which you owned over against the Emperor, rather than a description of an arrangement which bound and included you.

THE CONCEPT of right passed through many transmutations—beautifully described by Tuck in a fine blend of history and analysis—but it never lost this characteristic of ownership. In its more modern definitions, by the humanist lawyers of the Renaissance, the association remains prominent. Tuck quotes François Connan, the great pupil of Alciato:

"There is no *ius* to which is not given, either by nature or by law, some obligation as a companion and guide; so that if need be it can protect itself through a judgement in an action in front of judges. If I settle on vacant land, I become a possessor and a *dominus*; and although no one is bound to me by a definite obligation, nevertheless everyone is obliged to me thus far, that they do not dispossess me. And if they do, then immediately by virtue of an obligation which can now be termed definite and natural (*nata*, and not *naturalis*), an action lies, soliciting the aid of judges. Therefore *ius*, obligation, action and judgement do not differ if one regards the cause, the matter and the end, but they do differ in reason, role and scope. For a *ius* consists of a person, a possession, or the facts from which an obligation springs; from the obligation comes an action, which procures a judgement and finishes the matter."

Tuck deals a nice, if not fatal blow to Professor C. B. Macpherson's doctrine of "possessive individualism." For the possessive character of human rights can be seen to predate Locke and Hobbes by a thousand years or so; indeed, a moment's reflection suggests that this possessive character derives not from the capitalist nature of a given society but rather from the existence of an intrusive central power against whom rights need to be held possessively. Indeed, it is doubtful whether an idea of human rights which did not include something of this possessive character would mean

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very much. If rights can be surrendered to the authorities like unlicensed firearms, can they really be said to be human rights at all—that is, rights which are yours by virtue of your humanity? This is what many of the great arguments throughout the 16th and 17th century come back to. Does the natural right to liberty include the right to surrender liberty and become a slave? Does the right to life include the right to throw life away and kill yourself? Does the right to liberty include the right to rebel, or does the duty to submit to authority include a permanent if perhaps only tacit surrender of any such right? Can your *dominium* in your own life and liberty be transferred like a piece of property? Or are what we now call human rights different from other rights in that they are inalienable? The windings and twistings of Grotius and Selden in the face of the growing claims of absolutist régimes indicate that we have arrived here at the heart of difficulty.

One answer to this difficulty is generally credited to Locke; we speak of “the Lockean tradition” and of Locke as “the father of the American Revolution.” This view was established quite early on. “Mr Locke . . . was the oracle to those who began and conducted the American Rebellion, which led to the French Revolution; which will lead (unless God in his mercy interfere) to the total overthrow of Religion and Government in this kingdom, perhaps in the whole Christian world” (the Rev. William Jones in *A Letter to the Church of England*, 1798, quoted in John Dunn’s *Political Obligation in its Historical Context*⁷). Poor Mr Locke would have been horrified. Nor would he have been much better pleased to hear praise from Leigh Hunt in 1810, also quoted by Dunn:

“it was Locke, and such men as himself, who, in teaching us to give up our mental liberty to no man, taught us to give up our personal liberty to no man; but to prefer even the consciousness of independence to a slavery however worshipful.”

It is this historical fixed idea which John Dunn sets out methodically to destroy. Locke, he argues, could not have been the father of the American Revolution in the sense claimed because, until half-way through the 18th century, his *Two Treatises of Government* was virtually unknown in the American colonies and not much better known elsewhere; and even later, the *Two Treatises* never achieved very wide circulation in America, except among a handful of political theorists. Locke’s fame was essentially as a philosopher and the author of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*; the fact that so eminent a man should also have advocated the right to rebel against an unjust ruler was a propaganda windfall;

Dunn appears to be arguing that Locke stood in rather the same relation towards the American Revolution as Bertrand Russell occupied toward CND. Moreover, Dunn continues, what occupied 18th-century critics of Locke’s political works was the question of the state of nature, not the right of resistance. Going back to Locke himself and his historical context, we shall find that his intentions and interests were quite different. Far from being obsessed with the state of nature and the right to property, Locke merely throws them in now and again, in an unsystematic way, as convenient illustrations—readily comprehensible to the audience—of the true substance of the rights of government and the individual.

Locke’s real intention was polemical and persuasive; he hammers Sir Robert Filmer’s arguments for patriarchy and for obedience to established authority because he had to convince the Tory squires that they need not tamely accept a Catholic monarch simply on the grounds that he happened to be the next in line. According to Dunn, Locke’s role in this was little better than that of hired hack to his patron Shaftesbury who was conducting a campaign to exclude the Catholic James, Duke of York, from the succession to his brother Charles II:

“What is in question is not Utopia but the most desirable political arrangements that Shaftesbury or William III might reasonably aspire to bring about. To attempt to extrapolate the Lockean Utopia from such unpromising materials is a sterile exercise and the results, by necessity, faintly ludicrous.”

THIS APPLIES just as much to Lockean enthusiasts as to those like Macpherson who have sought to erect a Marxist critique of “possessive individualism” upon the foundation of Locke’s few casual illustrations using property rights. Locke, according to Dunn, never works out a systematic definition of consent or of legitimacy:

“What constitutes the legitimacy of a political society is precisely its recognition as legitimate by its subjects. The issue of just what such a recognition would be like as an event in the world is not discussed because it had happened long enough ago in England for its precise historical character to be irrelevant.”

That’s all.

I must confess to a certain sympathy for all this. That is how the *Two Treatises* read; indeed, for a layman it is hard to reconcile the neat models of the Lockean system as set out in the textbooks of political theory with the higgledy-piggledy, Filmer-obsessed polemic. Dunn’s purpose is, however, more general than that of debunking the idea of a Lockean system. To start with, anyway, what he wishes to do is to “re-integrate” the history of

⁷ *Political Obligation in its Historical Context*. By JOHN DUNN. Cambridge University Press, £14.50.

ideas. It is not possible, he argues, to choose *either* to discuss what Locke "actually" wrote *or* to describe the historical development of his ideas or the ideas of his time; the two activities flow into each other and mix too thoroughly. Obvious and generally agreed perhaps, and yet how few published works in practice do respect the oneness of the history of ideas, how easy it is to retreat into either textual analysis or historical interpretation, and how difficult and exhausting to combine the two; Tuck's book is a shining exception.

It has to be said here that although Dunn's own essays do practice what they preach, they are often let down by his manner of writing. His style at its worst might best be described as Cambridge Clotted. This academic dialect is to be found in many disciplines but most often among philosophers. The features of Cambridge Clotted are: weak verbs bedecked with strong adverbs and a multiplicity of clauses-within-clauses expressing hesitations and qualifications which, when coldly analysed, do not add much to the sense. The adverbs overload the frail skeleton of subject-verb-object, often without making it clear exactly in what way they are intended to modify the meaning; the clauses within clauses often make the simplest argument hard to follow. The remedy, as usual, is to take more trouble to break the sentence down into its components, to use full stops, and to cut out unnecessary throat-clearing.

Take this description of one definition of human rationality:

"Epistemic rationality treats reason as intrinsically heuristic and, at least in some respects, teleological and resists in consequence seeing it as intrinsically and appropriately constrained by the immediate contingencies of historical visibility. It thus resists, also, imaginative encapsulation in the immediate importunities of agency."

How would Sir Ernest Gowers tackle this?

"It is rational to expect to find out more as you go along towards your goal, if you have one. Rational thinking is not limited by what you can see to start with or by the need to make up your mind quickly in order to act."

Not quite right, perhaps, but better.

None the less, if he succumbs to some academic faults of writing, Dunn does convincingly expose academic faults of thought which are more serious: to wit, the abstraction of a false synthesis or a non-existent system from a political polemic inspired by specific historical circumstances. In the case of Locke at least, this malpractice does more than do violence to Locke himself. It extracts an unreal simplicity from a complex pattern of problems, arguments and solutions. The textbook gives us Locke's theory of political obligation, followed by

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Hobbes's theory of political obligation, followed perhaps by Hare's theory, or the author's own. This extracted simplicity imposes a question that there is no inherent reason to ask and the hope of an answer that we have no reason to hope for:

"The scope and limits of political duty are never securely given by conventional categories of law and public authority. They stretch elusively across a much wider stratum of human conduct than these categories can specify, at times overwhelming in their force and centrality, at others mercifully peripheral to the living of a full and decent life. Their content and character is always changing; and, in so changing, it mirrors the historical contingency of human existence. The hope that political duty can be rendered cut-and-dried, simple, dominant and perspicuous is in essence the hope that historical contingency can be conclusively eluded and human social existence be rendered as simply willed and committing as an exchange of private promises.

It is easy to see the charm of such a conception. The fact that one has promised to do something does in most circumstances give one a firmer and a more definite *obligation* to do it than is provided by most of the types of good reason which one has to act in a particular manner. The view that political life would be altogether more crisply and perspicuously *obligatory* in its demands if only it could all be reduced to the execution of promises is thus, in its own terms, convincing enough. But it is hard to see that this offers any very helpful instruction on the political duties of actual historical agents—on what they should in fact do in the sorry circumstances in which they happen to find themselves."

There exists no single permanent political obligation. There are only political obligations in the plural, just as there is no single obligation in life as a whole but a variety of changing obligations. To assume otherwise is to fall into a trap:

"All modern states, whatever their official ideological affiliations, hold extremely strong and confident doctrines of their primacy of entitlement to the obedience of their citizens or subjects. Yet it may also be true that we are today in a position to recognise clearly the blatantly intellectually inconsequential character of all the theories of the rational status of these claims to authority."

BY TAKING ON the issue of universal political duty at all, we may be crediting these claims with some kind of inner coherence that they do not possess when in reality a state is legitimate only because its citizens accept it as legitimate and when

there could be no other valid reason for that legitimacy.

The argument about human rights contains a similar trap. If there exist such things as human rights, permanent and unchanging because they belong to us in virtue of our permanent and unchanging humanity, then they cannot be selectively enforced or accorded a low or variable priority, for they must be *prime*. Can we say that the maltreatment of dissidents is a foul blot on human rights in the Soviet Union but not in China? Can we say that the Shah's methods of dealing with unrest were tolerable in 1960 and 1970 but not in 1978? And if the Shah's methods were tolerable, why were Dr Mossadegh's not? It may be expedient to invoke moral reasons for action, but if the expediency is too nakedly visible, then the moral force must be fatally weakened; allegations of hypocrisy will fly. Taking on human rights is a commitment of far greater prudential and political complexity than is usually recognised.

Richard W. Cottam's summary of the United States's pitiable maltreatment of Iran, not just over the past five years but over the past seventy years, is well worth reading in *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*:

"The case of Iran should indeed create skepticism concerning the advisability of an official American foreign policy advocacy of human rights. Such an advocacy constitutes intervention in the affairs of other states and it is an intervention with the bluntest and least controllable of instruments. The first question to be asked is how will that instrument be perceived? The Iran case argues that perception of the policy will be in tune with American historical relations with the target state. However, since American officials dealing with that state are likely to have no more than a shallow understanding of historical relationships, there will be little official understanding of how the human rights policy is perceived and therefore of the challenge this response poses for American policy. That Soviet and East European leaders would see human rights advocacy by the United States as a manifestation of roll-back policy, for example, is understandable.

The Iranian case, and quite likely the Soviet case as well, suggest that presidential advocacy of human rights as a central objective of American foreign policy has been and is likely always to be a mistake. Any government's foreign policy is a compound of responses to pressures placed upon it. A basic contention here is that even with optimal conditions, including presidential receptivity, pressures working for human rights abroad can never be strong enough to give anything approaching a primary coloring to American foreign policy. Thus when, as under

President Carter, human rights advocacy is presented as a central aspect of American policy, that policy will be inconsistent, will be interpreted as hypocritical, and will produce unintended effects possibly of momentous importance. On the other hand, an American foreign policy that is compelled to take into account strong and highly visible domestic pressure from human rights advocates is far less likely to be misinterpreted and may well be productive of results in the form of human rights achievements. For example, a policy that is clearly responding to an insistence by Congress that the observation of human rights be taken seriously into account in determining arms sales, is not likely to be misinterpreted by affected governments."

While it may be one of a government's duties to right wrongs, where possible, abroad as well as at home, governments cannot by their nature consistently put human rights first. People can.

Now it may be that the universal enforcement of human rights as an overriding priority is a complex, if not impossible, task for the government of a nation-state, for the simple reason that it is the existence of the nation-state that creates "the human-rights problem" in the first place. But that does not entail that the human rights *tradition* is problematic; indeed, the tradition seems to be

rather uniform and consistent; wherever people have used the notion of human rights at all, they appear to have used much the same language. Again, we should not necessarily expect them to reach the same conclusions to the well-known dilemmas because these dilemmas tend to involve conflicts of human rights with other rights or considerations; the question of the right to rebellion, for example, brings the human or natural right to liberty into conflict with prudential doctrines of stability or order or religious doctrines of the divinity that hedges kings. But the content of the human right itself seems as nearly historically stable as most things ever are.

THIS HISTORICAL AUTHORITY does matter for three reasons; for the practical reason that what men have historically respected as human rights, they are likely to continue to respect; for the linguistic reason that a term which is so heavily and exactly laden cannot easily be stripped of its traditional burden of meaning—the effort to redefine human rights to include, say, economic and social rights is an act of linguistic *violence*; for the indicative reason that the term's historical use directs our attention to features that might be useful, even if our purpose is to rebuild the whole concept from the ground up.

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Nor does it make sense to talk of a human right which does not lay an obligation on some identifiable person or persons. For rights regulate relations between persons, not between persons and trees or persons and the weather; "we've a right to expect a bit of sunshine" is a facetious commonplace which more or less consciously parodies the serious style of rights-talk. And the obligation must also operate upon persons who stand in a reasonably close and clear relation to the right-owner. "We are all guilty" is a dangerous statement, not least because it can be used to gloss over how much guiltier some of us are than others. Guilt, like obligation, is properly used, as in its original legal context, to *single out* those who are to be held responsible. If we are all guilty, there can be no fair prosecutions, because there will be nobody left to act as judge, jury and advocate. And there can be no proper collective indictment because we are not all guilty of the same offence. When Hitler murders the Jews or Stalin murders the Soviet prisoners who were repatriated after the war, then it is Hitler and Stalin and their agents who are guilty of murder. The Western governments and voters who failed to accept more refugees or to repatriate fewer prisoners are not guilty of the same offence; they are guilty of what they did, no more and no less. The attempt to broaden the notion of "human rights" into something more nearly approaching the idea of "social justice" does not merely blur the original notion of rights, it robs the consequent obligations of specific content.

And so, in a rather subtler way, does the utilitarian philosopher's idea that the language of rights is superfluous and probably misleading, because what rights are is obligations dressed up in emotive personal costume. But as soon as you convert human rights into their constituent obligations, funny things begin to happen. First of all, you shatter the unique particularity of Smith's rights. Smith simply becomes a walking target of other people's obligations; the focus of attention moves from this single right-enjoying being, to a shifting multitude of obligants in each of whom the obligation to Smith coexists with a thousand other such obligations. And the coexistence is by no means always peaceful; many of the other obligations compete with if they do not actually conflict with the obligation to Smith. Some of these obligations are not to individuals at all but represent larger collective obligations to community or state. The *psychological* effect of this breaking down of rights into their constituent obligations can only be to disperse Smith's individuality and to reduce his importance.

The difference between the assertion of rights and the maintenance of obligations is a profound *political* difference. We can all tell the difference between a state in which charity is dispensed and one in which rights are claimed. This difference

does not depend on the prevailing degree of sensitivity to the pride of the recipients; it depends on where power is located. The language of obligations is the language of the authority which has defined and parcelled out those obligations; the language of rights is the language of those self-moving, independent beings who claim their own rights regardless of all other claims. To pretend that there is no difference, even in theory, between looking at rights as obligations and looking at rights as rights is to pretend that there is no real difference between examining patients and examining agents, on the grounds that every patient presupposes an agent. To which one can only say that, in the world, there is all the difference.

To insist on this difference is not necessarily to subscribe to liberal conclusions. Richard Tuck points out how many of the most powerful theorists of human rights, supremely Hobbes, come to conclusions that are commonly described as absolutist. Indeed, the more powerfully a political theorist portrays the scope and potential force of human rights, the more likely he may be to take fright and find refuge in some overriding authority. To us in the West, human rights may appear to be the basic underpinning of a stable order. To frightened rulers in other societies, based on the supremacy of collective values—military juntas, dictatorships of the proletariat, Islamic republics and the like—the assertion of human rights can hardly help appearing radical and subversive.

This is often disputed. After all, do not all these authoritarian and totalitarian societies at least pay lip-service to liberal individualist values? Stalin's 1936 Constitution offered impeccable protection for human rights. Scholars tell us that this or that religion or national tradition takes full account of the value of the individual. Surely what we are dealing with is simply a corrupt and hypocritical ruling class or political élite which is suppressing a popular political culture which may be as nearly impregnated with human rights as our own. It is patronising to imagine that ours is the only tradition which is fully conscious of the value of the individual.

ALL THIS MAY WELL be true, but it should not lead us to underestimate the obstinacy and durability of the ruling class, its fear of change, its willingness to resist by force all threats to its own position, and its capacity to identify its own security with the security of the nation. The granting to individuals of any measure of independence from the state calls into question the legitimacy of the whole structure. It is not the precise demands that may be made—the release of A from jail, the transfer of the entirely sane B from psychiatric hospital: it is the making of the demands that is so

unsettling to the authorities. And this poses a question to the human-rights campaigners both inside and outside the target country. Is your aim to secure better treatment for Mr A and Mr B? In that case, there is much to be said for the argument put forward by Dr Kissinger and Mr Callaghan—that you will achieve more by private diplomatic representation and discreet trade-offs than by making a public fuss which simply places the authorities in an embarrassing position and may force them to refuse your demands for fear of losing political face. Or are Mr A and Mr B, in part anyway, symbols of the unfreedom of the whole target country? And is your aim in campaigning for their rights to light a candle that shall not be put out? Perhaps a little of both; you may fall between two stools; the authorities may refuse your public demands, thus causing despair among the campaigners, while satisfying your diplomatic channels by a few token releases which do not begin to make up for the wave of mass arrests. Or you may happen upon the right combination of pressures and force the régime to make public concessions and also hearten the human-rights movements inside the country.⁸

These are difficult judgments. I hazard only that arriving at the right judgment is likely to depend upon a true estimation of what it is we are asking for. Human rights are not simply a “human minimum”; nor do we need to broaden the traditional list of civil liberties and include economic and social justice in order to transform the target society. To ask for the old human rights is quite enough; in fact, it terrifies the wits out of tyrants as much as it ever did; the rest may follow.

It is perhaps with this “may follow” that the crux of the argument is reached. For the narrow view of human rights at least implies and often explicitly affirms that personal and civil rights are *explosive*. A régime which grants such rights cannot remain the same in any important respect as one which does not; certain measures of an economic or social nature *have* to follow. If they do not, if the régime continues to deny, say, land reform or some degree of equal access to schools and to medical treatment, then there will be protests which the newly “civilised” régime must take account of. If the régime ignores the protests, then either it will be forced back into repressive “incivil” measures—censorship, harassment and arrest of protesters, even torture—or it will be brought down by the new civil modes of change; fresh ministers will come to power, fresh elections will be held. Personal and civil rights are not only a precondition of economic and social justice; they are preg-

nant with, and cannot help giving birth to, social justice.

IN THEORY, the end-result of this pregnancy could be roughly the same as that of a full-scale programme of human rights in the broad sense, including economic and social rights, such as the radical priests in South America are demanding. But the process is entirely different, because the transformation arises out of the concrete experience of democracy and not from an imposed programme which may include unrealistic, illiberal or even totalitarian measures. The difference between the *liberalisation* which follows from a narrow view of human rights and the *revolution* which is implied by the broad view is the difference between enabling people to choose the form of a new society and prescribing the new society that they ought to choose.

Two types of evidence tend to confirm that civil rights are explosive. First, the reluctance of oppressive régimes to grant genuine civil rights. If these were merely the kind of basic rights which led nowhere and which could be safely granted without endangering the tyrant's economic and social power and privilege, then we might expect him to yield to pressure to stop torture, arbitrary arrest and so on. In practice, tyrannical régimes will make only the most niggardly gestures of this sort and usually try to withdraw even those gestures as soon as the attention of well-meaning foreigners turns elsewhere. This suggests that the powers of torture, arbitrary arrest and censorship are essential weapons of social control, without which such régimes would collapse.

The other type of evidence points to the close association between civil rights and social justice. Régimes which imprison their citizens without trial and torture and murder them do not tend to look after them very well in other ways. On the calculus of the Freedom House Yearbook, countries which score a 1 on personal and civil rights tend to score a 1 or 2 on economic and social rights; those which score a 7 on personal and civil rights tend to score a 6 or 7 on economic and social rights. The scoring may sound as if it might be rather arbitrary and hence open to dispute, but in practice these are mostly matters of fact which can be established with rough reliability; either the régime's political opponents are in jail, or they aren't. Now this association between the two kinds of rights may be readily accepted in the case of Western Europe and the old white Commonwealth among the righteous and of Uganda and Haiti among the ungodly. But there appear to be less clear-cut cases. On the Left, some argue that while Soviet Russia undoubtedly fails on civil and personal rights, it is at least partially fair in the distribution of economic and

⁸ See *Morality and Foreign Policy*. By KENNETH W. THOMPSON. Louisiana State University Press, £11.20, \$16.95.

social goods, while the United States is the other way about. On the other hand, can it be denied that the extension of civil rights to Blacks in the Deep South has also, through their voting power, brought them a larger share of social justice, and would not the same apply if the same miraculously occurred inside the Soviet Union? What seems hard to deny is that the granting of civil rights does act as a lever to prise open boxes containing other, more material kinds of benefit.

Moreover, campaigners on the Left might like to consider the *tactical* advantage of sticking to the narrow definition of civil rights. The narrow campaign commands far wider support and cannot be written off as motivated by a single ideology and hence cannot be blackguarded by tyrants' propaganda machines. Human rights in the narrow sense present a simple, almost *naïf* claim which

makes them hard to argue against. Hence they could be written into the Helsinki Agreement without appearing to present an anti-Communist intervention in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. "Monitoring groups" could not be too obviously suppressed, for how could such a charitable, *apolitical* enterprise be strangled by a peace-loving government?

The campaign for human rights, however narrowly conceived, represents a rude intrusion into the affairs of another country. Successfully to pierce the frontiers of the nation state, it must subtly combine moral pressure with material negotiation. Bluff must be mixed with blackmail so that neither is too nakedly visible. And like any such enterprise, if it is to help rather than harm the intended beneficiaries, it should not be undertaken without forethought nor practised without restraint.

The Minotaur & the Maze

On American Politics—By ESMOND WRIGHT

BOOKSHELVES OF COMMENT on the American political scene have appeared in recent months. What light do they throw on a certain great event that took place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November?

Watergate is now ancient history. It may well have represented "narcissism unbridled" and constitute "a compromise with integrity" not just of the President but of his generation, but Leo Rangell's *The Mind of Watergate*,¹ an account by a distinguished psychoanalyst, tells a familiar tale without adding anything new to the now over-chronicled revelations. Watergate, and distaste for the Washington portrayed by Woodward and Bernstein, may well have put "Jimmy Who?" into the White House, but Dr Rangell's comments on this, drawing on a diary he apparently kept at the time as he—like the world—watched Impeachment-by-Television, show no special professional expertise; no doubt eighty million Americans felt as he did. In any event, we have moved a long way in four years. A President needs the ability, or the men with the ability, to handle not just foreign affairs but to handle Congress, which to some Georgians—and to some Californians—may seem a foreign world. It means handling not 435

Congressmen and 100 Senators, but 535 ambassadors from 535 distinct, selfish and greedy kingdoms, each with his own resources, dreams, and axes to grind, and each flanked by a small army of advisers, aides and experts. They do not leap to the crack of any whip, in the White House or on the Hill.

Catholicism, too, is dead as a political liability. Certainly many Catholics saw the Kennedy election in 1960 as a milestone conferring the seal of legitimacy on Catholic office-holding. Mary Hanna's *Catholics and American Politics*² is fascinating and frank: from her vivid in-depth interviews, it is clear—however surprising—that some Catholic Congressmen are not aware of the Catholicism even of some of their own colleagues. The issue was dying before 1960. In the 1958 Democratic landslide in Congress, 90 Catholics were elected to the House and 12 to the Senate, roughly approximating to their numbers in the population. Kennedy's victory was merely confirmation that the Catholic issue no longer disturbed. It is after all just possible that in 1928 the American people did not want Al Smith even if he had been a Protestant. Scholars at the Michigan Survey Research Center do, of course, remind us that it seems likely that the Kennedy candidacy spurred a greater percentage of normally Democratic or non-voting Protestants to vote against him than of normally Republican or non-voting Catholics to vote for him.

¹ *The Mind of Watergate*. By LEO RANGELL. W. W. Norton, \$12.95, £7.75.

² *Catholics and American Politics*. By MARY T. HANNA. Harvard University Press, \$15.00, £10.50.

But the power of the parish priest and the monsignor have waned—just as the power of the boss has waned; World War II, Vatican II, the growth of education and of “experts” on social issues who stand up to priests and bishops and are even encouraged to do so by them—all these constitute a major psychological and social revolution. Catholicism as a political feature in a candidate is now often not even noticed, and certainly is no more striking than his or her Jewishness or Mormonism. The Governor of New York, a Catholic, has been emphatic in recent days that one Senate seat for New York should go to a Jew. This reminds us, however, not merely that New York is special, but that it is ethnicity rather than religion that is still alive and kicking. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (now a Senator) recognised in 1963 (*Beyond the Melting Pot*) that the ethnic factor was far more important than the religious in American politics, although it might of course include religion in its texture. And writing in *Commentary* in October 1974, they said that “ethnic identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion stronger, ethnic conflict more marked everywhere in the last twenty years.” There is here a moral for 1980 and—if unemployment is not curbed—beyond it. Religious difference will not break out but ethnic trouble can. But then the United States was always more a salad bowl than a melting pot, more pluralism than consensus.

THE BRITISH READER of *Realignment in American Politics*³ will need to have a special political lexicon alongside him, if he is to discern anything through the clouds of turgid prose that lie beyond the title. We are in the world of models and social variables, and “The logical starting point of theory building is the identification of necessary concepts”.... Among political *aficionados* in American universities—and there are more professors there who know how to run the US than any Ayatollah would ever dream of—“realignment” is a precise term in what has become a very precise, if tautological, non-science. Experts—sixteen of them are gathered here—describe an election that brings about major political change as a “realigning election”, a term first used by Vladimir Key, to whose memory this book is dedicated, but who could write on this subject, and on the South, with a skill few of his disciples can match. Laymen—or foreigners—might of course innocently assume that all elections realign political forces.

Not so. If the change is short-lived it is only a

“deviating election.” If blocs of voters switch their traditional allegiance and do so in ways indicating a permanent change of loyalty, then the election is a “re-aligning election.” Four such are usually agreed on in American history: 1828 (Andrew Jackson’s), 1860 (Lincoln’s—though some would favour 1856 when a new Republican Party first contested the Presidency), 1896 (McKinley’s victory over William Jennings Bryan, in which mass campaigning emerges) and obviously, 1932, with FDR’s newly-structured Democratic Party, whose grip on the House has—almost—held until today. A contributor to this volume, David Nixon, would add to these 1836, 1856, 1864 and 1964, and he regards 1928, 1936 and 1960 as “possible realignments.”

Much of the argument in this book is about what constitutes realignment, and why one election is more “critical” than another. Much of it is technical and theoretic, and I have no doubt that both Mr Carter’s and Mr Reagan’s henchmen have been busy feeding such indices of opinion measurement into their hungry computers, though they tell us little about the actualities of politics. Indeed the first reference to an actual election does not occur until page 35. Fundamental aspects like the increasing rate of incumbency in Congress, the unwieldy committee system, and not least the weakening of political parties are so much taken for granted that they are rarely mentioned and never analysed. It is curious how a sophisticated study of politics by experts can fail to capture the “feel” of politics—or is it? The reason is that it is written by experts for experts, and every other paragraph refers to other experts. No doubt they have families to feed.

Let me balance these strictures by praise for two contributions. Louis Seagull writes with some vividness of the changing attitudes in the South and among the young; and Lester Seligman of the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, and Michael King of Penn State note with some freshness the pattern of continuity and change among Congressmen between 1870–1970. The book as a whole, although over-elaborate and undigested, is a reminder of a thesis that it goes a fair distance to prove: that democracy is more continual than continuous, more periodic than constant, more sudden and abrupt than smooth and incremental. Control in a democracy is exercised only at times of crisis, when passions are aroused. Control of government by citizens is, most of the time, potential only, but it is the fact that control can occur that makes a system democratic.

IN THE UNITED STATES, unlike Britain, that control is exercised as the Constitution and the calendar prescribe; come Civil War or foreign war, elections are held regularly. It is to this fact that Richard Watson’s *The Presidential Contest*⁴ and

³ *Realignment in American Politics: Towards a Theory*. Edited by BRUCE A. CAMPBELL and RICHARD J. TRILLING. University of Texas Press, \$22.50, £13.50.

⁴ *The Presidential Contest*. By RICHARD A. WATSON. John Wiley, \$7.35, £3.35.

Stephen Wayne's *The Road to the White House*⁵ (two handbooks as much for the primaries as for the election itself) address themselves. So do Herbert Nicholas, who in *The Nature of American Politics*⁶ brings a cutting edge and grace of style to his analysis—that of an outsider looking in, and Richard Neustadt in *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*,⁷ revising for 1980 what was in 1960 the book that after his election JFK is believed to have taken for bedside reading—if he had time or energy then for literature. Professor Neustadt became, as a consequence, a consultant in the Kennedy and Johnson White House, and draws on that experience in this second edition of a participant-observer's view of the problems facing the man in the Oval Office. It is a sophisticated if awkwardly written inside view, vivid and original, and with some admirable case studies of the President in action: Truman handling MacArthur; JFK and the Bay of Pigs; Carter and Bert Lance. On the other hand, James David Barber sees elections in their journalistic settings, in his study of *The Pulse of Politics*.⁸

All five books are excellent, and in places exciting, reading. Let me attempt to summarise what they say.

First, parties are in disarray and may be in a permanent decline. They were not mentioned in the Constitution, and were seen by James Madison (its real author) as dangerous and as "factions." Yet, as Herbert Nicholas makes clear, they have, as great federal alliances, helped maintain the federal system—"the cement of American politics" Professor Nicholas calls them, in a chapter that goes on to show how the cement is cracking, and how the power of the bosses declines under the impact of education, the development of primaries, and the massive scale of Federal social welfare. One in three of the electorate now calls itself Independent—a fact that ex-Republican, now near-Democrat John Anderson sought to exploit.

The President is himself, though party leader, largely independent of party support. CREEP (the committee to secure the re-election of President Nixon in 1972) was seen as engaged in a horrendous exercise—and it may have crossed the

narrow line between countering "enemy" propaganda and espionage at Watergate. But all Presidents since FDR have to a greater or lesser degree sought to create personal organisations alongside the parties.

"The Roosevelt coalition was a formidable machine for re-electing Franklin Roosevelt", says Godfrey Hodgson in *All Things to All Men*,⁹ drawing from his experiences as a Washington correspondent of *The Sunday Times* and *The Observer*. Goldwater felt that he had to have his own team, because many of the top party Republican regulars were opposed to him. Nixon had a personal staff of 337 paid workers; Ford and Carter had their own private organisations alongside the official party structure; so even had Johnson, who needed them least of all. (On this Stephen Wayne is vivid and well-informed. (And, apart from his own small White House kingdom, there stand alongside—part counsellors, part rivals—big semi-independent empires like the FBI, the CIA, NASA, and the host of regulatory agencies (over 30 in all, employing 60,000 people) that make Washington a company town, manufacturing at best a limited government and at worst jobs for bureaucrats. It all began, in fact, with the New Deal; the initiative came from the White House and the agencies "downtown." In those halcyon days that were in fact also days of crisis, Congress did not so much discuss bills as salute them as they went sailing by.

As party leader, however, the President gives his own style to the quadrennial contests; James David Barber in *The Pulse of Politics* argues that there are three dominant themes in Presidential elections—conflict, conscience and conciliation—and that they recur in predictable twelve-year cycles. A combative campaign (Truman versus Dewey in 1948, Kennedy versus Nixon in 1960) is followed four years later by a moral crusade (Eisenhower versus Stevenson in 1952, Nixon versus Goldwater in 1964) and then by an attempt to unify the nation (1956, 1968). This is of course much too simple, and the brief illustrative essays on each candidate since 1900 rehearse familiar facts. The book, however, seeks to put each election in the setting of the treatment given it by contemporary journalists and commentators, and is a reminder of how remorselessly the image-making is done.

SECONDLY, THESE BOOKS show us that Congress moves farther and farther away from being a Parliament in a British sense. "Parliament", Edmund Burke said once to a Bristol audience—and he was a member for Bristol—"is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests. Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation with one interest—that of the whole." It is impossible for Congress to play this role. Con-

⁵ *The Road to the White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections*. By STEPHEN J. WAYNE. Macmillan Press, £12.00, paper £5.95.

⁶ *The Nature of American Politics*. By H. G. NICHOLAS. Oxford University Press, £4.50, paper £1.95.

⁷ *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Carter*. By RICHARD E. NEUSTADT. John Wiley, \$11.35, £5.20.

⁸ *The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age*. By JAMES DAVID BARBER. W. W. Norton, \$14.95, £8.95.

⁹ *All Things to All Men: The False Promise of the Modern American Presidency*. By GODFREY HODGSON. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, £8.95; Simon & Schuster, \$12.95.

gressmen reflect special and narrow interests, but are required to decide on broad and national issues. They are closer to Parliament in an 18th-century sense, a cluster of connections, against which the Americans revolted in 1776. President Nixon rightly claimed that the President was more truly representative than the House of Representatives.

Individual candidates, whatever the party labels they wear, make their own local and federal alliances, raise their own resources in their constituencies, and when they go to Washington, go as power-barons from their 435 congressional baronies, or Senators from their 50 semi-independent states. "Vote your district first", said Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, LBJ's mentor (as FDR was *his* hero). They need a lot of money. Congressman Dodd of the Second District in Connecticut, running for the Senate this November, reckoned in November a year ago that he needed a million dollars for his campaign, and he organised it alongside rather than inside his party. They no longer get in on the President's coat-tails. Nor do they need them. Three out of four of all the districts that elected Democrats to Congress in 1972 voted for Nixon for President. In 1976 President Ford was steered away from some districts, and in 1978 some Democrats in key districts did not want the Democratic President campaigning for them, since they believed he would lose them votes.

As James Bryce was told, a century ago, the parties are like two bottles, each bearing a different label—and both empty. The weakening of the seniority system in Congress; the decline of "straight-ticket" voting and the importance of "issues"; the proliferation of "political action committees"; the fantastic growth of staff bureaucracies (more than 38,000 aides work for the 535 men and women on Capitol Hill); Common Cause; campaigns for ecology or consumer protection that take place "outside" party politics: all have eroded party and Congressional leadership. Discipline in a British sense is conspicuous by its absence (witness the career of Adam Clayton Powell).

Indeed, despite the Arthur Schlesinger thesis of the Watergate years that the Presidency had become dangerously Imperial—and despite the various measures to ensure Congressional authority and "government in the sunshine" (the War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed over Nixon's veto; the ban in 1974 on US arms shipments to Turkey; the probings in 1975 and 1976 into the CIA; the creation of the Congressional Budgetary Office; sections of the Foreign Military Sales Acts like section 36(b); the growth of "legislative vetoes" and of "watchdog committees")—Congress has not become a "leader" and the striking feature of recent months has been the call for Executive not Congressional initiatives. On the



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budget and on legislation that initiative must come from the White House. In any crisis, and in any country today, there is a recurring cry for leadership. All the Congressional authority elaborately built up in the Watergate years has looked very sick in recent months. It has not faced up to Iran, or to Russia, or to the problem of Oil. Clearly the OECD economies, the dependence of farm prices on grain sales to the USSR, and of fuel prices on the politics of the Gulf, all point to the need for a new and close relationship between the President and the Hill if there are to be real answers to problems.

There has been little sign of it, however, in the Carter Presidency. The one piece of perverse leadership Congress has shown has been to block President Carter's proposals for a ten cents a gallon tariff on imported oil, as an energy-saver. This was the first time in 28 years that a Democratic Congress over-rode a Democratic President's veto. In a country whose petrol costs are absurdly low but whose demands for petrol are abnormally high (American expenditure on gasoline uses up one-ninth of the world's energy), this is the abnegation of Congressional leadership, but equally is a denial of it to the President. Yet on this issue almost all Congressmen, Republican and Democratic alike, were agreed. And three days after the Congress thus defiantly spoke, the President was pelted with bottles in Miami by a Black community whose votes were essential to his re-election.

THIRDLY, THESE WRITERS stress the importance of the development of the Primaries. There has been a revolution here. Humphrey won the nomination at Chicago in 1968 without winning or even entering a single primary. George McGovern and his cohorts of young idealists opened up the system; it was to be the end of "fixing" nominations in smoke-filled rooms; democracy and with it, it was assumed, sweet reason would prevail. This year there were 35 primaries, as well as those in Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.

Primaries not only extend participation—some 30 million Americans helped to select their party representatives this year—and build up interest, they weaken the power of whoever might seek to act as bosses at the conventions (note the loss of authority of Mayor Byrne in Daley's old fortress, Chicago) and, of course, eliminate those who lack vote-getting ability. Even incumbents can be hurt by them: in 1952 President Truman and in 1968 President Johnson announced their decisions not to

seek re-election when the New Hampshire primary indicated lack of party support.

We have left the age of barons [writes Richard Neustadt] and entered the age of candidates. Its hallmarks are management by private firms, exposure through television, funding through direct-mail drives and canvassing by zealous volunteers. That an incumbent President becomes an avowed candidate a year before his party meets in national convention seems a sure and fitting sign of the new age.

He needs money and he needs time. Carter started running for the Presidency in 1974, his last year as Governor of Georgia—or even before. Reagan had been at it for twenty years.

The system is expensive, in dollars and in stamina. A presidential campaign through the seven months of the primaries is estimated to cost half-a-million dollars a week. There is no agreement that the elaborate curbs on campaign expenditure really have had much effect. They appear greatly to favour the incumbent, certainly at the Congressional level, as Gary Jacobson shows in his *Money in Congressional Elections*.¹⁰ John Connolly gave up the Presidential race after spending ten million dollars, which secured him exactly one delegate to the convention. But primaries are here to stay.

NOR IS THERE, fourthly, agreement on the role of the Media. Richard Neustadt notes (and Godfrey Hodgson confirms) Kennedy's skill in using television, and FDR's ease before a microphone:

No recent President, not even Kennedy, has been prepared to use this medium as its habitual practitioners do, emphasizing visuals, action, conflict, turning ease to account in commentary. No President thus far has felt he had the talent to do that and still appear "presidential". It will be interesting to see what happens if we get someone who can.

Neustadt foresees, as a scenario for the future, a President with skill on television mobilising suburbanites across the country as partisans for *him*, forming a national television-bound public action committee, "a sort of tribe." The problem, he recognises, would not only be how to keep such leadership but how to pass it on.

Herbert Nicholas is too astringent, and too little enthralled by Camelot, to hold with this. If television means so much, what happened, he asks, to telegenic John Lindsay? It is a one-way medium, leaving the man isolated in his studio.

Flashing a smile on the screen does not replace the shaking of live hands. Purchasing a com-

¹⁰ *Money in Congressional Elections*. By GARY JACOBSON. Yale University Press, \$17.50, £11.05; paper \$5.95, £3.75.

mercial does not do away with the press conference. Renting a crowd is not a substitute for building a consensus.

All are agreed on this. All indeed have a common hero: that hero is Franklin Roosevelt. But then none since his day had so big a challenge; and none had a Harry Hopkins alongside him either.

J. M. Blum of Yale, a product of the "conventional liberalism" of the 1930s, believing in a strong president as the agent of social justice, also sees FDR as a hero, even if his essay on him—like those on Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—is too brief and conventional to open up any new themes. His essay on LBJ does not draw on the research in which the earlier studies are rooted, but perhaps because it reflects the tension and the temper of the man and is less certain of his place in history, it is the most lively of the four all-too-short studies in *The Progressive Presidents*.¹¹ Blum writes with his customary grace and smoothness even if his fourth "hero" had faults.

NOR, RUNNING THROUGH these accounts, is there, fifthly, much optimism. Presidential weakness, writes Neustadt, was the underlying theme of his *Presidential Power* in 1960; "weakness is still what I see." This theme is spelled out clearly. It is a non-Imperial Presidency. "Powers" are no guarantee of power. The President like his party is engaged in persuasion. Alliances have to be formed, and reformed—just as have Democratic Party (or Labour Party) coalitions. Some urgent issues seem all but insoluble; the plight of the hostages, inflation, unemployment in (of all things) the automobile industry, have all eroded confidence in government. People get elected now less because they instil confidence than because their opponents do not. Popularity in itself is less important. In recent elections for governorships, men and women were returned who were not especially popular—in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio and California. They were seen, however, as able. The mood is, in other words, negative, as it is largely in Britain.

"That government is best", said Jefferson, "that governs least." Yet the dream died almost with his death. The demands on the President grow remorselessly. All the extra agencies set up to help him can act only in his name. His is an elective Kingship, with ceremonial, executive, legislative, bureaucratic, partisan and foreign roles all having

threads leading through endless Washington echoing mazes to the overburdened Minotaur at the centre. And Washington itself, the media, the *Washington Post*, the Hill, and all the armies of lieutenants around them are part friends, part enemies, jostling for status, hungry for gossip, eager to find and savagely to reveal the God's feet of clay. Neustadt and Hodgson both write vividly on this theme. "Is the Presidency possible?" asks Neustadt. Only, it seems, if the man has FDR's skill on radio and with the press, JFK's skill on television, Johnson's mastery with Congress and Truman's capacity to grow into the job. He needs a lot of experience, preferably in the nuances of Washington. And more than anything else he needs the right temperament, the capacity to attract and hold the right people, and—in all its burdens—to enjoy the job.

AN IMPORTANT FOOTNOTE to the theme of attracting talent is offered by Philip Burch's *Elites in American History*,¹² although footnote might not be the most accurate description. It is the third volume in a most impressive piece of scholarship, much the weightiest of all the books noted here. In this fascinating biographical dictionary, 140 of the 500 pages list the men of power who have gathered round the Presidents since 1933, revealing educa-

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¹¹ *The Progressive Presidents: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson*. By J. M. BLUM. W. W. Norton, \$11.95, £6.95.

¹² *Elites in American History: The New Deal to the Carter Administration*. By PHILIP H. BURCH, JR. Holmes & Meier (distributed in Britain by Noonan Hurst), £9.50, paper, £7.00.

tion, status and family, and business associations. The text discusses and assesses their significance. It establishes that the New Deal drew on élite leaders but recruited them from a much wider social background than before; that Eisenhower's Administration was much more business- and conservative-oriented than Nixon's ("indeed, one might argue that the Watergate scandal would never have occurred if the Nixon administration had not relied so heavily on ambitious, if not amoral, outsiders"); that Hubert Humphrey in 1968 was well-heeled, thanks to business support, whereas George McGovern in 1972 had to rely on an unprecedented number of small donors; that Carter was "an insider campaigning as an outsider", drawing heavily on the Washington establishment, and with three of his Cabinet from IBM.

The Presidential politics of America, whether Democratic or Republican, are thus another aspect of high finance; Presidents are (or rapidly become) millionaires; and if they are not, their wives are (or do).

AND WHAT DO these books *not* tell us? Four points relevant to this November election strike me. First, and in sharp contrast with Britain, is the small part played in American politics by issues, in part because the parties, being federal, cannot risk being ideological. Witness the fate that overtook Barry Goldwater in 1964, and George McGovern in 1972. In the campaign this year each has accused the other of ideology as a crime, and the Democrats in particular have attacked Reagan's alleged extremism. Thus when Neustadt does refer to the problems that are coming up for solution in 1981 and beyond, he lists them *staccato*:

Homeowners versus oil suppliers, ecologists versus energy producers, bondholders versus streetcleaners, taxpayers versus teachers, workers versus pensioners, suburbs versus cities, everybody versus "welfare", race versus race, and so forth in domestic terms to say nothing of foreign affairs. . . .

Yet it is on these issues that the voter has been judging, as much as on the skill or experience of the man and the salesmanship that goes in selling him to the electorate. This is where indeed all the Presidents since FDR do seem inferior. He did inject into the 1932 campaign not just a personality, a temperament and an image but a clear policy ringingly declaimed. The problems in 1980 of course might be more difficult, the answers less clear-cut,

the media more inquisitive (would he, given his polio, ever have been allowed to run in a television age?). But clearly there has been a slump since 1945.

THE MINIMISING OF ISSUES is made all the sharper by R. H. Tawney's essay on American labour,¹³ printed here for the first time. It was written in 1942 when Tawney was attached to the British Embassy in Washington, as a counsellor on American labour problems, and is a splendidly informative guide to the status, numbers and characteristics of Trade Unions as they were in the heyday of New Deal Liberalism. Their membership was eight-and-a-half million in 1940, three times that of 1933; by 1955, with the merger of the AFL and the CIO, it had reached seventeen million. Now they constitute about one-quarter of the total labour force in the country, but their targets have been won and much of their campaigning is dulcet-toned. There has been increasing government intervention in union affairs, in the Taft-Hartley Act and in the Labor Act of 1959, providing for Federal supervision of many aspects of union activity. Organised labour in the USA is conservative, even capitalist, in tone. But it is not Republican—in the Congressional elections of 1972, 1974, and 1976, 95% of labour funds went to support Democrats.

An account of British politics would by contrast be dominated by discussion of the militancy of the Trade Unions; in these studies they hardly get a mention—they are only one among an army of pressure groups, and much less influential than the military-industrial complex that wrecked McNamara's plans for the F-111, the American Petroleum Institute (speaking for 350 oil companies), the American Medical Association, the National Rifle Association, the NAACP, the National Association of Manufacturers, Common Cause (with 250,000 members) or Ralph Nader's Public Citizen. Some 5,000 such groups are registered as lobbyists in Washington. Carter pre-1976 was going to shred them by 90%; they are still there. At the Democratic Convention in August, while organised labour got all it asked for in the Kennedy-influenced platform—including repeal of section 14b of the Taft-Hartley law, which allows states to pass right-to-work laws forbidding union shops, and revision of the Hatch Act to permit federal employees to engage in political activity—everyone knows that Presidents are not tightly bound by such platforms.

In American politics, a platform is not something you stand on, but something you get in on. In 1971 President Nixon ignored the Republican platform when he imposed wage and price controls, and announced "I am now a Keynesian in economics." In August 1980 the Democratic convention paid more attention to the Equal Rights Amendment

¹³ *The American Labour Movement, and other essays.* By R. H. TAWNEY. Harvester Press, £15.50.

than to anything else (reflecting the large number of women delegates in its public discussions) and announced that they recommended the barring of party financial aid to all candidates not backing it; indeed in urging that public funds should be used for abortions for poor women they knew that this was a policy to which President Carter was firmly opposed.

"Issues" are not what Presidential elections are about; it is image-manufacturing that matters. As a Carter aide put it in the 1976 campaign:

Issues, issues, issues! Can't political scientists ever think of anything else? The issues take care of themselves. Everybody who counts knows where Jimmy is, except the press who parrot back whatever some idiot Republican tells 'em. Issues are not our problem now—we've got to have good advances, good and precise targeting, good media, better polling, and a hell of a lot more turn-out. We've got one major goal between now and November: to see Jimmy and Mondale as leaders whom voters will trust. *They are the issue.* . . .

Carter's own comment on the relevance of issues is significant: the only Presidents he knew of who emphasised the issues were, he said, Presidents Dewey, Goldwater, and McGovern.

Yet some issues do hurt; energy for one. Carter set up an Energy Administration (staff 20,000, budget 10 billion dollars); its impact thus far is small. It was Representative John Anderson's frankness in the Massachusetts primary campaign in protesting against the blandness and "politics as usual" stances of both major parties on the oil crisis that increased primary voting in some precincts in the state by some 250%. It has been hard for him to sustain this impact since. The energy question, however, was a central issue this November.

SECONDLY, THESE BOOKS all but totally omit reference to Blacks. This would not have happened twenty years ago—or even perhaps five years ago; in 1976 it was the Black vote and the Black turn-out that put Jimmy Carter into the White House. In 1976 the Black turn-out was only 49%—and that was thought high, though not as high as in 1964. After the high glamour of the Southern voter registration drives of the 1960s, however, apathy returned. Nevertheless, in 1976, of the 6.6 million Black votes cast, 90% went to Carter, and this tipped some key industrial states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas into his column.

The relative decline in importance of this factor

is reinforced by the withdrawal from Congress—by choice or by fate—of major Black figures like Andy Young, for four years a Representative of the Fifth District of Georgia (the prosperous parts of Atlanta, the city that proudly boasted in the '60s that it was too busy to hate), and Barbara Jordan, the first Black state Senator in Texan history, an acting Governor of the State and for three terms a Representative of down-town Houston. She decided quite simply to abandon politics for teaching. And Shirley Chisholm, one-time firebrand and in 1972 the first Black woman to run for the Presidency, shows less ambition nowadays. The Black Caucus is not the force it was.

THIRDLY, THERE IS too little attention paid here to regional imbalance, to the fact that at least one American family in five moves house each year, to the importance of suburbanite and therefore single-issue politics, to the increasingly divergent political attitudes of various sections of the country, to what might even seem to be the growing economic balkanisation of the United States.

The special characteristics of the South are familiar enough. Wayne, Neustadt, Nicholas all

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spell them out, and register that Jimmy Carter (originally no liberal on race) finally banished the race issue in the South by defeating George Wallace in the 1976 primaries and by forging an alliance of Blacks and working-class Whites to carry all of the South except Virginia.

They recognise, too, an emerging Southern Republican and affluent White vote. They do not, however, I believe, fully note the scale of the White backlash in 1978 (not only in the South, but evident in the defeat of liberal Democratic senators like McIntyre in New Hampshire, Clark in Iowa, Anderson of Minnesota—which Mondale's democrats badly botched that year—and Hathaway of Maine) or the emergence of two Souths split by the energy question. The oil producing states, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, strongly oppose government price controls on oil. What might be called the inner South, Arkansas, Alabama and Tennessee, stretching through to the Carolina tidewater, is oil-hungry but not oil-producing. Its growth rate in the 1960s and '70s was phenomenal; its cheap and under-unionised labour attracted Northern capital, and it attracted sun-belt worshippers too. There is a sharp distinction arising here.

Add to this the irony that the East now feels aggrieved and bypassed. Its long winters and hot summers demand oil alike for heating and for air-conditioning, and its energy costs are high. It needs controls; it needs federal aid for its declining cities (Gerald Ford probably lost the 1976 election by his firm line in refusing aid to New York); its state and sales-tax bases are eroded as population moves to the suburbs at least and to the sun at best. It is likely to become what the South was in FDR's time, the nation's economic Problem Number One.

The West is Marlboro' country. It includes, notably in the Bay area and down its glamorous Pacific shores, pockets of liberals with a life-style all their own: on homosexuality and gay rights, on easy abortion and ready access to marijuana, on ecology and varieties of strange religious experiences they are unique. The rest of America wants them to remain so. The affluence of money and climate that produces social freedom produces also firmly right-wing views on economics. This is now the home of Professor Milton Friedman and of ex-President Gerald Ford, and readily spawns tax-cutting Propositions. The Rocky Mountain states and Alaska are energy exporters. All the West—except (narrowly) Hawaii—went Republican in 1976, and would probably have gone so even more decisively had Reagan, not Ford, then been the Republican candidate. The margin in 1976 was narrowest where the majority of the population live, in the coastal states. But in and across the Rockies it is an empire of affluence in which Reagan was very much at home.

FOURTHLY, AND FINALLY, there is a mood that stands—philosophically if not always politically—to the Right of centre. It is reflected in the born-again-Christian phenomenon, of which all three major Presidential candidates are examples—and Charles Colson of the Watergate team also. Over one hundred million Americans are regular Church-goers, and Church-givers.

Ex-Secretary Cyrus Vance, giving the Commencement Address in June at Harvard, noted—and described as self-indulgent nonsense:

a dangerous new nostalgia... a longing for earlier days, when the world seemed at least in retrospect to have been a more orderly place, in which American power could, alone, preserve that order....

Yet when the state is under threat or under challenge from outside, there is an instinctive rallying round the flag, as in 1933 and in 1940. The seizure of the hostages in Teheran, the Iran-Iraq War with its threat to the oil life-line, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan are but the banners around which the troops mustered. This has been—for once—an election in which foreign policy matters. The posture of both major candidates was firmly anti-Soviet.

Again, there is small faith in government, and still less in government spending. But Government is Big Brother and Big Provider. One in ten of all New York adults are on public welfare; one in ten of all American workers work for public bodies. Two out of every five of the 3,300 delegates to the Democratic Convention this year worked for the government in one way or another. One reason for the failure of the Kennedy campaign to get far in the convention was that a majority of those present as party activists were in fact on the government payroll and had a vested interest in the programmes sponsored in their own localities by the incumbent President. The Duke of Newcastle would have found himself—almost—on familiar ground. As in Britain, so in America, the alarming scale of the payroll vote has produced an intellectual shift in values, and a new and ugly alignment.

Liberalism is, in fact, at discredit in both major parties and in both our countries. As Godfrey Hodgson shows, it is not merely "Viet Nam" and "Watergate" that are to blame. There is no consensus any more, but many groups clashing with each other—each the product of its own anxieties. Inequality is still a fact in American life that no Supreme Court pronouncement can outlaw; inflation and unemployment remain; the recurring oil crises have destroyed the easy assumptions of an all-but-effortless economic growth; the age of innocence is over.

Is there a conclusion to what is, necessarily, an endless adventure? The Presidency will survive, transformed in and by television, and despite it. It

will need from now on to be continually engaged in coalition-building, manufacturing alliances of disparate "single issues", as it always has been. Only in the second and final term will campaigning cease. It is no longer always—in Teddy Roosevelt's phrase—a "bully pulpit." But "the weakening of the presidency is about as likely", says Aaron Wildavsky, as "the withering away of the state." As Reinhold Niebuhr has said, political con-

troversies are in any case never between the righteous and the sinner but always between sinners. No doubt both as a righteous man and as a sinner Jimmy Carter regarded himself as better qualified for the job than Ronald Reagan. In politics, as in life, of course, it is not always the best qualified who wins. But then in politics as in life—as Democratic chairman Larry O'Brien put it—there are no final victories.

Trying to Diagnose the British Disease

Pessimists & Utopians—By DAVID MARQUAND

"The eyes of the world are turning to Great Britain. We now have the moral leadership of the world, and before many years we shall have people coming here as to a modern Mecca, learning from us in the twentieth century as they learnt from us in the seventeenth century."

ANEURIN BEVAN (1948)

"In the process of constitutional development England first and Great Britain afterwards have led the way. Written constitutions are based on theories or principles of government; but theories are suggested by experience, and the nations who dare to call themselves free have built largely on British experience."

SIR IVOR JENNINGS (1945)

"Few now sang 'Land of Hope and Glory.' Few even sang 'England Arise!' England had risen all the same."

A. J. P. TAYLOR (1965, writing about the end of the Second World War and the 1945 Election)

NO DOUBT, Aneurin Bevan and Sir Ivor Jennings were laying it on a bit thick, even for the late 1940s. Yet, as the final sentences of A. J. P. Taylor's now classic history of England from 1914 to 1945 remind us, they spoke for many. In the late '40s the British really did believe that their institutions provided a model for the rest of the world—that Westminster, even if not Transport House or the Labour Party Conference, was a Mecca for mankind. They could be forgiven for doing so. Where Germany had suffered three changes of régime since 1914, and France and Italy two each, the "Westminster Model" had survived two World Wars, the disappearance of the Liberal Party as the main anti-Conservative party in the state, its replacement in that role by the Labour Party, the only General Strike in British history, the worst

depression in the history of capitalism and the return of a majority Labour Government, committed to a programme of social and economic reforms more far-reaching, at any rate in the eyes of its adherents, than any since the 17th century.

MANY OF THE social and economic changes which have taken place in this country since the late 1940s could have been predicted then. It would have been much harder to predict the change in the political climate which accompanied them. For whatever may be in doubt about the mood of present-day Britain, it is clear that no one outside a handful of Law Lords and political commentators still sees Westminster as a Mecca. Confidence in and support for the Westminster Model are weaker now than at any time since it took its modern form at the end of the 19th century. The succession of jerky and ill-considered institutional changes in the 1960s and '70s; the calling into question of hitherto sacrosanct features of the system (including the relationship between Parliament and the courts, the political impartiality of the Civil Service, and the relationship between Westminster and the non-English parts of the United Kingdom); the decline in the proportion of the electorate which considers it worthwhile to vote in general elections (and the much sharper decline in the proportion willing to vote for either of the two main parties); the decisions, for that matter, of the October Labour Party Conference on the House of Lords and the furious arguments within the Party over the role of its Members of Parliament and their relationship with the mass party outside—all these point in the same direction. The Model may not be in crisis, but there can be no question that it is in disarray. The only questions about which there is room for argument are, Why? and, What needs to be done to restore stability?

THE ANSWER to the first question, at any rate, cannot be found in the last few years alone. The disarray may be new, but the forces which produced it must have been in operation for some time. The central problem for a historian of post-War Britain is therefore how to identify, and, if possible, to account for, these forces. David Childs's sober, workmanlike, but unfortunately rather pedestrian study of this period¹ does not do this; indeed, it is not even clear that he recognises that there is a problem to be solved. His tone is brisk, matter-of-fact, almost chirpy. By the late 1970s, he concedes, Britain "looked a sorry place in many respects" compared with her old enemy, Germany. But the strong implication of his final paragraph is that the "sorriness" was only skin-deep. A higher percentage of Britons owned their own homes than of Germans, he points out; Britons were "less inclined to kill themselves than were some other Europeans", and also "less inclined to kill each other on the roads"; in the 30 years between 1945 and 1975 "Britain gave the world more Nobel Prize-winners for chemistry, physics, and medicine than any other country apart from the United States"; though Britain had less influence in the world than for many centuries,

"its people were better off than at any other time. The 'good old days' of greatness and empire were not so good for the majority of Britons. It was still an unfair society at the end of the 1970s, but somewhat fairer and freer than it had been."

This is all true, of course, and it needs saying. The self-flagellatory pessimism of the last few years is as dangerous a guide for policy as the complacent optimism of 30 years ago. Britain is not the only country in the Western industrial world with problems; indeed, many of her problems are to be found in other Western industrial countries as well, sometimes in a more acute form. Yet, when all the allowances have been made, the fact remains that Britain has tackled the most salient of these problems less successfully than most (though not all) comparable societies. She has adjusted less well to membership of the European Community than any other Member State. As the second Brookings report on the British economy² makes clear, her record in dealing with the double crisis of inflation and recession is worse than that of any other member of the OECD. Though this is less certain, her loss of political self-confidence has also been

more marked than in any other major European country.³

But although Dr Childs does not appear to recognise the extent of the British malaise, and might even deny that there is one, his book does throw light—if only indirectly—on some of its more puzzling aspects. As befits a specialist in international relations, he deals more convincingly and authoritatively with foreign and colonial policy than with internal politics. What his book shows most clearly is that the roots of the malaise are external as much as internal. In 1945, the Indian subcontinent was still ruled by the ministers of the King-Emperor, George VI. The destinies of the greater part of Africa were still settled in London. The structure of imperial preference created by the 1932 Ottawa Agreements was still in place; because of this, Britain still had a captive market in her colonial empire and still enjoyed preferential access to markets in the white Dominions. More important still, the British governing class, irrespective of party, still took for granted the network of assumptions and values which derived from and underpinned the Imperial system. No less than Churchill and Eden, Attlee and Bevin were the products of late-Victorian imperialism; so were most of their colleagues and followers, and for that matter most of their countrymen.

The British knew, of course, that the Empire was not what it had once been. Some of them even knew that its days were numbered. But the notion that, within 20 years, it would have vanished utterly, that the Imperial chapter in British history would have ended for ever—and that Britain's role in the world outside Europe would be no greater than that of France or Germany or even Italy—would have seemed so fanciful as not to be worth considering. So would the notion that Britain would have to earn her living by selling goods and services to her fellow-Europeans rather than to Indians, Africans, Australians, Canadians or even Americans.

GIVEN ALL THIS, it says much for the skill, ingenuity and realism of the British governing class that its Empire was liquidated so much more smoothly, and with so much less domestic conflict, than the much smaller French one: that there was no British *Dien Bien Phu*, no British Algeria and no British General Massu. The trouble was that its adjustment to the loss of Empire went hand in hand with, was indeed made possible by, the emergence of the myth of the multi-racial, ocean-spanning, peace-promoting British Commonwealth.

As we can now see, that myth bears a large part of the blame for Britain's laggard adjustment in other respects. It was clearly responsible for her failure to understand or take part in the drive towards economic integration on the mainland of

¹ *Britain Since 1945. A Political History.* By DAVID CHILDS. Ernest Benn, £11.95.

² *Britain's Economic Performance.* Edited by RICHARD E. CAVES and LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE. Brookings Institution, distributed by Basil Blackwell, £12.00 and £4.95.

³ Except perhaps in Italy.

Europe which began in the early 1950s, and helped to delay the post-Imperial reorientation of her trade. Only slightly less clearly, it was also responsible for the misallocation of resources which resulted from the Attlee Government's decision to develop an independent nuclear deterrent in the late '40s, from the stubborn determination of successive British Governments to remain in the aerospace business and from the equally stubborn refusal of successive Governments to abandon the British military presence east of Suez, long after it had become clear that the costs were out of all proportion to the benefits. All this imposed a direct burden on Britain's increasingly fragile economy, and made it more difficult to overcome the underlying crisis of economic maladaptation, of which that fragility was a symptom.

I suspect, though this cannot be proved, that the indirect effects of the Commonwealth myth were more important and more pernicious still. For, even if it did not create, it unquestionably helped to sustain the illusion that Britain was, in some mysterious way, *sui generis*—different from, even if not necessarily superior to, mainland Europe. In doing so, it also helped to sustain the even more damaging illusion that she therefore had nothing to learn from mainland Europe, and that developments which took place in mainland Europe were somehow irrelevant to her.

THIRTY YEARS AGO, that illusion was generally expressed in a comic, but damaging, superiority complex. Nowadays it is expressed even more damagingly. At the heart of Britain's crisis of economic maladaptation lies a deep-rooted, century-old failure to shift resources out of unsophisticated, uncompetitive industries, in which the comparative advantage has passed to others, and into more sophisticated industries, in which she might have been competitive if only she had bothered to develop them in time. Because of that failure, she found it more difficult than her competitors either to take full advantage of the boom of the 1950s and '60s, or to withstand the shocks of the 1970s. Hence, her relative economic decline since the end of the Second World War, and the threat of absolute decline in future. Thanks to its unwillingness to learn from Continental experience, however, the British political class has failed, not only to halt Britain's decline, but to recognise what it is that needs to be halted.

Our crisis of economic maladaptation is a British crisis. It is not a crisis of Capitalism, or of Socialism, or of the Mixed Economy or of Modern

Industrialism. It is a crisis of the British class system, the British education system, the British banking system, British managers, British trade unionists, British civil servants, and British politicians. But, in recent years at any rate, our politicians have been increasingly unwilling to realise this. The neo-Marxist Left of the Labour Party and the neo-liberal Right of the Conservative Party have both fallen victim to a strange kind of economic solipsism, assuming that because Britain is sick the entire world must be on its death-bed. Mr Tony Benn and his supporters imagine that we have been engulfed by a "crisis of capitalism", forgetting that on the other side of the Channel, capitalism is alive, well and triumphantly successful. Sir Keith Joseph and his colleagues see it as a "crisis of socialism", forgetting that every other Government in Western Europe intervenes in the economy in a way which they condemn as socialist. By a cruel irony, moreover, the fact that the British crisis has become more acute, or at any rate more visible, in the last ten years has weakened the social-democratic centre in both major parties, and strengthened the far Left and far Right.

THE RESULT is twofold. As Professor Samuel Finer shows in an explosive new study of the development of the British party system since 1945,⁴ one of

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⁴ *The Changing British Party System 1945-1979*. By S. E. FINER. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, £3.75.

the main reasons for the current disarray of the Westminster Model is precisely the polarisation which has taken place in major-party politics in the last 10 years. For although the parties have both lurched, unsteadily but unmistakably, towards their respective ideological extremes, the voters have remained stubbornly unideological.

Thus, the ascendancy of the far Left and far Right has created a growing gap between parties and voters—dramatic and yawning in the case of the Labour Party, but increasingly apparent even in the case of the Conservatives. Though there can be no proof of this, there can be little doubt that this is one of the reasons for the fall in the level of electoral participation and for the much more dramatic fall in the two-party share of the vote (from 80% in 1951 to 56% in October 1974 and 61% in 1979). Increasingly, the voters are being forced to choose between menus which they do not like. Understandably, they are showing an increasing propensity to take their custom elsewhere. More alarming still, there are strong grounds for thinking that this process is self-reinforcing.

Again, there can be no proof. But there is no doubt that since the early 1950s both major parties have suffered a dramatic loss in individual membership. In 1953, the Labour Party had more than a million individual members, compared with at most 300,000 today. In the same period, Conservative membership has fallen from three million to a million-and-a-half. Though Professor Finer does not say so, it is reasonable to assume that those who have stayed behind, or joined recently, are more extreme ideologically than those who have left or failed to join, and that dwindling membership therefore produces extremism, while extremism produces dwindling membership. Professor Finer's conclusion that the party system has therefore become politically "dysfunctional"—that it keeps issues which ought to be debated off the political agenda and concentrates attention on issues which would be better left undiscussed, that it makes government less representative than it would otherwise be, and that it inhibits popular participation in politics—seems to me indisputable.

THERE IS growing evidence that it is equally dysfunctional economically. As everyone knows, the range of economic options open to British Governments is in fact very narrow. All recent Governments, irrespective of party, have sooner or later been obliged to operate an incomes policy of some kind, at first in the public sector and eventually in the private sector as well. All Governments, irrespective of party, have discovered that,

in a mixed economy, business confidence is a prerequisite of investment—no Government, irrespective of party, has been able to defy the City of London or ride roughshod over the CBI. Finally, all Governments, irrespective of party, have discovered that they need a mix of industrial and regional policies to handle the supply side of the economy and that they cannot solve the problems of the supply side by relying on market forces alone. But although all Governments have discovered these things, all recent Oppositions have forgotten them—or, at any rate, those of them which do not fit their ideological predilections. As the economist, Michael Stewart, showed in his splendid study, *The Jekyll and Hyde Years*,⁵ the polarisation of the last ten years has meant that, in opposition, the restraints learned in government are joyously unlearned. The sober, consensual, moderately interventionist, incomes-policy-operating, confidence-upholding Dr Jekyll is replaced by the roaring ideologist, Mr Hyde. The Conservative Hyde, full of guilt at his Jekyll's flirtations with socialism, persuades himself that next time market forces will be allowed to rip; the Labour Hyde, even more full of guilt at his Jekyll's flirtations with capitalism, resolves that next time the bankers will be defied, and a new range of industries nationalised. Each Hyde turns his back on what his Jekyll did in government; each Jekyll has to betray what his Hyde said in opposition.

The result is that all Governments are attacked for doing what the attackers did when they were in government—that all Oppositions create expectations among their own party supporters which cannot be fulfilled—that policy has lurched damagingly from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other—that institutions are destroyed before they have had time to work—and, most damagingly of all, that each Government has to pretend that it is still doing what it said it would do in its Hyde phase, even though everyone can see that it is doing nothing of the kind.

In 1972 the Heath Government, and in 1975 the second Wilson Government broke decisively with the policies on which they were elected. Because neither was willing to engage in a head-on conflict with its party supporters, neither dared make clear how total the break was, or explain clearly and unambiguously what its new policies meant and were designed to do. The present Government has not yet broken with its old policies, but it has undoubtedly bent them. Even if it does not break with them completely as the recession deepens during the next few months, there can be no doubt that the bending will become more pronounced. But, if anything, Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues are even less willing to reveal their heresies to the party faithful than their predecessors were, and are therefore even less able to explain to the public what they are doing and why. There is no doubt

⁵ Michael Stewart, *The Jekyll and Hyde Years: Politics and Economic Policy since 1964* (J. M. Dent & Sons, 1977).

that all this has helped to erode popular confidence in the system. Partly because of that, it has also made it even more difficult than it would have been in any case for Governments to tackle the central economic problems of high inflation and low productivity, or at any rate to do so with any hope of success.

FOR AT THE HEART OF both these problems lies the peculiar, shifting, but almost always socially destructive relationship between the British trade-union movement and the British state. That relationship has been studied from many different perspectives by a wide variety of authors, but its full significance has only become apparent in the last few years. Much of the credit for making it apparent belongs to Mr Keith Middlemas, whose study of the evolution of what he calls "corporate bias" since the beginning of the First World War⁶ has thrown more light on the dark corners of British Government than any other study since the early 1960s. It is a rich and complex book, sometimes muddled, but often profound and always thought-provoking, to which no brief summary can possibly do justice. The point that matters is that, perhaps without realising it himself, Mr Middlemas has shown that there is a built-in contradiction at the heart of the British politico-economic system. Since the First World War, it has been dominated by an informal, only half-acknowledged form of power-sharing between the state, on the one hand, and organised labour and the organised employers, on the other. Power-sharing began during the First World War because trade-union cooperation was a pre-condition of victory. It continued thereafter because the governing class could see that it provided the best way to avert the threat to the established order posed by the rise of an aggressive and self-confident proletariat. In effect, the working class—or, rather, the trade-union bureaucracy which spoke for "the working class"—was bought off. The forms of the old, Victorian constitution were retained, but the reality was transformed. Technically, Parliament remained sovereign. In reality, it was pushed aside. The TUC and the employers' organisations became "governing institutions"—not agencies of the state, as they would have been in a fully-fledged corporate system, but so closely enmeshed in it that neither it nor they could act independently of its partners in the triangle of power. And the manoeuvre worked. Where Imperial Germany and pre-Fascist Italy both collapsed in the face of social crisis, and where Third Republic France was paralysed into immobility, the established order of Edwardian

Britain survived, to all intents and purposes intact.

But there was a price to be paid. The "governing institutions" are bound to be conservative in their economic behaviour, however radical their rhetoric. Their instinct is always to resist change, not to promote it—to raise profits and wages by conspiring together against the consumer, not by providing better goods or services; to keep men in employment and firms in business by protecting old industries, not by developing new ones. Hence the contradiction. The state, as the custodian of the long-term interest of the community as a whole, should have tried to prevent the "governing institutions" from conspiring together in this way. But the state was not a free agent. It had influence over the "governing institutions" only because (and to the extent that) they had influence over it. The motives which had led it to share power with them in the first place also led it to avoid conflict with them thereafter. The result was that, although power-sharing succeeded in its primary purpose of preventing crisis, it did so only at the cost (in Mr Middlemas's words) of "political compromise, industrial feather-bedding and low overall growth...." It was, in short, a classic case of Danegeld; and it produced the results which Danegeld classically produces. In time, endless feather-bedding eroded the economic base on which the whole edifice was built. The crisis which

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⁶ *Politics in Industrial Society*. By KEITH MIDDLEMAS. André Deutsch, £14.95.

had been bought off between the wars, and again in the 1950s and early '60s, returned in the '70s, in a new and more virulent form.

THESE HARSH CONCLUSIONS have now been reinforced by Sir Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid of the Policy Studies Institute. Their study⁷ is shorter, less imaginative, narrower in scope and in many ways less profound, but it is equally thought-provoking, equally disturbing and, if anything, even more relevant to current policy preoccupations. Sir Denis was permanent secretary to the Department of Employment before he left the civil service to become chairman of the Manpower Services Commission. He is an old Ministry of Labour hand, whose life has been spent oiling the wheels of the tripartite system which Mr Middlemas has described from the outside. Perhaps because of this, he and his co-author write in a tight-lipped, mandarin style, as though composing a paper for a peculiarly tricky inter-departmental committee; readers unused to Whitehall English may fail to receive the message. That would be a pity, for the message is a startling one. After a lifetime trying to accommodate the industrial relations system to the political system and vice versa, Sir Denis has evidently come to the conclusion that such an accommodation is impossible. Most of the book consists of a spare, but beautifully lucid account of the way in which the unions' insistence on free collective bargaining has sooner or later defeated all recent attempts to combine full employment with tolerable inflation. It makes chilling reading. Between 1964 and 1979, the British trade unions destroyed two voluntary incomes policies, two statutory policies, one quasi-statutory policy, and one quasi-voluntary policy. They also destroyed the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and prevented the 1969 *In Place of Strife* proposals from reaching the statute book. They savaged the first Wilson Government, killed the Heath Government, walked all over the second Wilson Government, and humiliated the Callaghan Government. It is not surprising that the Thatcher Government should have concluded that incomes policies cannot work, and that the only way to curb inflation is to increase unemployment.

Sir Denis and his co-author seem to think that that solution is unfeasible politically. I am not sure that they are right. The old Marxist notion that depression and unemployment radicalise the working class does not stand up to close inspection. It was the Nazis, not the Communists, who profited from mass unemployment in Weimar Germany; the National Government, not the Labour Party,

which won the elections of 1931 and 1935 in this country. So far, at any rate, Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues have suffered remarkably little political damage from the increase in unemployment since the last election. Since Labour voters in Labour seats in the North of England are more likely to lose their jobs than Conservative voters in the Midlands and South, it is quite conceivable that the Conservatives will win the next election even if the unemployment figures are higher than they are now. But even if the present Government's solution is feasible politically, it is terribly damaging economically as well as being repugnant morally. Britain's only sensible course for the long term is to use the proceeds of North Sea oil to break out of the vicious spiral of declining competitiveness and balance-of-payments weakness in which she has been trapped for the last 30 years, so that when the oil runs out she can compete with the advanced industrial societies of Japan, Europe, and North America. The Labour Government did not do this, since it gave job protection in declining industries higher priority than economic efficiency. But the present Government is not doing it either, since its attempts to encourage efficiency are being negated by its monetary and exchange-rate policies. The net result is that North Sea oil is being used in exactly the wrong way, cushioning consumption instead of restructuring the economy. But this is inevitable so long as the Government's only instrument for curbing inflation is a monetary squeeze; and if incomes policies are ruled out only a monetary squeeze is left. Yet unless trade-union behaviour changes or is made to change, incomes policies are a dead end.

SOMETHING, in short, has to give. In their final section, Sir Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid try to forecast the likely evolution of the industrial relations system on the basis of three governing assumptions: 1. that there will be no change in the two-party system, 2. that there will also be no change in the relationship between the unions and the parties and, finally 3. that there will be no change in the trade-union movement itself. Their conclusion is bleak:

"The continuation of the existing relationship between governments and the trade-union movement in a situation of continuing economic failure could have unpredictable political consequences. These may compel changes in the trade-union movement itself, the party political system in which it plays a key role, the relations it has with governments and the legal framework within which it operates. *The assumptions made at the beginning of these final pages seem unlikely to prevail throughout the 1980s.*" (My italics).

⁷ *Government and Trade Unions: The British Experience 1964-1979*. By DENIS BARNES and EILEEN REID. Heinemann Educational Books, £12.50.

They do not say which of their assumptions is most likely to break down, or which they would most wish to break down. A reviewer can be less circumspect.

What is needed is to change the balance of power between Government and the unions to the advantage of Government—not just temporarily, through high unemployment, but permanently. This can only be done by smashing the existing party system, from which much of the veto power of the unions is derived; by reforming the electoral system, so as to increase the authority of Government and strengthen the social-democratic centre against the neo-Marxist and neo-liberal extremes; by strengthening the “micro-economy” of small firms, labour cooperatives and self-employment at

the expense of what Dr Stuart Holland has called the “meso-economy” of giant firms and giant unions; by democratising industry, so as to weaken the “Us-versus-Them” attitudes which lead the unions to use their veto power in anti-social ways; by opening up the tripartite power-sharing described by Mr Middlemas to parliamentary scrutiny, so that the public interest can more easily be brought to bear on it; and perhaps by putting the barons of the TUC and CBI into a reformed House of Lords, so that they can be made more accountable to the general public for the use they make of their industrial power.

In present circumstances, such a programme may seem utopian. The alternative is too horrible to contemplate.

Balancing the Bomb

The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons—By ANTHONY HARTLEY

FEW PEOPLE these days lack information concerning the horrors of nuclear war. It is a subject which, for years, could hardly be escaped in the newspapers or on television, in science fiction or in films. We have, most of us, some consciousness of living on the edge of a precipice—as much consciousness, that is, as it is possible or desirable to retain of any prolonged dilemma during the business of everyday life. The man in the street (or the man in the foreign ministry) does not spend much time on demonstrating or asserting that he “wants to live.” Yet the existence of the bomb has certainly brought significant change to the world of international affairs—a change that might be compared to that produced on the poker table by the placing of a stake high enough to render the other players insolvent.

Anyone who wishes to remind himself of the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange has only to look at a book published by the Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress on *The Effects of Nuclear War*.¹ One case examined is that of the explosion of a single nuclear weapon over Detroit and Leningrad. Estimated dead and wounded in such a case could range from 220,000 dead and 420,000 wounded to 2,500,000

dead and 1,100,000 wounded, depending on the weather, the time of the attack and the state of preparedness of the population. A “counterforce” attack against missile sites and submarine pens might produce between 1 and 20 million immediate deaths. Such are the results of limited exchanges.

When so much has been published in official documents about the effects of nuclear warfare, no one should complain of “conspiracies of silence” on the part of politicians, diplomats, or soldiers. Not only is the published material there for anyone who wishes to inform himself, but everything that has appeared about decision-making in international affairs over the last thirty years shows statesmen to have been acutely conscious of the forces that might be unleashed by any major conflict and, hence, of the need to limit local clashes before the nuclear threshold is reached.

Michael Mandelbaum has written an interesting historical account of the reactions of successive American administrations to *The Nuclear Question*.² It is a story creditable both to the brains and the consciences of those concerned. As early as 1946, the year after atom bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bernard Brodie summed up the change that had come over strategic thinking:

“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”

Brodie also saw that other countries than the

¹ *The Effects of Nuclear War*. By THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. Croom Helm, £7.95; Allan, Held & Osmon, \$9.95.

² *The Nuclear Question: The United States & Nuclear Weapons 1946–1976*. By MICHAEL MANDELBAUM. Cambridge University Press, £12.50.

United States would soon come to have atomic weapons. In that case, since there was no defence against them (one bomber or missile would always get through, and one was enough), they could hardly be the instruments of aggression, since the aggressor would necessarily expose himself to devastating retaliation.

This prescient analysis of the basis of mutual deterrence (or “balance of terror”), on which the strategic relationship between the two super-powers was to repose, still holds good today. In 1980 nuclear weapons are still fundamentally defensive arms, and the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, contrary to many wild imaginings, is a stabilising factor in international affairs. To “deter” is essentially a defensive operation, since the state which deters is trying to inhibit its opponent from doing something. Mutual deterrence of the kind existing between the United States and the Soviet Union, after the latter gained the capacity to reach American territory with its missiles, is not an ideal state of affairs, since it implies the existence of mistrust and enmity. But defensive attitudes have this to be said for them: that they might reasonably be supposed to bring caution in their wake, and so it has proved to be in the history of the central strategic balance between the two major possessors of nuclear arms.

WITH JOHN FOSTER DULLES'S strategic “new look”, the principle of deterrence was given world-wide application. “Massive retaliation”, however, was a threat that was already implicit in the circumstances. For it was clear that anyone taking on a nuclear power in an area, or over a matter, which affected its vital interests must expect to run the risk of such retaliation. The Russians certainly did not need to be told this. However, the question still remained of exactly which interests might justify the application of nuclear power. Once deterrence became mutual, only the gravest threat could provide such justification—the kind of threat that led the European nations into general war in 1914 and 1939. Moreover, it was a basic characteristic of the era of deterrence that countries possessed of, and faced by, nuclear weapons would do their utmost to avoid placing themselves or others in situations where vital issues were raised without any line of retreat on either side. The concomitant of nuclear deterrence was political

prudence. Between 1950 and 1980 it cannot be said to have been lacking on either side of the balance.³

The Eisenhower era added thermonuclear bombs, missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons to the American armoury, but it did not much change the strategy directing their use, despite the growing sophistication of the discussion about nuclear warfare in American political, military and academic circles. Such theories were to come into their own when sifted by the powerfully rational minds of the Kennedy administration. For Kennedy came to power at a moment when there was a widespread belief in “the missile gap”—in Russian superiority in delivery systems for nuclear weapons—and one of the first actions of his administration was to order an examination of America's military position by the new Secretary for Defence, Robert McNamara. The problem of the vulnerability of the American strategic striking force had been increasingly debated in the late 1950s. A force vulnerable to sudden attack not only would not achieve deterrence, but would actually tempt the adversary to deliver a surprise nuclear blow in the belief that he could do so without incurring retaliation. The Kennedy administration solved this problem by siting its long-range missiles in protected siloes (*Minuteman*) and on nuclear-powered submarines (*Polaris*).

McNamara also looked about for ways in which the effects of nuclear war, supposing that one had to be fought, could be diminished. American planners examined civil defence, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, new doctrines of “graduated deterrence” whereby tactical nuclear weapons could be regarded as a first step towards a full exchange and “counterforce” strategy (i.e. a strategy in which missiles would be targeted primarily on the enemy's own nuclear forces). All these options had in common the postponement of a full nuclear exchange or the lessening of damage if such an exchange were to take place.

The introduction of these sophisticated alternatives, however, did not produce the benefits anticipated and, politically, turned out to be positively disadvantageous. To lessen the damage of nuclear war was to make the waging of it more probable. To raise the threshold at which nuclear devices were used was to lessen the deterrence generated by the existence of such weapons. America's European allies had no desire to be the scene of a tactical nuclear war, while the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union remained untouched by any strategic exchange.

³ Whatever may be thought of the importance of episodes such as the war in Viet Nam and the invasion of Afghanistan—and they were, undoubtedly, important, both politically and strategically—there was never any prospect of their escalating into a nuclear war. The areas in which these conventional wars took place were peripheral as far as the super-powers were concerned, despite the involvement of the United States in Viet Nam and of Russia in Afghanistan.

PROFESSOR MANDELBAUM'S NARRATIVE makes it clear that the new McNamara strategy did not succeed in solving the basic dilemma of nuclear war: how to fight one in such a manner as to pre-

serve the idea of advantage over an adversary. McNamara's overall planning of weaponry, on the other hand, did endure and served to reinforce the central concept of deterrence. This concept was also strengthened by the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, the first and (until now) the last major clash between two great powers both of whom possessed nuclear weapons. The result is seen by Professor Mandelbaum as a victory for a relatively crude type of deterrence:

"The answer . . . that emerged from the missile crisis was that a large invulnerable nuclear arsenal would discourage a great deal of political mischief by the Soviet Union."

Deterrence, it seems, worked even when Kennedy and McNamara had not expected it to do so in so simple a form. It may be, indeed, that in any real crisis (as distinct from a simulated one) the logically complex reactions anticipated by students of "games theory" cannot be elicited from all the actors on the stage. Khrushchev's disarray during the Cuban missile crisis is patent in his rambling and incoherent communications to Washington. Moves in any such game are as likely to be dictated as much by the emotions and personality of the players as they are by sheer logic or even sense of advantage. This is why attempts to produce a theory of international crisis seem doomed to failure, since each such crisis represents a distinct structure which cannot profitably be compared to others.⁴

Another and a less theoretical conclusion might also be drawn from the missile crisis. In any similar crisis in the future it would be desirable that the leaders of the Soviet Union should be better informed about America's view of its own vital interests than had appeared to be the case on that occasion. Moreover, there was an undoubted need for the negotiation of international agreements governing the use of nuclear weapons. Such agreements could only be arrived at bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. Other countries might sign if they wished, but the substantive negotiation had to take place between the two powers who maintained the central nuclear balance. Only they could lead; only they could decide.

In the early 1950s the United States had tried to deal with the nuclear problem by the Baruch plan which would have placed such arms (and, indeed, all nuclear development) under the control of an international organisation with power to enforce its

orders. But it immediately became obvious that the Soviet Union would never agree to giving any international body the authority to carry out inspections on Russian territory. It would be easier to reach agreement on specific issues where a common interest could be identified through a process of bargaining decided by the realities of power. A ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere proved to be the first such agreement that was feasible. Subsequently, there have been the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in their first and second phase, a moratorium on the development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems (each country finally being allowed one each), and a non-proliferation treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

These measures, whatever limits they set to the development of nuclear weapons, could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as disarmament. SALT II encountered great difficulties due to the disparity of the arsenals compared, the speed of technological development, and, more recently, a worsened political atmosphere following the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. The cycle of weapons development has not been interrupted; indeed, the assumption on either side seems to be that if any weapon can be developed, it will be. It may be that arms control has exhausted its possibilities for the present. Only political change will provide the imperative for further progress.

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⁴ See *Threat Perception in International Crisis*. By RAYMOND COHEN. University of Wisconsin Press, \$10.00, £6.00. Mr Cohen reaches the conclusion that "observed infringement of accepted norms of international conduct" is what his cases of perceived threat have in common. But this is a fairly insubstantial link, since the evolution of any crisis will depend upon just how those norms are violated.

Disarmament, after all, is the consequence of a measure of political agreement rather than its cause.

YET IT REMAINS TRUE that the very process of continuous negotiation on such matters between the United States and the Soviet Union has done something to lower the level of international tension. Each side may now understand the other rather better; the danger of miscalculation is less; the opportunities for resolving crises by direct contact greater than was the case in 1962. It is too early to say whether the theory—most persuasively presented by Dr Kissinger—of incorporating the Soviet Union into the international body politic by a series of agreements, each one of which restricts the freedom of action of its signatories to some degree, is correct or not. The impression given by the present Russian leadership is one of ageing, conservative men, disliking change and becoming testy when it is forced upon them by reality—men who have acquired a habit of negotiation, but who are liable to sudden bursts of anger when faced with an unforeseen situation. The real test of Russian foreign policy will come when the present leadership are replaced by younger men. Even then, and even if the new men are more flexible than their predecessors, it is in the highest degree unlikely that they will consent to abandon their imperium in Eastern Europe and elsewhere or will cease to struggle ferociously against the forces which are eroding both Russia's world power and the Communist system on which it is based.

However, whether American attempts to mitigate the dangers of any clash between the United States and the Soviet Union be successful or not (and diplomacy is hardly ever entirely successful), the fact is that the effort has been made and pursued over twenty years or more by successive American administrations of widely differing political complexions. Under no circumstances can the rulers of the United States be said either to have ignored the nuclear threat or to have behaved recklessly with their own nuclear weapons. There is

no reason to suppose that things will be any different in the future. Unfortunately, the extent of this rational prudence has never been appreciated by liberal publicists in Europe who have usually preferred apocalyptic visions of power-mad generals and scientists dicing with death to the sober truth of intelligent and conscientious men trying to do their best with problems for which there was no precedent. As Professor Mandelbaum's excellent book shows, Dr Strangelove has no basis in historical fact, and the United States has not done so badly in its efforts to solve the nuclear dilemma. It is, after all, the Soviet Union and not the United States whose official military doctrine maintains that a nuclear war can be won.

SO HERETICAL an introduction of reality into the argument was, of course, far from the Aldermaston marchers just as, one presumes, it is far from the new unilateralists of today. It is too early to try to analyse the new movement which has emerged, significantly enough, in the context of the strengthening of NATO's nuclear theatre weapons, but two aspects of it are worth noting. First, that, in the wake of Three Mile Island, the new protesters seem to object to any use of nuclear energy whatever. As they attack nuclear missiles in the name of pacifism, so they attack nuclear power stations in the name of the ecological balance.⁵ Secondly, that, although the new unilateralists claim to object equally to both American and Russian weapons, in practice their protests are directed against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and there is a general assumption in their arguments that the Soviet Union would not take advantage of any Western unilateral disarmament—which appears, to say the least, disingenuous.

This attitude came to be shared by the earlier marchers. In a new book on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard⁶ recall how the leaders of the campaign began by wishing Britain not to withdraw from NATO—only to end up, in 1960, by making such withdrawal an objective of the movement. This new account of the brave days of Aldermaston is designed to answer the questions "Where have all the marchers gone?" and "What went wrong with CND's strategy?" and it is based on the replies to questionnaires sent to ex-supporters of the campaign. The profile of the CND supporter which emerges is not noticeably different from that sketched in Frank Parkin's book on the same subject, published in the late 1960s. Ten years later young participants in the Aldermaston march still appear as largely middle-class and coming from families with a radical tradition

⁵ I cannot enter into this side of the argument here. But two questions might be asked. First, why, after Flixborough and Sveso, do not ecologists wish to abolish the chemical industry? There has not, after all, been a nuclear accident of similar dimensions. Secondly, would they be prepared to accept the additional unemployment which would result in many countries from the abandonment of nuclear power? The kind of discussion which has resulted in the United States can be seen in *Nuclear Power and Public Policy: The Social and Ethical Problems of Fission Technology*. By K. S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE. D. Reidel, \$19.75, Dfl38; paper \$10.50, Dfl20.

⁶ *The Protest Makers: The British Nuclear Disarmament Movement of 1958–1965. Twenty Years On*. By RICHARD TAYLOR and COLIN PRITCHARD. Pergamon Press, £10.00.

(usually at least one parent approved their support for the movement). Nor is it very surprising to learn that as the movement collapsed many CND supporters went off to protest about Viet Nam, join various ecological crusades, or take part in local protest movements ("community politics"). Others found their political activity and interest diminished—a development not unfamiliar among those who grow older. All in all, there are few surprises to be found in the results of the authors' questionnaire.

NOR IS THIS THE BOOK which is waiting to be written about the politics of CND, its impact on the Labour Party, and its use as a weapon by the left wing of the party in their struggle against Hugh Gaitskell's leadership. The authors see CND as having the choice between three strategies: capture of the Labour Party, alliance with "the New Left", and "direct action" in the manner of the Committee of 100. Mr Taylor and Mr Pritchard point out quite correctly that Aneurin Bevan's alliance with Gaitskell doomed any take-over bid for the Labour Party from the start by eliminating the only leader under whom the Left might have hoped to conquer. They also see that "direct action" by a minute handful of militants could only discredit the cause in the eyes of public opinion.

There remains the New Left which the two authors seem to regard as having had a far greater potential for the transformation of society than most observers of British politics would attribute to it. For Mr Taylor and Mr Pritchard it was the "last determined attempt to radicalise and revivify the Labour Party, to inject some socialist purpose into an otherwise essentially barren and demoralised Social Democratic Party." However this may be (and many a howling, spitting participant at the recent Labour Party conference in Blackpool no doubt believed himself to be injecting a mortal overdose of "socialist purpose" into a Social Democratic Party), for most of us the outward and visible sign of the New Left's inner wrestling with the future of Socialism (carried on, we are assured, by "some of the very best intellectual talents of the post-war period") was the use of language so turgid and incomprehensible, so riddled with jargon and cliché, that it is small wonder its regurgitations of Marx and Sartre never made much impact even on the intellectual public.

When those intellectuals who saw more in CND than a mere pacifist protest *did* achieve clarity, it cannot be said that any very practical guidance was offered as to what to put in place of Britain's existing international connections. A good example

of the advice tendered is a quotation from Peter Worsley:

"[Britain could] generate immense pressure, in alliance with India, Ghana, Yugoslavia and backed by the uncommitted countries, for world peace and active neutrality."

The simple answer to this is "No, it couldn't", but such a programme was composed of fantasy rather than any other ingredient, and, because the fantasies were self-generating and did not intersect with reality at any point, they were resistant to refutation. The intellectual history of the New Left might be an interesting subject for study; its political history is practically non-existent.

CND was an obvious failure. The bomb was not banned, and the complicated process of mitigating its consequences for international relations owed nothing to the recipes of nuclear disarmers. Since—and here it is possible to agree with the New Left—what was at stake was much more Britain's alliance with the United States than the bomb itself, this is hardly surprising. In fact, Britain's own deterrent is still with us today, and the Minister of Defence has announced the government's intention of prolonging its life to a third generation by the purchase of the *Trident* submarine-launched missile (SLM) system from the United States.

THE HISTORY OF the British deterrent and the arguments, strategic and political, which have surrounded it, are set out in a Chatham House study which is a model of its kind.⁷ Lawrence Freedman has written with clarity, fairness and concision; *Britain and Nuclear Weapons* is an admirable guide for anyone wishing to inform himself on the subject. There is no excuse for anyone talking about the British deterrent without having read it. Its publication shows Chatham House displaying a welcome awareness of the need to provide the educated public with brief, well-written studies on topics of public concern. Dr

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⁷ *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*. By LAWRENCE FREEDMAN. Macmillan Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, £12, Papermac £3.25.

Freedman's book has come out at precisely the right moment.

The most striking fact about his narrative is the measure of continuity it displays between successive British governments. The British deterrent was initiated by the 1945 Labour government, developed and given its final shape by Conservative governments whose policies culminated in the Nassau agreement and the purchase of *Polaris*, preserved by the 1964 Wilson government despite a declared intention of "re-negotiating" the Nassau agreement, updated by the Heath and the second Wilson government (the *Chevaline* programme), and eventually prolonged for another generation by the decision of the Thatcher government to buy *Trident* from the United States. Despite the party rhetoric it is consensus all the way. There seems to have been practically no difference between successive British governments on the need for Britain to possess strategic nuclear arms—the party faithful are, of course, another matter.

As for the controversies that have raged around the British deterrent on the platform and in the press, Dr Freedman finds the strongest argument against it in the amount of scarce resources that such a programme must take from other aspects of defence. In its favour are "the uncertainties of the future." Among these uncertainties is the fact that a number of medium-sized powers now look like

acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In a dangerous world there is a good deal to be said for hanging on to a force which is already in existence and which does not cost very much as defence projects go (Dr Freedman points out how good a bargain *Polaris* proved to be). It should also be noted that, in 1980, the American Department of Defense recognised for the first time that the British deterrent "contributes to our mutual defense interests." The agreement to purchase *Trident* was attended with none of the traumas that had preceded Nassau.


Possibly there might have been a case in the early 1960s for cancelling the British deterrent and maintaining conventional forces east of Suez. The early '60s were certainly the moment at which such a case was strongest. Yet, even then, it was not quite convincing. Would such a decision have been welcomed by those opposed to nuclear arms? Would the role of an Indian Ocean policeman have been one that Britain could comfortably assume, much as such a figure seems to be needed? By going for its own nuclear deterrent Britain was taking the same kind of decision as was taken by Switzerland during the 1939–45 war—a defence posture where it is hoped that the certainty of destruction will be averted by the unacceptable damage in prospect for the adversary. That possession of nuclear weapons, if they are invulnerable, has something of the effect of an insurance policy is a crude statement, but, as the Cuban missile crisis showed, reactions in the political world to strategic problems are sometimes less refined than the sophistication of the strategists might anticipate or desire.

THAT THE PRESENT WORLD is a dangerous one is something on which everyone can agree. But it is also possible to concur with a recent statement of McGeorge Bundy at a Pugwash conference:⁸

"Yet there is also value to uncertainty, and I cannot omit the remarkable fact that the long peace of Europe in these thirty-four years may well owe much to the fact that no one really knows what would happen if war should start there, even in a small way, between East and West."

This defence of nuclear deterrence is convincing, but there is also another side to international relations than the central balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his inaugural speech John F. Kennedy referred to that balance,

⁸ *The Dangers of Nuclear War: A Pugwash Symposium*. Edited by FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS and JOHN C. POLANYI. University of Toronto Press, \$21.50, £9.00; paper \$8.60, £3.60.



but also to the condition of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. The Kennedy administration produced a "doctrine" concerning those countries. They were to be helped through the pains of development and, through a mixture of economic aid and military advice, were to be given an opportunity of overcoming political instability, poverty, and the social crises arising out of rapidly changing conditions. This was an immensely ambitious programme, and it failed in the dramatic circumstances of the Viet Nam war. But the problem of political and social stability in the Third World did not go away.

In fact, the last decade has seen a steady decline in the condition of many Asian, African, and Latin American countries. What has happened ranges from total destruction (Cambodia or Uganda) to economic decay (Ghana or Tanzania), from war (Ethiopia or Iran) to the internal violence endemic in states too small to be viable and an easy prey to *caudillos* and gangsters (most Caribbean countries). In areas peripheral to the world economic system such events have little significance, much as they may be deplored from a humanitarian point of view. But when it is a question of countries which, because of their possession of some vital raw material, must exercise great influence on the future of the industrialised countries in America, Europe, and the Far East, then it is quite another matter. Political chaos in the Persian Gulf means economic chaos in many industrialised countries: it means the sapping of the foundations of the economic strength of the United States and its allies; it means the tilting of the balance of power.

A war like that between Iraq and Iran does not seem easily controllable by the super-powers, even if they wished to combine to limit its effects. It is more likely that, drawn by their vital interests, the super-powers will be led into conflict with one

another as the disorder spreads. Despite the prudence so far shown by the United States and the Soviet Union, if the war continues, there may come a time when the former will feel impelled to intervene and the latter to fish in troubled waters. Then the carefully nurtured balance of power between the two super-powers would be in danger of destruction through the intrusion of factors extraneous to it. The nuclear component of the balance might continue in equilibrium, but the political restraint underlying it would be threatened.

In the words of a contemporary historian, "strategic theories are not a description of the real world, but blueprints for possible worlds."⁹ Everything cannot be foreseen, and it is impossible to predict accurately the reactions of other human beings. Nevertheless, the effect of the emergence of nuclear weapons on the foreign policies of those countries possessing them has been that much more attention has been devoted to studying the causes of conflict and trying to eliminate them.

The nuclear threat has concentrated the mind of foreign policy-makers (in the first place, of American foreign policy-makers) to some effect. It is the newly formed states, rancid with nationalism and heedless of the consequences of their actions to themselves or anyone else provided that a rancour can be assuaged or an ambition satisfied—it is they who, by their failure to act responsibly, are now threatening a stable balance of power which is the single necessary condition of peace. If, to maintain that balance, the United States and the Soviet Union can abstain from acquiring certain types of weapon or developing too threatening a strategic posture, can they not likewise agree to use their influence for stability when trouble in the Third World seriously disturbs it?

No doubt, this would be too much to hope. But it remains all too true that it is not so much the new phenomenon of nuclear weapons which threatens world peace as the old ones of nationalism preached by demagogic rulers and the mutual hatred between neighbouring states.

⁹ *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798–1850*. By M. E. YAPP. Oxford University Press, £35.

Heisenberg's Time of Decision

A Memoir—By ELISABETH HEISENBERG



AFTER THE NAZIS seized power in January 1933 everything changed, not overnight, but very rapidly, and the political reality became painfully evident even to Heisenberg. The numbers in his seminars began to dwindle. Those who received offers of university posts abroad went away, one after the other. But he himself now also came into conflict with the National Socialist establishment; he was a thorn in their flesh, because he refused to become a member of even one of their various front organisations. He refused to cooperate. He was once requested to pledge his support for Hitler and to sign a telegram declaring his allegiance to the Führer. He refused to sign. He also refused to attend a meeting of teachers called to support Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations; and these actions all had unpleasant

and dangerous consequences from which there was no escaping.

HEISENBERG had received the Nobel Prize in 1933 (for the year 1932) and was therefore in the national limelight. In November, after news of the award had been announced by the press, a friend secretly informed him that a gang of National-Socialist thugs was intending to disrupt his open lecture the following morning, and the ovations which the students wished to accord to Heisenberg were to be turned into a demonstration against him. It was well known that such actions would have serious consequences. Not infrequently such situations escalated into real "lecture-hall battles", and could even lead to casualties. What was to be done? The friend—let me call him W.W.—who had warned him and who himself wore an SA uniform, offered to "straighten things out" (*in Ordnung zu bringen*), as he put it.

The next morning the lecture-theatre was packed. The uneasy atmosphere was charged with tension. Many had come to applaud the young Nobel prize-winner—but now there were whispers of a demonstration against him because of his lack of "political solidarity." In this atmosphere of

ELISABETH HEISENBERG, the widow of the Nobel prize-winner Werner Heisenberg, provides in her recollections a vivid account of the great Göttingen physicist's controversial situation in Nazi Germany. Once again we are made painfully aware of the conflicts which confronted a scientist who really wanted to "keep out of politics." (What person of any sense could believe in such a thing as "German physics" or "degenerate Jewish science"?) Frau Heisenberg recalls how her husband gradually came to be branded as a "white Jew (weisse Jude)" (because he continued to follow Einstein's teachings in his work). We learn something of the student boycotts, something of the daring of Werner Heisenberg, who applied directly to nobody less than Heinrich Himmler with a request to be reinstated. (Himmler

was the son of the headmaster of a school in Munich; Werner Heisenberg's mother successfully managed to influence Himmler's mother, whom she knew well. The ruse succeeded.) As a celebrity, he received offers in the middle of the 1930s to go abroad, where he could have retained his "spotless integrity", had nothing to do with Hitler's Third Reich, and continued with his research in America undisturbed. But Heisenberg refused to do this. For the sake of his students? Because he was a "German patriot"? There are parallels here between the situations and the deliberations of Heisenberg and Wilhelm Furtwängler, and indeed to the dilemmas of a whole host of intellectuals, living under totalitarian régimes, then and now.

uncertainty W.W. climbed up on a bench, called for silence and made more or less the following speech.

He knew Heisenberg, of course, and had always found him a decent patriotic man. But refusal to attend the teachers' meeting was completely incomprehensible. If it were true that he did this only in deference to his Jewish colleagues abroad, this was an outrage—and he was through with Heisenberg. But until this was established, there should be no demonstration. He had just received a telegram from Party headquarters stating that no action should be taken against Heisenberg for the time being. This was a strict order, and contravention would mean expulsion from the faculty. So there was nothing else to be done but receive Heisenberg in icy silence. Those who wished to express their disapproval more strongly, however, should demonstrate this by leaving the lecture-hall with him now. And W.W. left the hall, followed by a handful of militant radicals.

As they went out through the upper door, Heisenberg came in through the lower. He was received in dead silence. He went across to the podium with his heart in his mouth—then suddenly the stamping of feet began, the familiar academic greeting, swelling into a storm of enthusiasm. When everything had calmed down again, he was able to proceed with the lecture undisturbed.

THERE IS NO DOUBT that this was all an extremely shady and contrived game, impenetrable to those unfamiliar with the dark intrigues of Hitler's Germany. Things had already got to the stage where such methods had to be employed in order to avoid worse conflicts.

How could all this happen? It may come as a surprise that the students could be so easily and quickly manipulated. Also, from today's perspective, many people will find it strange that Heisenberg had as a friend an SA man who used such shady methods. One can only comprehend all this if one knows what it was really like at the time. A large proportion of the population and also of the students had voted for Hitler, wanted a new strong Germany after the humiliations of the post-War period, and hoped that decisive leadership would put an end to all the confusion and hardship of the crisis. But the hate-filled and grotesquely inflated Nazi Party ideology had by no means infected everybody at this time; and only a few people agreed with intellectual oppression. Most people were insecure and frightened. They didn't know exactly in which direction things were going and what they should believe. At that time many people still thought that "National Socialism" might take a turn for the better; they deluded themselves in the hope that the terrors which one heard about were merely the excesses of the initial stages. And they

often felt called upon to throw in their lot by joining the Party or even the SA. At the time none of us had had any experience of such violent dictatorships, and so many of us cherished the illusion that things could perhaps be improved from within. But demoralisation spread quickly. Many no longer dared to operate out in the open. W.W. used deceit and cunning to protect Heisenberg. There had been no telegram from Party headquarters, let alone an order to spare Heisenberg. This whole game of bluff was in reality a sad and indeed shameful example of the way in which, even at this time, it was often possible to protect oneself from evil only by employing underhand methods.

Heisenberg knew next to nothing about the tricks which W.W. had devised to protect him. When he entered the Leipzig lecture-hall, he sensed the eerie, icy silence—he told me about this later—and he was relieved when this turned into applause and support. (W.W. had arranged this in advance, too.) W.W. was basically a decent man, though to me he seemed a little bit slow-witted and weak, and hazy in his ideas. But Heisenberg was firmly convinced that he would never allow himself to be used to perpetrate evil. He had confided in him in this dangerous situation, and was always grateful to him for preserving him from an extremely unpleasant experience. W.W. realised later that the path he had chosen was the wrong one. In deep despair over everything for which he bore a share of the responsibility, he quite intentionally went out to meet his death in the War. His letter of farewell to his family is a shattering testimony to the confusion of the time.

IN THIS SITUATION Heisenberg felt strongly that it was incumbent upon him to take some more effective form of action. Together with his colleagues who were all about the same age as himself, the physicist Fritz Hund, the mathematician Bartel Lehnert van der Waerden, and Carl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer (Professor of Physical Chemistry, and a brother of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the theologian executed by the Nazis), he considered what steps they must take to demonstrate that they were not prepared simply to stand aside and watch everything that was going on, to give notice that: "*Bis hierher und nicht weiter!* (This is as far as we go)." They considered whether they should all resign their teaching positions—certainly a spectacular demonstration. Heisenberg was not really sure whether there was any sense in such a step, whether it would have any effect at all. So it was decided that Heisenberg should go to Berlin to see Max Planck and consult with him.

Max Planck was a generation older than Heisenberg and his friends; he was experienced and a man of great integrity, quite beyond suspicion. But Max

Planck advised them against any action. He told them nothing would change if they left. The radio and the newspapers would say that these four professors had become an intolerable burden to the régime, and that it had been necessary to relieve them of their posts because they were “subversive agitators” acting against the interests of the People. He reflected that once an avalanche has started to roll it cannot be diverted—and that was the true situation. He advised his younger colleagues to remain and see it through. “Hold on until it’s all over, become ‘islands of strength’, and in this way save some things of value from the catastrophe.” This was the essence of his advice to Heisenberg.

On his way back to Leipzig Heisenberg was deeply depressed. He saw that it was too late for an individual to influence the course of events, that there was nothing he and his friends could do to ward off the inevitable. Nevertheless he decided to follow Max Planck’s advice—and so did the others. His conversation with Planck was definitely a significant factor in the decision he took later not to leave Germany, in which so many other factors were involved. To become “islands of strength (*Inseln des Bestandes*)”—that made sense to him and was an abiding revelation.

HEISENBERG had curtailed the term in Leipzig prematurely as I was not well and the doctor had urgently prescribed a change of air. We arrived at Heisenberg’s mother’s house in the Hohenzollernstrasse, and after saying hello Heisenberg immediately called the Rector to find out the position with regard to possible teaching vacancies. Kölbl was brief on the telephone and merely said: “Have you seen the *Schwarze Korps* yet? There’s a long article about you in it. Go out and buy the paper immediately and read it! Then we can talk . . .”

Das Schwarze Korps (the Black Corps) was the organ of the SS—we never used to read it. Heisenberg went straight to the news-stall and bought the edition for 15 July. The article in question was entitled: “WHITE JEWS AMONG THE SCIENTISTS.” In fact it was a frontal attack on Heisenberg; (signed by Stark). Among other things the article contained the following paragraph:

“How secure the ‘White Jews’ feel in their jobs is proved by the activities of the Professor of Theoretical Physics in Leipzig, Prof. Werner Heisenberg, who in 1936 managed to smuggle an essay into an official party organ in which he declared that Einstein’s Theory of Relativity was ‘self-evidently the basis of all further research’ and saw it as ‘one of the main tasks facing young German scientists to extend this theoretical conceptual system.’ At the same time, he tried to get

a consensus of German physicists to agree to the value of the theory, in order to impress people in high places and to muzzle its critics. In 1928 this champion of the Einsteinian ‘spirit’, a star pupil of Sommerfeld, became a professor in Leipzig at the age of 26, at an age when he would hardly have had time to undertake any solid research . . .”

In another passage it stated:

“In 1933 Heisenberg received the Nobel prize together with those other disciples of Einstein, Schrödinger and Dirac—a demonstration of the Jewish-influenced Nobel committee against National Socialist Germany which is comparable to Ossietzky’s ‘award.’ Heisenberg showed his gratitude in August 1934 by refusing to sign a message of support from German Nobel prize-winners for the *Führer* and Chancellor of the Reich . . .”

Further on Heisenberg was termed a “*Judengenosse* (comrade-Jew)” and a “Jewish pupil”, and it went on to say: “His fame abroad is an inflated result of his collaboration with foreign Jews and Jewish comrades.”

Such an attack in a top official militant organ of National Socialism was dangerous in itself; but it certainly meant the cancellation of Heisenberg’s appointment in Munich. He could no longer hope to succeed Sommerfeld—the battle was lost on this front. From now on the only thing that mattered was to stem the advance and pernicious spreading influence of false pseudo-scientific theories in the universities.

IN THIS CONNECTION I would like to stress something that is often called into question and yet was an indisputable reality. Nowadays we easily forget how difficult it was in those days to obtain a true, realistic picture of events which took place behind a façade of silence and fear and which were only spotlighted now and then. These fleeting glimpses were so horrific that it was almost impossible to believe them. We knew that we were living under a criminal régime. The problem in those days was that we didn’t as yet have any experience of how terrible such criminality could be, and of how far people would be prepared to go in these criminal acts. We were badly informed, not so much because we weren’t given enough information—that was also the case, of course—but above all we were badly informed because we were incapable of believing the extent of depravity in our own nation. By that I don’t mean that we as Germans felt superior to other nations—such arrogance was associated in our eyes precisely with the fanaticism of National Socialism. But we felt ourselves to be Europeans, and the whole of Europe at that time

was still quite confident of being at the heart of the civilised world, nations which had left unbridled barbarism behind them, and had devoted themselves to the cause of fairness, tolerance, and humanity.

ON 21 JULY 1937, a week after the publication of the article in the *Schwarze Korps*, Heisenberg wrote a letter to Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS and the highest authority responsible for *The Black Corps*, in which he demanded “an effective protection against such attacks”, and insisted that his “honour should be restored.” He addressed a similar letter to Rust, the Minister for Education, his own highest superior. He thereby instigated some sort of disciplinary proceedings against himself, an investigation which would test the truth of the defamatory attacks.

At the time I was very frightened, and to some extent also shocked by this step. While I was studying in Freiburg, I had had various experiences which had brought it home to me that Nazi justice no longer had anything to do with right and wrong and that you were soon and easily lost once you had fallen foul of the machinery. Heisenberg had not discussed this step with me—he didn’t want to burden me with it, and also probably sensed that I wouldn’t have approved of it. Even today, when I know and understand his motives better than I did then, I think the stakes in the game he was engaged in were far too high, although—and this must be clearly recognised—his success proved him right in the end.

To ensure that his letter actually reached the hands of Himmler and did not get stuck somewhere in the lower echelons (as was the usual rule with such letters), Heisenberg adopted a method which was probably just as problematic as it was effective. He asked his mother to take the letter to old Frau Himmler, so that she could pass it on to her son. In order to explain this, I’ll have to run through another bit of family history.

Heisenberg’s grandfather on his mother’s side was Rector Wecklein, headmaster of the Max Gymnasium in Munich, a feared and severe grammar-school educator. Rector Wecklein belonged to a circle of colleagues who met from time to time and went for walks in the Isar valley discussing along the way current scholastic problems. Old Himmler, who was also a grammar-school headmaster, belonged to this circle. So in this way there grew up a loose connection with the Himmler household. The Himmlers had three sons. The first was a clever boy, had a good ear for music, and learned a proper profession, as did the third son. But the middle son was a failure. He had to leave school, wasn’t learning anything; in the end

his parents bought him a chicken farm, but even that didn’t prosper. This middle son became the “*Deutsche Reichsführer SS*.”

My mother-in-law was a faithful Christian and a bitter opponent of the Nazis. But, worried about the fate of her son and concerned for his young growing family, she now rang Frau Himmler and asked if she could come and see her. Frau Himmler still lived in the old modest but comfortable flat with its crucifix in the corner of the living room, before which stood fresh flowers. The old woman listened to everything she had to say; she also accepted the letter for her son, shaking her head rather sadly and solicitously at everything my mother-in-law told her. Then she said; “If my *Heinrichle* (my little Heinrich) knew that, he would certainly put a stop to these libels. I’ll have a talk with him and give him your son’s letter”, she added resolutely. Then just as my mother-in-law was leaving, Frau Himmler turned round again and asked with anxious eyes: “Or do you think, Frau Heisenberg, that perhaps my *Heinrichle* may have gone to the bad, after all?”

IN THESE YEARS Heisenberg received several offers of professorships at universities abroad. One offer came from Australia; that didn’t attract him. He only seriously considered the offer of an appointment at Columbia University, which he received in 1937. He had real friends there, which tempted him. On 31 August 1938 he wrote to Sommerfeld: “As recently as last summer Professor Betz of Columbia University brought me an invitation to go there either for a term or permanently.” He then continued: “In reply to this letter I wrote that I wanted to stay in Germany and that to begin with I only wanted to go over there for a short period. I have set aside the period from February to May for this visit, but even this isn’t finally settled yet” From a letter to Nils Bohr it is clear that this decision plunged him into agonising uncertainty. He wrote that he almost wished he was left with no other choice but to emigrate like so many of his friends, that Providence would take the decision in this matter out of his hands. But the opposite was the case: it was made particularly difficult for him by his marriage.

Marriage meant more to Heisenberg than “togetherness”, it meant founding a family—and he still hoped that his children would ultimately be able to grow up in Germany, in the Germany he had loved and in whose secret existence he still believed deep down inside. He still hadn’t given up all hope at this time that something might be changed from within. Not that the course adopted by the Nazi régime could have been changed—it bore the imprint of Hitler too much for that—but the Army held the actual means of power, and a

successful resistance from within the military ranks was ultimately conceivable and offered a last hope. Didn't we know the names of enough officers who were just as shocked by the events in Germany as we were, and whose courage and decency was not in doubt? Where were they? How often we used to speak about such a possibility—a military *putsch*, by an army which swept away the Nazi régime and wouldn't let itself be used for a war in the name of Hitler! This hope was still alive at that time. Apart from that, Heisenberg was also much too involved in his fight against "German Physics"—his departure would have meant a disastrous victory for this false doctrine and would have endangered the lives of his students and colleagues in theoretical physics. This probably also largely determined his refusal.

AT THIS TIME the reasons for his refusal to emigrate to America were certainly not yet fully developed, but rather his decision was tinged with emotion. It was very different when Columbia University repeated its offer in 1938-39 and he travelled to New York and Chicago for two months in the middle of May 1939. By then all hope of a change for the better in the political situation of Europe had disappeared. The "Czech crisis" had clearly shown that Hitler was prepared to go to war. On his brief visit to England, Heisenberg had seen that "rearmament was going ahead feverishly day and night", so that there was no longer any doubt that Europe would accept Hitler's challenge in the future. The persecution of the Jews had also reached proportions which deeply shocked us all—the wild and brutal scenes which had taken place on 9 November 1938, the notorious "*Kristallnacht*", absolutely horrified us all. Such acts of terror created a depressing and hopeless

atmosphere. There was no longer any doubt about it: War was inevitable.

Before Heisenberg set out for the USA we decided to go to Badenweiler for two weeks. I was expecting my third child and was urgently in need of a rest. In Badenweiler when the weather was good we could see the beautiful undulations of the Vosges on the other side of the Rhine—a wonderful sight, but one which also saddened my heart. Would a terrible war rage in this lovely countryside once again? Heisenberg sank into a deep depression at the sight. Later he said of it: "At the sight of the Vosges, visions of war and destruction rose to my mind, of the inevitable war towards which we were heading . . ."

He was so deeply absorbed in his problems at the time that he didn't speak to me for days, and I became completely helpless and desperate. I couldn't manage to call him back from this inner darkness; nor did I know the reason for his total reserve. I know it now. He was wrestling with the problem of what he ought to do, what decision he ought to make. Did he owe it to his young family to emigrate, to bring them to safety? He really felt he ought to stay in Germany, but could he justify that to the family which after all he himself had wanted? But if he went away, what would become of his students, his friends, and all those to whom he was close and to whom he also felt some sort of obligation? Would we be able to survive at all here in this inferno? And was there any sense whatsoever in staying? In this conflict he decided against his family, against its safety, against the easier and more pleasant life: that was the reason why he couldn't talk to me. In a sense he decided against me. The fact that I never held this against him or reproached him for it in any way moved him to write surprisingly of me in his book that I was *tapfer*, "brave", which never seemed to me greatly characteristic of myself; and it always puzzled me until I understood what lay behind it.

LETTERS

Freud & The Evidence

IN HIS HASTE to join with the current fashion to devalue the contribution of Sigmund Freud—and of psychoanalytical concepts—to psychiatry in general, Colin Brewer (ENCOUNTER, July) resorts to selective and at times downright misleading assertions and quotations. Although the columns of ENCOUNTER are not the most appropriate forum for a discussion of clinical issues, I shall have to refer to some of these so as to correct the misinformation contained in Dr Brewer's article.

The comparison of psychoanalysis and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is used by Brewer to bolster his claim that psychoanalysis—which is a specific type of psychotherapy—has not been adequately evaluated in controlled trials. This he does by also asserting—falsely—that ECT has not been thus evaluated. Although ECT was admittedly introduced into clinical

use in the mistaken belief that it cured schizophrenia, it is now used almost exclusively in the treatment of severe depression. Numerous controlled studies over the past 20 years have repeatedly shown that ECT is more effective than both anti-depressant medications and placebo.¹ A study reported in 1977 specifically showed that ECT is more effective than simulated ECT and concluded that the seizure is in fact the essential therapeutic agent.²

Dr Brewer also falsely implies that psychotherapists—unlike “behaviourists”—have not been engaged in the assessment of their technique and its effectiveness. In a review published in 1968 Malan³ noted that symptomatic improvement occurs in about 50% of untreated neurotic patients; this has been recognised and acknowledged by other psychotherapists. Several studies of outcome of psychotherapy have been published⁴ while others are in progress.⁵ A review of controlled studies of psychotherapy has estimated a 68% improvement in patients treated.⁶

Finally, Dr Brewer refers to the effects of intestinal bypass surgery on patients with morbid obesity and suggests that psychodynamically-based predictions about these patients are invalid because the patients respond to this treatment approach without further problems. This is not the case. Dr Brewer fails to mention the hypothesis that bypass surgery works by inducing dietary change and establishing a more normal dietary pattern due to unpleasant gastrointestinal symptoms.⁷ After the initial marked weight loss over the first two years, patients tend to regain weight and stabilise at about 30% less than their original weight. When followed up for five to six years, significant numbers of patients have been noted to be unable to follow the post-operative exercises and low-calorie dietary programme and to have regained a large proportion of the initial weight loss.⁸ Other authors have recommended that patients have post-operative psychotherapy to help them adjust to the short-term psychological effects of surgery.⁹

Psychoanalysis is not only a specific treatment technique, but also a theory of the origin of neurotic illness, and a research technique into general personality development. Some of the scientific and philosophical criticisms of psychoanalysis have been recently reviewed by Guntrip,¹⁰ and were in fact anticipated by Freud in his “project” for a scientific psychology. However, your readers deserve better than the selective and misleading comments by Colin Brewer—he has merely illustrated that psychiatry, like politics, is in need of “intellectual hygiene.”

GEORGE MENDELSON

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Dr Brewer Replies

IT IS DR MENDELSON himself who is being selective and misleading in his quotations. He says that “a study reported in 1977 specifically showed that ECT is more effective than simulated ECT.” In fact, there have now been four controlled trials of real-versus-simulated ECT. Two of these suggest that the seizure was important. Two—including the Medical Research Council's careful study—conclude that for many patients the seizure is either unimportant or confers only a marginal advantage. That is why I said that “the evidence is still somewhat

¹ M. Greenblatt et al., “A comparative study of selected antidepressant medications and ECT”, *American Journal of Psychiatry* (1962), Vol. 119, p. 144.

² J. L. Barton, “ECT in depression: the evidence of controlled studies”, *Biological Psychiatry* (1977), Vol. 12, p. 687.

³ T. J. Crow, “The scientific status of electroconvulsive therapy”, *Psychological Medicine* (1979), Vol. 9, p. 401.

⁴ C. P. L. Freeman et al., “Double-blind controlled trial of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and simulated ECT in depressive illness”, *Lancet* (1978), Vol. 1, p. 738.

⁵ D. H. Malan et al., “Study of psychodynamic changes in untreated neurotics”, *British Journal of Psychiatry* (1968), Vol. 114, p. 525.

⁶ L. S. Kubie, “The process of evaluation of therapy in psychiatry”, *Archives of General Psychiatry* (1973), Vol. 28, p. 880.

⁷ D. H. Malan et al., “The assessment of methods of psychological treatment”, *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine* (1965), Vol. 58, p. 522.

⁸ J. D. Frank, “The present status of outcome studies”, *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* (1979), Vol. 47, p. 310.

⁹ J. Mintz et al., “Measuring the outcomes of psychotherapy: findings of the Penn Psychotherapy Project”, *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* (1979), Vol. 47, p. 319.

¹⁰ M. Smith and G. Glass, “Meta-analysis of psychotherapy outcome studies”, *American Psychologist* (1977), Vol. 32, p. 752. Quoted in Mintz, op. cit.

¹¹ W. L. Mersheimer et al., “A critical analysis of 51 patients with jejunoileal bypass”, *Surgery, Gynecology & Obstetrics* (1977), Vol. 145, p. 847.

¹² R. T. White, “Development of surgery for obesity/mechanism of action”, *Medical Journal of Australia* (1976), Vol. 2, p. 698.

¹³ H. W. Scott et al., “Results of jejunoileal bypass in two hundred patients with morbid obesity”, *Surgery, Gynecology & Obstetrics* (1977), Vol. 145, p. 661.

¹⁴ J. M. Campbell et al., “Jejunoileal bypass as a treatment of morbid obesity”, *Archives of Internal Medicine* (1977), Vol. 137, p. 602.

¹⁵ H. Guntrip, “Psychoanalysis and some scientific and philosophical critics (Dr Eliot Slater, Sir Peter Medawar and Sir Karl Popper)”, *British Journal of Medical Psychology* (1978), Vol. 51, p. 207.

conflicting." For Dr Mendelson to suggest otherwise is wrong.

I do not think I implied that psychoanalysts had never regarded the assessment of their effectiveness as important; merely that their efforts have been in general reluctant, belated, and the exception rather than the rule. In contrast, behaviourists have adopted a position of healthy scepticism about their own efforts from the very beginning. Death-bed conversions do rather lack credibility.

I did not suggest that patients who had intestinal bypass surgery for obesity had no *medical* problems afterwards (though I have personally examined several dozen of them, and almost without exception they would prefer to suffer these complications than to go back to their former weight). I merely made the point that serious *psychological* problems, as predicted by psychoanalytic theory, were very unusual. Dr Mendelson tacitly accepts this.

COLIN BREWER

London

Racial Genocide

CONSTANTINE FITZGIBBON says in the April issue (p. 44):

"Racial genocide, at least in modern times, has been the prerogative of the Germanic nations. In only one case (Tasmania) has it been totally successful."

He then claims that a similar policy with regard to Amerindians in the United States failed. This needs to be qualified by the well-documented case of the Beothuks in Newfoundland (the original and only "red" Indians, red on account of the clay with which they used to smear themselves on festive and war-like occasions). Hunting them was for some white men a pastime and sport . . . until all Beothuks were exterminated.

Another qualification is called forth by the limited tribal genocide of Volga Germans and Crimean Tartars by Russian Communists. It failed to exterminate completely, but the numbers involved must have been in excess of those in sparsely populated Tasmania and Newfoundland. Granted that morally there is little difference between few murders and many murders, but it does make some difference to the people subjected to such policies.

KAROL KROTKI

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PROFESSOR KROTKI's interesting letter raises two points. The first is the popular designation of Amerindians as "Red" Indians, to distinguish them from the inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent. This derives from the skin tones of some "Indian" tribes. The cosmetics applied by the unfortunate Beothuks would indicate that perhaps they did not regard their skins as red enough. Or maybe, like the Picts, they had some religious or other reason for painting themselves. In any event, Redskin is surely an accepted, if antiquated, general word for the pre-European inhabitants of North America.

"Genocide" is a loose word, since it is based on the murder of the *genus* which, when applied to humans, used to be translated as "race." From an anthropological point of view the word "race" is highly suspect

nowadays, quite apart from its strongly emotive quality. I use genocide—for lack of a better word—as a noun which means the killing of large numbers of people who, in the eyes of their murderers, appear to possess an inherent identity, which may be linguistic, geographic or, perhaps, religious. The result is the extermination of a society, which may be as small as a tribe, by the physical destruction of its members. Thus while Carthage was utterly destroyed as a society, its members were not physically exterminated. However, genocide should not be regarded as a synonym for mass murder. Mass killing of individuals is different, in purpose, from the obliteration of a social group or culture which believes itself, or is believed by its exterminators, to be a living entity.

From the Marxist point of view, though not I think often from that of its members, the "bourgeoisie" constitutes such a culture. To the Leninists, class war has therefore as its objective a form of genocide, though it is not often described as such. If we accept that what has been happening in the Communist-dominated countries over the past sixty years is, in fact, genocide, then the Germanic peoples lack the dubious distinction of being its only, or even its most successful, practitioners.

CONSTANTINE FITZGIBBON

Dublin

Paul Johnson's Theology

PAUL JOHNSON's desire to find "a moral basis for Capitalism" (October 1979) leads him to produce an interpretation of Christianity in terms of what he calls "the paramourty of the individual."

The essence of Judaeo-Christian teaching, exemplified in that of Christ and St Paul, was, he argues, individualistic and expressed in the notion of a Divine Contract, "an individual bargain between God and Man." There was, he assures us, nothing collective about it. Unfortunately this individualism was temporarily submerged during the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages beneath an image of society "as a body or corpus rather than a collection of individuals." Then Christianity, so conceived, gradually reasserted itself and "the Christian notion of the individual gradually broke through the corporatist carapace of society."

Theologically this will not stand up. Judaeo-Christian theology is not about individuals but about persons, not about collectivities but about community. The fact that Paul Johnson does not see this makes his case poor indeed. He does not come within hailing distance of either Jewish or Christian understanding of Man. As Martin Buber put it,

"Individualism sees man only in relation to himself, but collectivism does not see man at all, it sees only 'society.' With the former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is masked."

Judaeo-Christian theology is concerned with the laos, the holy people of God and His will to bring them into the enjoyment of His Kingdom. The supreme mystery of the Christian faith is the mystical union between Christ and His Church. The Christian knows no more profound or joyful expression of saving truth than that "we are very members incorporate in the mystical Body of Christ." The God in whose image he believes himself to have been made is the Three-Personed God, the Divine Community, "in whom none is afore or after other, but

all are co-equal and co-eternal." It is clear, however, that Paul Johnson has little time for the Christian Church. He mentions it twice in his article with reproof. It would insist on seeing itself as a Body divinely called and appointed, and not as a collection of individuals.

HE IS EQUALLY RETICENT in the region of the Bible, and again the reason is clear. Judaism was the religion of a people, the children of Israel, or more strictly, it was the life of that people since it permitted no division between religion and total living. It came into being with a Divine Contract (to use Paul Johnson's phrase), but it was a contract made not with individuals but with a people solemnly bound to observe a Law of holiness. It was with a people called out of Egypt that the contract was made and with a people called back from Babylon that it was renewed.

The New Testament does not disavow Israel's calling nor the corporate character of salvation—life. It claims rather that the Divine purpose has been fulfilled in the new Israel into which men are called and made very members in virtue of their Baptism. It is significant again that Paul Johnson makes no mention of the sacraments of the Christian Church though he talks endlessly about the Judaeo-Christian system of morals. It was not as a moral system that this faith was preached and lived but as incorporation into the Body of Christ. Paul's thinking is not Greek but Jewish. He was convinced that "all Israel shall be saved" and equally convinced that Gentiles were saved by incorporation into the true stock of that vine which the God of Israel had planted. Such a view did not lose sight of the many crises in Israel's history when the hope and faith of the Covenanted People were narrowed down to the witness of a remnant, an Elijah or a Jeremiah. But such men were not "individuals" but true members of a body whose restoration to health was God's saving purpose.

New Testament Christianity is, therefore, a life of membership of the Body of Christ. The phrase "in Christ" points at all times to a holy community. The backslider, like Demas, is one who forsakes this life. The true Israelite is never an individual but a son or daughter, a brother or sister. The relationship is the channel of life itself. The Christian Church developed the concept not of the individual but of the Person, and persons (as John Macmurray tirelessly insisted) are persons in relation with each other.

IT IS OF COURSE POSSIBLE to speak of the emergence of an individualism in the Middle Ages as Colin Morris does in his book *The Discovery of the Individual, 1050–1200*, and to see in that movement of thought the beginnings of an objective study of the natural order and the secular State. But the individualism with which Paul Johnson is concerned makes headway only so far as the sense of mystical union with Christ and membership of His Body is fragmented and lost to sight. That the Christian Churches retained the language of this incorporation while losing much of the reality of the relationships it affirmed is undeniably true. Their weakness in Christian witness in the modern world springs from that fact.

In our own day the Jewish affirmation of the nature of Man's Life has nowhere been better expressed than by Martin Buber. In his book *Between Man and Man* he wrote:

"The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction. It was in the relationship between men that human life was to be found. It takes place between them in the most precise sense, as it were in a dimension which is accessible only to them both."

That living relationship of persons was John Macmurray's life-work as a Christian philosopher. It was given its fullest expression in his Gifford Lectures: *The Self as Agent* (1953) and *Persons in Relation* (1954). In that work Macmurray argued that "religion must be concerned with the original and basic formal problem of human existence" and that this was the problem of the relation of persons. Not unnaturally it drew its picture of community from the family. The Judaeo-Christian conception of religion has never ceased to refer to this norm of all community. "Religion is about the community of persons." The symbols of religion are designed to express and to nourish the will to community. The prayer life of the Christian faith is never individualistic, for it is modelled upon that which addressed itself to Our Father and expressed itself in the yearning "that they all may be one, even as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee." Paul Johnson clearly dislikes any such notion of incorporation. The prayers, the sacraments, the theology, of the Christian Church do however affirm it as the ground of our hope. In ourselves we are nothing, in Christ alone are we alive unto God.

There may be a moral basis for Capitalism but it is not to be found in Judaeo-Christian religion.

ALAN ECCLESTONE

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Whither "Europe"?

I AM SURPRISED there has been virtually no public discussion of the crisis in the Common Market. Looking back to our entry in the early 1970s so little really deep thought seems to have been given to the implications of our membership—in the same way that so little thought was given by the Labour Government of 1945 to the implications of nationalisation.

We as a nation seem to stumble into great events almost as if we were sleep-walking.

Everyone knows about our ever-increasing subscription to the Market, which few realised less than ten years ago; everyone understands that the Common Agricultural Policy is an economic absurdity which must be reformed; there is general dissatisfaction with the mass of detailed legislation which pours out from the desks of the Brussels bureaucrats and many are concerned about the effect of the Market's fishery policy.

Very many of us hoped for better things than this once we joined. We kept intact our loyalty to the United Kingdom, and most of us living in the United Kingdom to England (it is far too early days to have a *European* patriotism) but we had in the back of our minds the idea of Christendom, the West and all it stands for, the impossibility of war between France and Germany, and we hoped EEC would underpin NATO. We were told (and believed) that it was the Market's *political* will, even more than the economic, which would count in world affairs.

Now we have had the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the EEC's views have been pitifully weak and

divided. Only the United Kingdom has backed the United States.

France still apparently has an anti-American chip on her shoulder, Germany is still bemused by *détente* and anyway follows France, and the other countries of EEC are nowhere. Where is the EEC foreign policy?

There are other disquieting signs. The original club is to have new members—Portugal, Greece and Turkey. Turkey is semi-oriental, Greece and Portugal still very different from the present nine countries in the EEC. Surely members of a club must have some real common interest—I happen to love Portugal, Greece and Turkey but it is idle to pretend that they have much in common with the Nine.

Finally we have the European Assembly. No one has yet thought out a role for this embarrassed phantom. Will it in due course take over power from national parliaments and the Council of Ministers? No one knows—and if it did, what chaos would result!

I still want the United Kingdom to remain in the EEC but I wish someone would tell me where the EEC is going.

JOHN STOKES M.P. (Cons.)

House of Commons

Translations

I WISH to correct a small, understandable misapprehension concerning my father. In your March issue (p. 92). Professor Leonard Schapiro says of Max Hayward that "in 1976 he collaborated with Kyril FitzLyon on the translation (a very difficult undertaking) of *A Voice from the Chorus* . . ." My father insisted, with his customary and rather strict modesty, that Hayward's name be included as translator, whereas he now admits (only when pressed, and he won't approve of this letter, if he sees it) that the formula "with advice from" would have been more accurate.

The (much praised) translation was indeed a difficult undertaking, and Hayward passed it on to my father. However, Hayward made minor emendations to the finished translation; some of these my father recognised as improvements and so he felt obliged to insist on the inclusion of Hayward's name as co-translator, while the rest he considered to be incorrect and in all examples of this latter type Hayward was kind enough to concur with my father's judgment.

JULIAN FITZLYON

London

AUTHORS

William Trevor's most recent novel, *Other People's Worlds*, was published earlier this year by Bodley Head.

John Fuller has recently published a verse novel, *The Illusionists* (Secker & Warburg), which is a Poetry Book Society Recommendation.

Ferdinand Mount is a political commentator (writing weekly for *The Spectator*) and novelist (his most recent work of fiction, *The Clique*, was published in 1978 by Chatto & Windus). Among his articles in *ENCOUNTER* are "The Unloved Ones" (February 1979) and "Revolutionaries" (December 1977).

Esmond Wright is Director of the Institute of United States Studies and Professor of American History at London University. Among his publications are *Fabric of Freedom 1763-1800* (2nd ed. 1979, Macmillan).

David Marquand is Professor of Contemporary History and Politics at the University of Salford. He was a Labour Member of Parliament for Ashfield from 1966-1977, when he joined the staff of Roy Jenkins, the newly appointed President of the European Commission in Brussels. His biography of Ramsay MacDonald appeared in 1977; his latest book is *Parliament for Europe* (Jonathan Cape, 1979). His article on the causes of the Labour Party defeat in the 1979 election, "Inquest on a Movement", appeared in *ENCOUNTER*, July 1979.

Anthony Hartley, for several years the editor of *Interplay* in New York, is Deputy Head of the Commission of the European Communities in London.

Elisabeth Heisenberg's recollections are about to be published by Piper Verlag, Munich.

ENCOUNTER acknowledges financial assistance from, among other generous donors, the Arts Council of Great Britain.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY WATMOUGHS LIMITED,
IDLE, BRADFORD; AND LONDON

From the Editors:

THE response to the "personal note" which we addressed to our readers in the October *ENCOUNTER* has been more than heart-warming; but more than that, it has been in the view of our Business Manager the beginning of a possible change in our fortunes. Subscriptions, renewals, gifts, as well as encouragement and even shrewd suggestions and advice, have all been pouring in. If all those among our loyal readership who have not yet responded were to do so by return mail, we might well be "out of the trenches" by Christmas. Please write today!

M.J.L., A.T.

Life & Letters Today

Brussels

RAPID RABBIT: A British member of the European Parliament, reaching recently for a metaphor to describe the perils of facing EEC governments, likened them to "the crew of a canoe shooting the rapids." Some minutes later his French colleagues were still trying to puzzle out why anyone should want to go "shooting rabbits" on a river. Another example, presumably, of the inscrutable British sense of humour.

THE TIMES

London

TEDDY BEARS: *The teddy bears had a real picnic at the Commons yesterday.*

A loudspeaker played the picnic song, and MPs clutched their favourite teddies.

It was all in a good cause. Tory MP Mr David Gilroy Bevan, who runs a branch of the charity, Good Bears of the World, was launching a fund-raising branch at Westminster.

The purpose of the charity is to provide teddies for children in hospital who have no toys of their own.

DAILY MAIL

[Ed. Note: Readers may like to be assured that the story by William Trevor in this month's issue was written *before* the above social occasion was announced. Fiction sometimes precedes fact. . . .]

Nashville, Tennessee

OUT THERE: Louis L'Amour's *Western* and frontier novels are more popular than girlie magazines or roadmaps among America's truck drivers. It is thought by his publisher, Bantam Books, that the drivers are the biggest buyers of his books and the racks at truck stops across the United States are crammed with his titles. But his appeal is not limited to the modern-day, high plains drifters riding 18-wheelers.

Of 76 books, almost all in soft-cover, 65 have sold more than a million copies. In 1979, Bantam shipped out 7.8 million copies of his books.

He predicted that within five years each new book that he wrote—and he writes three a year—would begin with printings of five million. "There are at least 25 million people out there that I've never touched at all and I want them", he said. "I want every damned one of them."

L'Amour said he wrote tales of "strong men in a rough, hard world."

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

London

NEO-PIDGIN: Papua New Guinea can fairly be described as a tropical paradise inhabited by unsophisticated blameless villagers who haven't

eaten anyone. In a country already possessed of 700 different languages for example (not to mention Australian and Pidgin), they must now wrestle with a new one. Under the influence of the large British Army contingent everyone referred to reports as "Sitreps," Young Explorers became "Y Es" (or, less flatteringly, "Ducklings"), and expedition leaders "D S" ("Directing Staff"). In self-defence, I and a colleague from the Press Association hurriedly transformed ourselves into PMWPOs (Printed Media Word Processing Officers).

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

London

POST-PRISON PATTERN: *There was a time when men of spectacularly evil character would try to fool the authorities by saying that they had repented of their sins and were following the way of the Lord. And precious little good it usually did them! By contrast, a most eloquent document has appeared in The Times and The Guardian, evidently from Charles Richardson, who recently strolled out of a more than usually open "open" prison.*

It is a beautiful and touching affair strong on "value systems", "sub-cultures." Under the influence of his O- and A-level tutors and new "concepts and perspectives", Richardson has come, he says, "to seriously question the value of my parochial mores." His prolonged term in prison makes him doubt if he will be "capable of satisfactorily fulfilling . . . familial and employment roles." He was not always so coy nor so indirect in his arguments. It is worth recalling little details like the pliers used on the teeth of one man, the cigar burns, the electric fire, the lump of metal on the head, and the private electric generator used by Richardson or his infantry in those four-to-one encounter situations in which frank and meaningful dialogue occurred.

Although never convicted of murder Charles Richardson is one of the most cruel, sadistic and vicious men to have gone through the courts. Anyone who supposes that a torturer with an A-level in sociology and a starred first in pater should cease to be punished for his tortures is a great fool.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

Pretoria

CHOICE WORDS: As the violence subsided in Cape Town and other troubled areas, the Minister of Police announced that the official toll during the present unrest was 29 dead and 141 injured up to late last night.

The Minister also explained that the "shoot to kill" statement issued on behalf of the Commissioner of Police yesterday, which produced headlines throughout the world, was a mistake. "It was an unfortunate choice of words and was immediately withdrawn when it came to the notice of the Commissioner of Police", he said.

THE TIMES

What's new from the past?

Two outstanding books
that reveal new aspects of history.

THE REVOLUTION REMEMBERED

*Eyewitness Accounts of the War
for Independence*

Edited by John C. Dann

A magnificent piece of oral history. Seventy-nine accounts (culled from some 80,000 pension applications in the National Archives) of how the Revolution appeared to the ordinary men and women who took part in it. "An extraordinary evocation of what it meant to be alive in those adrenal days.... You can hear their voices."—Robert Kirsch, *Los Angeles Times*. "In a book fairly bursting with feats of daring, perhaps the most spectacular accomplishment of them all is this volume's transformation of its readers into the grandchildren of Revolutionary War soldiers. It sets us upon the knees of feisty old men and at least two spunky women and regales us with their stories.... They afford us a perspective of the war from the bloody ground up."—Elaine F. Weiss, *Christian Science Monitor*

Profusely illustrated with period drawings and woodcuts.

CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY

*Gay People in Western Europe
from the Beginning of the
Christian Era to the Fourteenth
Century*

John Boswell

One of the most intensive treatments of any single aspect of medieval history, this groundbreaking book shows that Catholic Europe was not unremittently hostile to homosexuality; that there were centuries when the church accepted it and even canonized gay people. "John Boswell restores one's faith in scholarship as the union of erudition, analysis and moral vision. I would not hesitate to call his book revolutionary.... By my count the author is the master of 12 languages...and his book displays the sweep and control that one finds only in the work of a major historian.... He has also mastered one of the rarest of skills; the ability to write about sex with genuine wit. Improbable as it might seem, this work of unrelenting scholarship and high intellectual drama is also thoroughly entertaining."—Paul Robinson, *New York Times Book Review*

Illustrated.



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